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ABSTRACT 
Revolutionary Talk: Communicating Climate Justice 
By Theo LeQuesne 
 
This thesis examines the role that story-based strategy and narrative oriented 
communications play in the Climate Justice Movement’s counterhegemonic 
struggle against neoliberal discursive hegemony. As more and more people come 
to accept the reality of the climate crisis a new struggle is emerging, a discursive 
struggle over what the crisis actually means. This project identifies an ideological 
polarization in which climate justice represents a socially transformative bottom 
up approach to climate change, while hegemonic neoliberal elites advocate for 
market solutions, technofixes and minimal social change. My project therefore 
places emphasis upon the role that ideology, norms and values play in shaping 
attitudes towards climate change solutions and societal transformation. I use 
Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of discourse and hegemony to provide a framework 
for studying the rhetoric and implications of climate change discourse. I examine 
two case studies in the United States: The Our Power Campaign in Richmond, 
California and the Fossil Free UC fossil fuel divestment campaign as sites of clear 
hegemonic struggle over how climate change is understood. Together these sites 
provide a valuable cross-section of climate justice organizations in the US. I 
discuss the implications of their communications strategies, and in particular what 
Reinsborough and Canning call story-based strategy. I pay close attention to how 
reframing narratives help restructure public discourse, as well as the successes and 
limitations of these discursive interventions. I have found that the strategies 
iv		
discussed in these case studies are beginning to shift discursive conditions around 
solutions to climate change and can be refined, reworked and applied to many 
other climate justice campaigns. 
 
Key terms: Climate Justice, Hegemony, Discourse, Laclau and Mouffe, Climate 
Change Communication, Counterhegemony, Climate Change, Story-based 
Strategy, Reframing Narrative, Fossil Free, Our Power Campaign, California, 
Global Studies 
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Introduction 
 
Twenty-one years too late, the Paris climate talks in 2015 finally agreed that 
climate change is happening and that it is anthropogenic – the age of climate 
change denial is drawing to a close (if only insofar as acknowledgement of its 
existence goes). Despite governments’ best efforts to suggest otherwise, however, 
the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP 21) achieved little more of substance. Put 
simply, COP 21 failed to produce a treaty that will mitigate the climate crisis. 
Current estimates suggest that the pledges made in Paris set global warming on 
track for a rise of at least three degrees Celsius. Meanwhile the climate science 
reveals that any increase above one and a half degrees is dangerous and above two 
degrees is disastrous. Delegates in Paris pledged to review their commitments in 
five years’ time. Moreover, any language on historic responsibility, human rights, 
intergenerational equity and gender empowerment – all key principles of climate 
justice – was removed from the body of the treaty and relegated to its preamble. 
Nevertheless the very fact that every country in the world collectively agreed to 
address the climate crisis is remarkable and a historic milestone. What comes after 
Paris, however, is far more interesting.  
 
An ideological, material and discursive struggle over the terms on which the 
climate crisis must be addressed has been escalating for at least a decade. In fact, 
we have already witnessed several overt skirmishes but COP 21 has forced this 
struggle into the open. The next decade will see outright climate denial in decline 
and in its place the rise of fierce confrontation over what climate change means 
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and the response with which it must be met. COP21 does not signal the end of the 
climate debate, nor even the beginning of the end, but perhaps it is the end of the 
beginning. It is here, at the end of the beginning, that my thesis makes its 
intervention. 
 
The terms of the ensuing struggle are profoundly ideological and highly polarized. 
On the one hand are the enlightened neoliberals and ecomodernists, aligned with 
what Hardt and Negri might term the forces of Empire, or as I understand it, 
militarized economic globalization. On the other is the network of social 
movements and activists comprising the Climate Justice Movement (perhaps an 
example of Hardt and Negri’s Multitude). The solutions each side presents to the 
crisis are radically different. While it is important to regard the dualism I have set 
up with some skepticism and recognize that climate politics are far messier and 
more complicated than this binary, I have generally found it an accurate and 
useful heuristic for the purposes of my thesis.  Neoliberal elites recognize climate 
change as a challenge for the market to resolve and an opportunity for both green 
economic growth and also increased spending on military and security. The 
approach widely favored by elites everywhere is to allow market mechanisms to 
cut emissions and to commodify the ecosystems upon which we depend, as well 
as to rely upon “bridge fuels” derived from fracking and fantasy technology to 
sequester carbon and store it under ground. Some of the more radical climate 
conservatives are seriously considering geo-engineering the climate to ensure 
business as usual continues (Ecomodernist Manifesto, 2015; Giddens, 2011). 
Should these mechanisms fail and inevitable conflict and instability ensue, these 
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elites will intensify military and security infrastructure to combat the fallout 
(Mirowski, Walker, and Abboud, 2013). Central to the neoliberal solutions is the 
belief that carbon emissions are ultimately the responsibility of each individual 
consumer and it is up to the individual to buy new sustainable products and to 
make small changes in lifestyle choices, thereby reducing individual emissions. In 
essence climate change is not considered a threat to the established order but 
rather as an opportunity to expand and consolidate it. 
 
The Climate Justice Movement, meanwhile, interprets climate change as a moral 
crisis that is deeply rooted in the Global North’s colonial legacy, neoliberal 
capitalism and contemporary structures of power. Arguing that these must be 
overturned to address the climate crisis many rally behind the slogan “system 
change not climate change.” Constituents of the Climate Justice Movement 
envision solutions to the climate crisis that are radically democratic, context 
specific, and intersectional (Bullard and Müller, 2012). A few examples of this are 
energy democracy, decentralized cooperative economics, opposition to free trade 
deals, recognition of climate debt and historical responsibility, and massive 
government investment in renewable energy and energy efficiency (Bond, 2012; 
Klein, 2014). The term many activists use to encompass this response is a “just 
transition.” Climate justice is a counterhegemonic project antithetical to neoliberal 
ideology and the security politics it depends upon. 
 
Solutions to the climate crisis are proposed on the terrain of hegemony and 
counterhegemony. More specifically the struggle can be understood discursively, 
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as both sides seek to articulate a set of solutions and vision of the future that is 
legitimized through public discourse. Hegemonic and counterhegemonic projects 
alike must constantly structure discursive conditions to legitimize their actions 
and their ideologies (Laclau and Mouffe, 2014). Using narratives and frames to 
affect value systems and successfully engage with diverse audiences is crucial. 
Therefore, when coupled with a careful analysis of power, communication 
strategy is an essential component to any hegemonic or counterhegemonic 
project1. This thesis integrates the findings of climate communications scholars 
with discourse theory and the empirical evidence counterhegemonic 
communications strategists have brought back from the field. In this way the 
project tests a theory of change against empirical evidence. It asks how climate 
justice activists across the globe can structure discursive conditions such that 
climate justice solutions to climate change are recognized as urgent and legitimate 
amongst audiences stretching far beyond the Climate Justice Movement itself. In 
other words, how can the Climate Justice Movement successfully challenge 
hegemonic climate discourse while engaging with, and appealing to, a larger and 
more diverse array of audiences? 
 
In many cases climate justice activists have so far “failed to establish an anti-
capitalist climate justice discourse that [is] understandable beyond the subculture 
of activists and policy wonks” (Bullard and Muller quoted in Tokar, 2014, 82). 
This thesis discusses possible avenues for climate justice discursive interventions 																																																								
1 I do not wish to overemphasize the discursive side of power. While discursive and cultural 
hegemony is by no means the only way in which power manifests itself, this thesis concerns its 
self primarily with an analysis of this manifestation of power. 
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that reach far beyond subcultures of activists and policy wonks. In fighting 
climate change denial, theorists of climate communications have come to 
recognize that “the facts” are rarely persuasive tools on their own. To gain 
legitimacy facts must be framed and assembled into narratives that fit with an 
audience’s preexisting (or evolving) system of values (Marshall, 2014). Many 
climate communicators have used this understanding to engage with traditionally 
conservative audiences whose value systems very often screen out the facts of 
climate change. They have used frames and narratives, however, that present 
climate change as a non-threatening business opportunity, or a very threatening 
excuse for increased securitization and militarization. In this way neoliberal and 
conservative approaches to climate change have been reinforced. While both 
effective and undeniably useful, missing from the work of many climate 
communication scholars has been an adequately sophisticated understanding of 
power and discursive hegemony. My thesis brings the climate communication 
literature into contact with the literature on social movements and discourse 
theory to address these gaps. I then apply these to improving the understanding of 
climate justice communications. 
 
While certainly responding to the climate change communication literature, this 
thesis makes its intervention in the broader field of global climate politics. It 
weaves Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of hegemony and articulation into a set of 
ideas applicable to climate justice counterhegemonic strategy. This thesis argues 
that the Climate Justice Movement must recognize itself as being in the midst of a 
discursive struggle over the meaning of climate change and that it can then draw 
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upon the power of framing and narrative to articulate a compelling challenge to 
hegemonic neoliberal climate discourses and restructure popular discursive 
conditions.  Paying particular attention to local context and specificity this 
argument is tested through two case studies. These case studies suggest some of 
the fundamental values to which movement communicators must appeal and how 
movement activists have sought to appeal to them. My thesis provides readers 
with a few generalizable propositions that could be integrated into a global 
climate justice strategy, while remaining sensitive to the contextual specificity of 
different place-based struggles.  
 
The first case study examines the Fossil Free campaign at the University of 
California, Fossil Free UC. It is part of the global fossil fuel divestment campaign 
and provides an important instance of young people’s vital contribution to climate 
justice activism. The campaign offers a very clear example of the role framing and 
messaging can play in shaping public discourse. While many instances of climate 
justice activism are examples of defending communities from fossil fuel 
infrastructure, the Fossil Free campaign takes the fight to those it deems directly 
responsible for the climate crisis, the fossil fuel industry. It seeks to change the 
story of climate change by delegitimizing the fossil fuel industry and the 
perpetuators of climate inaction in the eyes of the public. The campaign targets 
the investment portfolios of universities, foundations, and religious, city councils 
and other public or cultural institutions. It calls upon them to publicly distance 
themselves from the practices of the fossil fuel industry by divesting from the 200 
fossil fuel companies with the most carbon in their reserves. The Fossil Free UC 
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campaign is made up of a coalition of Fossil Free groups on the different UC 
campuses. Rather than targeting the investment portfolios of individual campuses, 
Fossil Free UC makes its demands directly to the UC regents and therefore fights 
for a much larger prize. This case study shows how social movements can go on 
the offensive to shape and change public discourse. 
 
The second case study applies my theory of change to climate justice activism in 
Richmond, California. For almost 100 years Richmond has been home to a 
Chevron oil refinery. During that time Chevron has become one of the largest oil 
companies in the world and has come to dominate local political discourses and 
decision-making in Richmond. In this chapter I claim that while a non-state actor, 
Chevron’s influence is such that the company has for a long time acted as a 
hegemon in the city – that is to say the company’s relationship with Richmond has 
been a hegemonic one. Recently, however, its hegemonic grip over Richmond’s 
politics has waned as the Richmond Progressive Alliance has taken control of the 
city council. Climate justice campaigns have successfully inserted 
counterhegemonic discourses into public consciousness. Richmond is an 
important site because it demonstrates how even where a hegemon’s power should 
arguably be strongest it can be challenged. This case study assesses the nature of 
that challenge and shows that narratives and framing again played an important 
role. 
 
The Climate Justice Movement is a network of individuals and campaigns 
bringing together a large array of backgrounds and privileges, but as a global 
	 8	
phenomenon it is led by the exploited, the underrepresented and the oppressed. 
Juxtaposing my two case studies offers a more accurate cross section of the 
movement and offers useful opportunities for comparison and contrast.  
Moreover, the inclusion of two case studies is an attempt to recognize that 
different communities experience climate change and fossil fuel extraction in very 
different ways. Where the Fossil Free campaign is comprised mostly of 
reasonably privileged and predominantly white college students, the climate 
justice campaigns in Richmond are, to a large extent, comprised of low-income 
people of color. Students fighting for divestment tend to have a very different 
stake than those fighting on the frontlines; communication strategies will therefore 
be different. Like the climate justice campaigns organizing there, Richmond is 
largely composed of low-income communities of color often with quite a different 
set of oppressions, frames, and sometimes values to those of the divestment 
campaign and its respective audiences.   
 
My research has found that what Reinsborough and Canning call “story-based 
strategy” is an excellent descriptor for the kind of successful communication 
demonstrated in these two case studies (Reinsborough and Canning, 2010). It has 
also found that climate justice in Richmond and fossil fuel divestment at the UC 
have both used story-based strategy with great success. We all rely upon stories to 
make sense of the world around us; they are incredibly powerful tools for 
maintaining the established order and for undermining that order (Selbin, 2010). 
These case studies present campaigns undermining dominant stories about climate 
change and replace them with compelling alternative stories. These turn climate 
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change into a moral crisis with clear antagonists and protagonists, and offer 
solutions that demand systemic change.  The stories they tell balance loss with 
hope, polarize audiences forcing them to chose a side, and prefigure a better world 
that can be fought for and won. They are unashamedly utopian yet grounded in the 
enormity of the challenges we all face, while being inclusive, credible and 
relatable; in the end they are both deeply personal and also universal. Social 
movement theorists and communications scholars alike have documented the 
persuasive power of stories. The two case studies are excellent examples of 
powerful counterhegemonic stories and how they can best be deployed. 
Ultimately, the stories and framing narratives evinced in the two case studies 
support my argument because they help to shape the discursive conditions within 
which climate change is understood.  
 
The findings presented in this thesis are important but by no means complete. 
Moreover, they are not entirely original. Activists on the ground, and the 
strategists supporting them, have taught me a great deal and they already know 
much of what my research has uncovered. My work has been to synthesize, 
analyze and articulate them in the context of discursive power and climate justice, 
both for an academic audience and for movement strategists. The purpose of this 
research is therefore twofold: it responds to gaps in the literature, filling 
theoretical holes with empirical evidence, while at the same time providing 
movement strategists with an image (though certainly imperfect) of the work they 
have done so far and the kind of work they must continue to do. I hope it helps to 
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contribute to the burgeoning field of inquiry pertaining to the theory and practice 
of climate justice strategy. 
 
The theory of change my research seeks to vindicate is embedded in several 
overlapping sets of literature and their corresponding disciplines or fields. 
Specifically, the theory developed and extended in this paper is derived from 
Communications, Critical Discourse Theory, Social Movement Studies, and 
Environmental Sociology. From Communications, I draw upon theories of 
persuasion, and particularly the literature on climate communication through 
framing and narrative. Key thinkers in this area are George Marshall, George 
Lakoff, the Climate Outreach think tank, and Weintrobe et al. From Discourse 
Theory I draw on Gramsci, Laclau and Mouffe, and Kevin DeLuca on ideology 
and postmodern politics. These thinkers have helped me add a much need analysis 
of power into climate communications and strategy. They also allow my research 
to address counterhegemony in a meaningful way. From Social Movement Studies 
I use Haiven and Khasnabish, Eric Selbin and John Foran to explore the 
development of counterhegemonic cultures of resistance and regeneration. Finally 
from Environmental Sociology, and the nascent sociology of climate change, I 
draw upon Patrick Bond, Michael Dorsey, Naomi Klein, Brian Tokar, and John 
Urry. These authors have been vital to articulating climate justice into a coherent 
set of principles and discourse, as well as exploring the relationships amongst 
climate, politics and society. Finally, Reinsborough and Canning’s field handbook 
for activists, Re:Imagining Change, successfully bridges much of this work and 
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has been essential to embedding counterhegmonic theory in practical climate 
justice activism. 
 
The theory of change derived from these thinkers starts with a discussion of who 
the Climate Justice Movement is, what it strives for, and then works backwards to 
understand how it can get from here to there.  The global Climate Justice 
Movement (CJM) is really a network of local, regional or national movements and 
campaigns. Despite the inevitable differences in political analysis, tactics, and 
theories of change, the movement coheres around a vision of a more democratic, 
equitable and sustainable society that challenges the neoliberal order. Climate 
justice is comprised of a highly diverse, uneven and yet potentially united front of 
those who resist and reject the logics of neoliberalism. This front presents 
solutions to the climate crisis that necessitate abandoning the neoliberal social and 
economic model, and the security apparatus upon which it depends.  
 
The neoliberal order is hegemonic. I understand hegemony in the neo-Gramscian 
sense and adopt Raymond Williams’s articulation of hegemony as the extension 
of politics into daily life, into culture and into what constitutes “common sense” 
(Williams, 1977, 108-114).  Asef Bayat calls this the “politics of culture” (Bayat, 
2010, 51). The CJM must engage in and win a counterhegmonic struggle against 
the hegemonic discourse of neoliberalism and its climate solutions. It must 
redefine what constitutes common sense. As Laclau and Mouffe have argued, 
counterhegemony is not only a material struggle but also an ideological and 
discursive one. Therefore the CJM must win the discursive struggle and reshape 
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the terms upon which climate change is understood and approached.  The CJM 
must build what Foran calls vibrant and effective “political cultures of opposition 
and creativity” and globalize them into what Paul Routledge has termed 
“Translocal Climate Justice Solidarities” (Foran, 2014; Routledge, 2011). These 
political cultures would need to undermine the legitimacy of the established order 
and instead bequeath legitimacy upon, and draw people into, climate justice 
solutions. Thus political cultures of opposition and creativity are, at least in part, 
engendered through Reinsborough and Canning’s “story-based strategy.” 
Compelling stories that redefine the terms of the climate crisis help to bring 
audiences into these new political cultures. Deploying the most compelling and 
affect-oriented stories depends upon strong communications strategies which help 
to displace dominant narratives and appeal to the values of diverse audiences. 
Understanding how to construct and use these requires that agents of social 
change recognize the power of persuasive communications. In this way several 
fields of inquiry must be synthesized to serve my research project. 
 
Heavily influenced by all of the aforementioned thinkers I have developed a 
theory of change rooted in a Global Studies perspective.  As a Global Studies 
scholar, I am well positioned to bring these fields of inquiry together and examine 
what they bring to bear on one another and on climate justice strategy through a 
global lens. For example, both of my case studies, while located in California, 
have global and transnational dimensions and scope. If my project is to have 
significance in Global Studies, its case studies should reflect the complex 
dynamics of hegemony and resistance as they shift between global and local 
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contexts – and indeed as the local appears the in the global and vice versa. 
Moreover, this is a Global Studies project not only because it deals with the global 
threat of climate change and the global response of the CJM, but also because its 
epistemology is fundamentally informed by Global Studies scholarship and 
intersects with some of Global Studies’ essential characteristics. Borrowing from 
Foran’s political cultures of opportunity and creativity with regard to global 
climate change, requires theorizing the possibility of global citizenship, solidarity 
and ethics. For this I have drawn on Giles Gunn’s work and what he calls “The 
Cosmopolitan Challenge” (Gunn, 2013). Gunn asks, “How are we to learn to think 
and feel not simply about others, or even for them, but with others in the face of 
global architectures that have become ossified, callous, or obsolete” (Gunn, 2013, 
13)? His guiding question provides the skeleton for my own. In its most essential 
form, my project is about getting people to take responsibility for the 
consequences of their socio-economic system (consequences that are very often 
perceived to occur far away in time and space), and to act based on a sense of 
obligation to the people these consequences affect the most.  A concern with 
global citizenship is an explicit or implicit strand of almost all Global Studies 
research and is integral to my own project. Through my enquiry into the ways in 
which climate justice activists can appeal to values and norms that transcend 
ideological boundaries, my research question is very much engaged in debates 
surrounding the potential for global ethics, citizenship and Gunn’s cosmopolitan 
challenge.  
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I will close this introduction with a few words about my method and approach to 
the research question. Much of the theory developed in this thesis depends upon a 
close reading of literature from the many fields described above.  Rather than 
compartmentalizing each discipline, approach or perspective, and simply taking 
from each what I require, I am trying to synthesize theories, arguments and tools 
from all these into a new framework of analysis, specifically designed to explore 
my research question as completely as possible. I test my theory with empirical 
evidence drawn from two ethnographic case studies. This data has been gathered 
from newspaper articles, reports from cutting edge think tanks, activist blogs and 
testimonies, in-depth interviews with movement organizers, and also the relevant 
research papers within traditional academia. In these case studies I have followed 
a method that scholar-activists before me have pioneered and continue to develop 
called Participatory Action Research. As an active member of the Fossil Free UC 
campaign I have been able to carry out Participatory Action Research, gaining a 
fascinating insider’s perspective on the work Fossil Free does. I consider myself a 
scholar-activist and believe my work lives up to that label.  
 
My thesis is developed in four chapters. I first embed my work within the relevant 
literature, responding to it as well as building a theory of change out of it. In the 
following to case studies I test this theory with empirical research on Fossil Free 
and climate justice activism in Richmond, respectively. In my final chapter I 
discuss the implications of these two case studies for the theory I have sought to 
develop, and examine its potential for generalizing my findings. I conclude the 
thesis by arguing that climate justice activists can and must enter into this 
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discursive struggle to win legitimacy and I describe some of the tools that can 
help them prepare for this epic existential struggle. 
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I. Communication, Discourse and Counterhegemony: A Literature Review 
 
As the potency of climate change denial has gradually begun to wane, the struggle 
over what climate change will mean is taking its place.  An ideological, material 
and discursive struggle over the terms on which the climate crisis must be 
addressed has been escalating for at least a decade and by the end of the Paris 
climate talks in December 2015, that struggle was forced into the open (Fenton, 
2016). The conflict can be characterized by a clash between, on the one hand 
neoliberal climate discourses and solutions, and on the other, the discourses and 
solutions of the Climate Justice Movement.  Ecomodernism is the most genuine 
attempt to address climate change within the framework of economic growth and 
neoliberal capitalism. I therefore (perhaps too generously) describe the neoliberal 
climate discourses and solutions as Ecomodernist (Ecomodernist Manifesto, 
2015). Their discourses and solutions are hegemonic insofar as they dominate 
media public discussion and the interpretation of climate change that passes for 
“common sense.” This is particularly true within the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and their annual Conference of the 
Parties (COP) of which the 2015 Paris accord was a part. The Climate Justice 
Movement (CJM), meanwhile, rallies around the slogan “system change not 
climate change,” claiming that climate change is a product of neoliberal ideology, 
the legacy of colonialism and the highly militarized state that protects both. The 
CJM is a counterhegemonic project challenging the logic defining what 
constitutes common sense in neoliberal society and seeks to replace this with its 
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own logic, or perhaps, sets of logics. To win this struggle it is clear that, among 
other things, the Climate Justice Movement must make a discursive intervention 
in hegemonic climate change discourse. This requires the development of 
communication strategies capable of bringing together the largest and most 
diverse social movement the world has ever seen. 
 
This chapter explains and develops a theory of counterhegemonic 
communications strategy that case studies in my following chapters will test 
empirically. This review of the literature demonstrates that narrative 
communication is a vital component of counterhegemonic movement strategy and 
that campaigns within the CJM must deploy compelling and engaging narratives 
to challenge hegemonic climate discourses. I claim that such narratives help to 
establish what John Foran calls “political cultures of opposition and creativity,” 
which he argues are essential to radical social change (Foran, 2014). Narrative is 
by no means the only component of counterhegemonic strategy, and the extent of 
its efficacy depends upon the context in which it is deployed. Moreover, there is 
no guarantee that better told stories will reach larger and more diverse audiences 
or even necessarily lead to system change. However, narratives are an essential 
intervention in what Asef Bayat calls “the politics of culture”(Bayat, 2013, 51). 
The politics of culture, and by extension cultural hegemony, cannot be truly 
understood without recognizing the power of narratives. 
 
This chapter synthesizes the theories and authors that have shaped my argument, 
revealing how they complement one another and also exposing some of the 
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tensions between their works. I begin with the authors writing about, and to a 
certain extent defining, the CJM and the hegemonic neoliberal climate solutions 
that it challenges. I go on to show how climate justice activists can draw upon 
more mainstream climate change communications theory to help challenge 
hegemonic climate discourse. In doing so, though, I recognize that much of the 
climate change communications work excludes a sophisticated analysis of power. 
Therefore I have integrated a more robust analysis of power into the findings of 
climate communications scholars. Lakoff’s seminal work on political 
communication, and particularly framing, is instructive, but here too I find an 
oversimplified account of power and society. To remedy this I have drawn upon 
Laclau and Mouffe, discourse theory, subject positions, and a neo-Gramscian 
approach to hegemony. Laclau and Mouffe’s work is crucial but it is also too 
abstract to be directly applied to climate justice activism. Kevin DeLuca has 
shown me how to “enmesh” discourse theory within quotidian struggles for 
climate justice. However, DeLuca generally abandons Laclau and Mouffe’s vital 
theorization of subject positions, chains of equivalence and their emphasis upon 
discursively articulating solidarity out of difference. Therefore, I claim that if the 
CJM is to establish a far larger and more diverse base of power then it must 
recognize that its greatest strength lies in difference and linking differences to the 
broader framework of climate justice. Foran’s work on establishing political 
cultures of opposition and creativity (PCOCs) helped me incorporate social 
movement building with DeLuca’s more practical account of discursive struggle. 
Constructing broad and far reaching PCOCs that undermine the legitimacy of the 
established order and confer legitimacy upon climate justice solutions depends 
	 19	
upon activists making a successful discursive intervention that organizes 
audiences around the principles of climate justice. Meanwhile, larger and more 
diverse PCOCs help to strengthen and extend that discursive intervention further. 
Narratives, which convey meaning and therefore hold enormous power, are very 
effective discursive tools that hegemonic and counterhegemonic forces alike can 
use to legitimize or delegitimize the established order. Compelling narratives that 
redefine the terms of the climate crisis can help to bring diverse audiences into 
these new PCOCs or help audiences recognize their position within them. To 
understand exactly what constitutes a compelling counterhegemonic narrative I 
finish this literature review with a discussion of Reinsborough and Canning’s 
indispensible concept: “story-based strategy.” 
 
Climate Justice and Neoliberal Discourses on Climate Change  
 
The Climate Justice Movement (CJM) is a transnational social movement, or 
more accurately a global network of many movements, that challenges hegemonic 
neoliberalism and its solutions to climate change. It presents alternative, 
egalitarian and non-hierarchical solutions driven by grassroots organizations that 
would radically alter economics, politics and societies across the globe (Bond, 
2012). Central to climate justice is the belief that the climate crisis cannot be 
solved within the framework of neoliberal capitalism in a just way. They mobilize 
for radical social change and moving away from what many call the “extractive 
economy” – which is perceived as unsustainable, exploitative and unjust for the 
vast majority of the world’s population. The movement embraces participatory 
	 20	
democracy and an economy and society capable of nurturing and empowering 
those who have historically been marginalized, exploited and colonized (and who 
are most threatened but least responsible for the climate crisis) (Klein, 2014).  
Climate change is perceived not only as an existential threat but also, in dealing 
with the crisis, as an opportunity to overturn hundreds of years of oppression and 
exploitation. 
 
The Climate Justice Movement is an incredibly diverse movement of movements, 
encompassing enormous differences in geographies, ideologies, cultures, wealth, 
access to power, and relationships to the state (Tokar, 2014). Despite this 
diversity, climate justice activists have made incredible headway articulating and 
defining what climate justice means for them and their communities across the 
globe. In the past five years Naomi Klein, Brian Tokar, Michael Dorsey, Patrick 
Bond and several others have documented these articulations and formed them 
into a lucid set of frames, principles and central ideas for public and academic 
audiences (Bond and Dorsey, 2011; Bond, 2014 Klein, 2014; Tokar, 2014). 
Klein’s book, This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. The Climate (2014), and 
the accompanying film of the same title (2015), is a very popular articulation of 
climate justice. Here Klein argues for the reviving and reinventing of the public 
sphere, economic planning, reining in corporations, abolishing free trade 
agreements, relocalizing production, “ending the cult of shopping,” energy 
democracy, economic democracy, “taxing the rich and filthy” and striving 
towards a regenerative rather than extractivist economy (Klein, 2014). Other 
activists talk about a “Just Transition.” As Movement Generation, a climate 
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justice organization based in Oakland, explains: “To usher in a just and equitable 
transition towards local living economies, leadership must come from 
communities on the frontlines of ecological disruption” 
(Movementgeneration.org, 2016). This entails investing in community-owned 
energy development, ensuring former fossil fuel industry workers have secure, 
sustainable and meaningful employment, or protecting local economies and 
community ventures from multinational corporations (Ourpowercampaign.org, 
2016). 
  
 The CJM’s struggle against neoliberal hegemony challenges an ideology that 
legitimizes both the continued extraction of fossil fuels and also neoliberal climate 
solutions and discourse. In fact, the two cannot really be separated. Continued 
fossil fuel extraction is legitimized in much of neoliberal climate discourse 
because its pollution – it is claimed – can be offset through carbon markets and 
reduced through technological innovation. Advocates of climate justice argue that 
this is neither just nor effective.  Fracking is a good example of a technofix that 
was supposed to reduce carbon emissions from other sources but has actually 
increased overall greenhouse gases and had severe negative impacts on local 
economies and communities (McKibben, 2016a). So while we may be entering 
what Cam Fenton has called “the post climate change denial era” (Fenton, 2016), 
fossil fuel companies and the neoliberal decision-makers they fund are certainly 
still in denial about the need to keep the vast majority of fossil fuel reserves in the 
ground (McKibben, 2016b). The climate justice activists described in this thesis 
are very clearly fighting against fossil fuel extraction but they are also fighting 
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against the neoliberal climate discourse that would impose a series of unjust and 
in many cases ineffective solutions on communities that are already marginalized 
and disempowered. Instead they are fighting for climate solutions that empower 
those communities, that are just and equitable, that emphasize cooperation over 
competition, that reclaim democracy from corporate interests through a Just 
Transition or ecosocialism or solidarity economies, or one of the many other 
alternatives that are being experimented with. 
 
In her book’s most influential chapter, Blockadia, Klein describes the different 
forms of resistance already underway against the fossil fuel industry, resource 
extraction projects, and climate technofixes that neoliberal elites have forced upon 
disenfranchised communities. Klein connects these struggles to the all-
encompassing framework of climate justice. Significantly, she recognizes the 
intersectional nature of the resistances. For example, the mindsets fuelling the 
crisis, and proposed solutions to it, are as much a product of racism and 
colonialism as they are of neoliberalism (and those isms in themselves are hard to 
disentangle). Bond adds to this analysis, demonstrating how, on a global scale, 
climate change cannot be decoupled from its colonial context. He also emphasizes 
the extent to which environmental racism, land theft, and disregard for indigenous 
ways of life are tied to climate change, extractivism and proposed neoliberal 
solutions (Bond, 2012). Finally, climate justice recognizes that the Global South 
owes the Global North an enormous ecological debt. 
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According to Bond, some representatives of climate justice propose that “the 
linkage of red and green struggles under the climate justice banner will require 
society moving from a fossil fuel dependent capitalism to ecosocialism” (Bond, 
2014, 142). Indeed, ecosocialism is very much what Klein’s own climate solutions 
look like. However, ecosocialism does not define climate justice, and indeed 
ecosocialism can itself seem a confusing and alienating term to many. There are 
many indigenous activists who might reject the term, as might anarchists, racial 
justice activists, land rights activists, and all who rally around the principles of 
climate justice but may not ascribe to a singular, prescribed ideology. As part of 
the CJM they do, however, identify with many of the tenets Klein, Bond and 
Tokar associate with climate justice. Climate justice, therefore, is comprised more 
of cultural or popular idioms like justice, equity and democracy than a specific 
ideology (Foran, Ellis, Gray, forthcoming).  This means that a diversity of 
paradigms and ideologies are embraced under the broad umbrella of climate 
justice and moreover that that difference is often celebrated. As such the CJM, in 
all its diversity, is not and cannot seek to replace neoliberalism with a singular 
dominant ideology. To be clear though, climate justice is as Bond puts it 
“anathema to mainstream climate politics” and is a counterhegemonic project 
(Bond, 2014, 133).  
 
Much of the urgency underpinning the Climate Justice Movement is not only the 
injustice and exploitation its members have experienced (which cannot be 
underestimated but have also existed far longer than the climate crisis) but is also 
based upon climate science and emissions modelling. Relations of production, 
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capitalist or otherwise, predicated upon the possibility of infinite economic 
growth, are incompatible with the speed and scale at which greenhouse gas 
emissions must be cut – and, indeed, the physical limits of the planet (Martinez-
Alier et al., 2014). Mainstream political consensus is that a stable climate is one in 
which global temperatures do not exceed a rise of two degrees Celsius above pre-
industrial levels (Anderson, 2012, 17).2 According to these climate scientists, 
remaining below two degrees requires greenhouse gas emission reductions on an 
enormous scale, with climate scientists like Kevin Anderson calling for a ten-
percent decrease in emissions year on year from 2020 onwards (Anderson, 2012, 
25). As Bows-Larkin explains, the neoliberal ideology, politics and economics 
pervasive throughout societies in the Global North are simply unable to initiate, 
let alone survive intact, such massive and rapid emissions cuts (Bows-Larkin, 
2015).  Anderson writes that growth-based economics has “abjectly failed to 
secure any control over emissions,” leaving little choice but a turn towards radical 
societal transformation (Anderson, 2012, 17). For Anderson the necessity of 
emissions reductions on this scale mandates the “total reorganization of economic 
and social life” (Anderson, 2012, 16).  Finally, the Carbon Tracker report shows 
that up to four-fifths or eighty-percent of all known fossil fuel reserves must 
remain below ground and unburned to ensure warming remains below two 
degrees and humanity avoids the most calamitous impacts of climate change 
(Carbon Tracker, 2012). The Climate Justice Movement has seized upon all of 
																																																								
2 Anderson and Bows-Larkin’s research suggests that even a two degrees rise is dangerous, but 
now an almost inevitable reality. They argue that two degrees is a number agreed upon by 
politicians not scientists. At the 2015 Paris climate talks delegates agreed to strive towards a one 
and a half degrees limit - but the Paris Treaty puts temperatures on track for a three Degrees rise. 
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these numbers as a vindication of their political claims. System change is not only 
ethically imperative but also urgent according to the climate science.  
 
Economic deregulation, privatization, minimal state intervention, the primacy of 
market forces, low taxation, individualism, and above all else growth, defines the 
neoliberal paradigm (Harvey, 2005; Newell and Paterson, 1998). The most 
genuine neoliberal commitment to tackling climate change is articulated in the 
Ecomodernist manifesto.  According to the Ecomodernists climate change is not a 
contradiction to neoliberal capitalism or to the growth paradigm, but rather a 
technical challenge for these to overcome (Ecomodernist Manifesto, 2015). They 
reject the “limits to growth” thesis (Meadows, 1972), and argue that “green 
growth” must be the direction toward which the global economy transitions. 
Ecomodernists seek to mitigate capitalism’s negative impacts on ecosystems and 
climate while maintaining free markets and capitalist development. While the 
Ecomodernist Manifesto at least recognizes that some reform to capitalism is 
necessary, the more mainstream neoliberal positions do not. Ecomodernists 
therefore must compromise their already diluted positions with mainstream 
neoliberalism that encompasses a spectrum of differing politics ranging from 
liberal-centrist to conservative. The hegemonic framing of climate change is 
therefore an uneven mix of neoliberal laissez-faire economics combined with 
some reforms such as carbon pricing and taxation and some government 
incentivising of green technology. This framing embraces technofixes including 
capturing carbon from the atmosphere and sequestering it underground (Carbon 
Capture and Sequestration or CCS),  “clean coal,” hydroelectric dams, massive 
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scale solar production, and in some cases fracking and nuclear power. At their 
most extreme many neoliberals even entertain the possibility of geoengineering 
(Mirowski, Walker and Abboud, 2013).  
 
Neoliberalism’s ideological hostility towards government intervention permeates 
the attempts of global governance institutions to mitigate the climate crisis. For 
example, delegates, particularly from the Global North, refused to sign an 
agreement that would have made emissions reductions pledges legally binding at 
the United Nations’ COP 21 in Paris. Instead, the only politically possible 
outcome of the COPs was a diluted treaty containing only voluntary emissions 
reduction pledges. Moreover, at the level of global governance and law, WTO 
rulings and free trade agreements like NAFTA or the European Free Trade 
Association will always trump climate agreements (Klein, 2014). Indeed, most 
neoliberal elites would rather see government removed from emissions regulations 
altogether so as to maximize the potential for the market to correct itself 
(Ballonoff, 2014; Knappenberger and Michaels, 2013). The free market and 
innovation can correct for climate change – thus market mechanisms like carbon 
offsetting and carbon trading have become very popular (Paterson, 2014). As 
governments are unable to properly regulate greenhouse gas emissions but remain 
committed to technofixes like CCS or fracking, the fossil fuel industry continue to 
extract, burn and search for more coal, oil and gas (McKibben, 2012). Climate 
justice advocates claim that Ecomodernist and neoliberal solutions do not 
challenge systems that created the climate crisis in the first place or the fossil fuel 
industry’s enormous influence over governments. The neoliberals’ meanwhile 
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argue that their challenge is to decouple rising economic growth from 
environmental degradation and rising emissions – Ecomodernists in particular 
relish this challenge.  
 
Within neoliberal climate change discourse four significant conservative framings 
are discernable. The first is that climate change is a technical problem not a 
political one. Second, and a corollary of the first, markets and more advanced 
technology can solve the problem without government intervention.  Third, 
emphasis should be placed on the lifestyle changes that individuals can make 
rather than on changes to contemporary social, economic and political regimes.  
The fourth and perhaps most disturbing neoliberal and conservative framing of 
climate change is as a security threat. Climate change is indeed a threat to stability 
and security. It is already fuelling conflicts across the world and will only 
continue to do so as access to food and resources are more severely impacted 
(Kelley et al., 2015). However, to frame climate change as a security issue first 
and foremost may help legitimize increased militarization and expenditure on ever 
more invasive security regimes. Each of these framings reinforces neoliberal 
values and has significant policy implications and are wholeheartedly rejected by 
climate justice activists. 
 
Climate Communications Theory 
 
The Climate Justice Movement’s counterhegemonic climate solutions have the 
potential to attract much larger audiences, and moreover, the movement needs to 
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do so if its cause is to be legitimized widely enough and won. However, activists 
often fail to capture the hearts and minds of potential supporters because their 
appearance and language can be alienating and their ability to communicate in 
relatable, accessibly ways is sometimes limited (Boyd, 2012; Smucker, 2012). For 
example, Shellenberg and Nordhouse famously challenged environmentalists’ 
highly disengaging framings of global warming and environmentalism, arguing 
that their rhetoric was divisive and failed to mobilize US voters against the re-
election of President Bush in 2004 (Shellenberg and Nordhouse, 2004). 
Meanwhile, conservative philosopher, Roger Scruton makes a fair point when he 
condemns climate campaigners, writing that “Their schemes, their cries of alarm, 
frighten the ordinary citizen without recruiting him” (Scruton, 2012, 2). Adam 
Corner illustrates the climate activists’ poor communication further, claiming “20 
years of ‘awareness raising,’ grandiose pleas to save the planet, lots of talk about 
sacrifice, apocalyptic messages and photos of polar bears have trapped climate 
change in a niche that it urgently needs to break out of” (Corner, 2013, 5). For a 
long time climate campaigners’ rhetoric appealed to people like themselves but 
did little to remove climate change from what Clare Saunders calls “the activist 
ghetto” (Saunders, 2013, 3). The same is true of many climate justice activists. 
Climate justice communicators are much better at “telling the story of the battle” 
than they are at fighting the “battle of the story” (Reinsborough and Canning, 
2010). In other words, many (particularly those without formal communications 
training) use language and frames that mobilize supporters they already have but 
fail to resonate with larger, more diverse audiences. Climate activists, and 
environmentalists in general, tend to be unattractively stereotyped as a subculture 
	 29	
of ascetic hippies, forgoing material comforts and personal hygiene (Saunders, 
2013). The appearance and language of many activists does little to dispel such 
prejudices (Corner, 2012). In the activist manual, Beautiful Trouble, Boyd 
explains that when communicating to audiences beyond activist communities it 
often helps not to look and sound like an activist because the image of an activist 
can trigger unhelpful assumptions and frames in the minds of their audiences 
(Boyd, 2012). The point here is not to criticize the hard work so many 
campaigners have put into climate justice activism, nor is it to demand that 
activists buy into crude respectability politics, but rather to hold a mirror up to that 
activism and explain why it may fail to engage or resonate with the values of 
some of its potential audiences. When climate justice activists communicate in 
ways that are neither relatable nor accessible, they alienate audiences from their 
cause, isolating it and themselves to an activist echo chamber.  
 
Jon Christensen has documented a few of the ways that climate campaigners have 
failed to communicate climate change and foster the necessary urgency to deal 
with it over the past 20 years (Christensen, 2016). They do this by: 
 
• Making it distant 
• Making it global 
• Making it about Antarctica 
• Making it about polar bears 
• Making it something audiences can do nothing about 
• Making it something only the UN can solve 
• Making it a problem beyond solving 
• Making it about who’s right and who’s wrong 
• Debunking myths and making corrections 
• Giving audiences more facts 
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Climate communication scholars recognized these failures when mainstream 
climate spokespeople sought to convince “the public” of the reality of climate 
change. Thanks in part to their scholarship, the fight against climate denial is 
slowly being won and I believe climate justice activists can learn a great deal from 
the mainstream climate communications scholars that helped turn the tide against 
denial. One of their most important contributions is that the “facts” of climate 
science do not persuade audiences of the reality of climate change. As Adam 
Corner, from the communication think tank Climate Outreach, notes “facts are 
filtered through ideology and preconceived values” (Corner, 2013, 9). Facts have 
little purchase if they do not fit into the value systems of their audiences. 
Intervening at the level of culture, ideology, and particularly through narratives, is 
often more effective (Corner, 2013, 12).  
 
Working at the intersection of climate change, psychology and communication, 
Sally Weintrobe has shown that scaring audiences with nightmare scenarios can 
result in anxiety and anxiety can lead to the psychological state of denial 
(Weintrobe et al., 2013). Paralyzing an audience with fear or antagonizing them 
with guilt-based appeals makes the work of persuasion much harder. These are 
very negative ways to frame the urgency of change and serve to alienate people 
rather than convince them. Framing action on climate change as a question of 
sacrifice and guilt is unhelpful because individuals are left feeling both resentful 
and disempowered (ibid.). Too often climate activists communicate the need for 
social change by focusing upon what will have to be sacrificed, the things we will 
have to stop doing, and the things we’re doing wrong.  
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Recognizing these mistakes, climate communications theorists are now studying 
what works instead. They show that framing, narratives and appealing to a target 
audience’s values can be much more successful communication methods (Corner, 
2013).  George Marshall argues that “everyone, experts and non-experts alike, 
converts climate change into stories that embody their own values, assumptions, 
and prejudices” (Marshall, 2014, 3). Stories are how human convert the world 
around us into meaning. This gives stories a great deal of persuasive power. 
Marshall makes the case for narrative communication writing that 
The cognitive systems require that complex issues be converted 
into narratives which become the primary medium by which the 
issues and the social cues that guide attention are transmitted 
between people. Meaning is therefore created by the way we talk 
about [climate change]. (Marshall, 2014, 227) 
 
While it important to be wary of sweeping statements about the process of the 
human psyche and also to understand that meaning is not only created through 
narratives, clearly, narratives are incredibly effective communication tools to 
speak to and engage with the values of larger and more diverse audiences. As I 
will use the term, a narrative is “a story or account of events, sequenced over time 
and space… [it is] a fundamental cognitive structuring process for the human 
mind to make meaning and relate with the world” (Reinsborough and Canning, 
2010, 122). Activists seek to change the way their audiences see the world. People 
largely understand the world through narratives, so activists must seek to change 
the narratives that organize their audiences’ worldview and provide audiences 
with stories that attribute alternative or different meanings to the world. There is a 
lot of potential for communicating climate justice by changing narratives that 
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structure meaning and using new narratives to organize people around the 
principles of climate justice. These narratives must help to lower the barriers 
people have to taking action, they must respect people’s cultures and be relevant 
to those cultures, they must be constructed with the communities for whom they 
are intended, they must show how climate change fits into the concerns of their 
specific audiences, and they must tie climate change into local discourses and 
phenomena. Above all, communicators must first listen to their audiences before 
constructing new organizing narratives. In fact, to the degree possible, new 
narratives should be constructed by, with and for their intended communities. This 
both empowers community organizers and also gives the whole community a 
stake in that narrative (Christensen, 2016; Corner, 2013; Marshall, 2014; 
Reinsborough and Canning, 2010). 
 
Collaborators on the Yale Project on Climate Communication have put together a 
report documenting “Global Warming’s Six Americas.” The report details the six 
different types of audiences’ attitudes towards climate change that climate 
communicators in the US will encounter (Maibach et al., 2009). The six audiences 
are “The alarmed” (18%), “The Concerned” (33%), “The Cautious” (19%), “The 
Disengaged” (12%), “The Doubtful” (11%), “The Dismissive” (7%) (ibid.). This 
is significant work because assuming one’s audience is a monolithic entity called 
“the general public” is a mistake that many climate communicators have made. 
This work reminds readers that different audiences will be receptive to different 
messaging, if at all. However, I think their work can be taken further in the 
context of climate justice. Within each of these six categories there are thousands 
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of different subjectivities, lived experiences, and local contexts. Climate justice 
activists cannot just focus on moving “The Alarmed” or “The Concerned” into a 
climate justice orientation. Climate justice encompasses far more than climate 
change and there are ways that climate justice communicators can make climate 
justice relevant to communities within all these categories, even when climate 
change itself isn’t.  
 
Climate communications scholars have also critiqued the polarization and 
politicization of climate change and argued that communicators should use frames 
that either appeal to conservative values or are apolitical (Corner, 2013). George 
Marshall argues that climate activists and communicators must give conservatives 
some ownership over climate change to bring them out of denial: 
Above all it is crucial that we close the partisan gap between left 
and right by opening up conservative framings and ownership. This 
should start with affirming wider values, which, it is well 
establishes experimentally, makes people far more willing to 
accept information that challenge their worldview. (Marshall, 2014, 
237)  
 
In climate justice discourse, however, neoliberal capitalism, exploitation and 
colonialism are at the root of the climate crisis – thus using conservative framings 
only reinforces the ideology that led to massive ecological disruption in the first 
place. Communicators argue that the polarization of climate change that climate 
justice activists create could end up excluding a lot people from the overall belief 
that climate change exists and must be dealt with (Saunders, 2013). As Adam 
Corner writes, “Most climate solutions involve the state and tax, and that 
automatically sets you up against most conservative-thinking people” (Corner, 
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2013, 9). If climate change activists present themselves specifically as anarchists, 
socialists or anti-capitalists, so the argument goes, they risk excluding all those 
who do not identify the same way, thus alienating themselves from broader 
support on climate action.  Many climate communicators therefore take the 
opposite approach and create narratives that are depoliticized or that fit climate 
change into the frames and values of conservative audiences. It is here, however, 
that I part ways with the more mainstream climate communication scholars. 
 
Though clearly influenced by George Lakoff’s work on framing, these thinkers 
have rejected one of his core principles: use your frames with conviction and 
never use your opponent’s frames (Lakoff, 2014). In doing so many climate 
communications theorists have implicitly rejected the notion that climate change 
is a political problem and as Kenis and Mathijs have shown, this is not only bad 
for democracy but reinforces neoliberal frames (Kenis and Mathijs, 2014). Patrick 
Bond writes that “Climate justice only arrived on the international scene as a 
coherent political approach in the wake of the failure of a more collaborative 
strategy between major environmental NGOs and the global capitalist managerial 
class” (Bond, 2012, 185). The failure of those collaborative strategies should be 
read as a warning against the neoliberal approach to climate change. The rejection 
of climate change as a political question reinforces the neoliberal position 
claiming that climate change is solvable through technological innovation and 
market forces, not political change. For example, framing climate change as an 
opportunity for green growth may help neoliberals acknowledge the existence of 
climate change but it also reinforces the frame that growth is an inherent good and 
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that green growth is even possible. Alternatively, climate change is also framed as 
a threat to national security, which could appeal to conservative values that focus 
on security or patriotism, but it could also justify the expansion of the state’s 
security apparatus and increased militarization. Both of these undermine 
principles of climate justice. Appealing to your opponent’s values can be 
dangerous if those values are not ones you share because it legitimizes your 
opponent’s frames in public discourse. In accordance with Giles Gunn’s work on 
shared values, I am not suggesting that climate justice activists should give up on 
people who have different values, but instead that they must find areas where 
values are shared and emphasize those in climate justice narratives (Gunn, 2013).  
Crucially, however, abandoning the idea that narratives exist in a contested 
political terrain defined by relations of power shores up the neoliberal articulation 
of climate change and undermines the climate justice articulation. Lakoff himself 
best clarifies this position in his theory of framing.  
 
Lakoff claims that progressives and the left have for too long tried to win over 
support by seeding ground to the conservative right and moving towards the 
center of the political spectrum. Lakoff argues that this does not work because 
using the rhetoric of your opponents only reinforces their message, their frames 
and their values (Lakoff, 2014, xiii). He provides an excellent counter example to 
Corner and Marshall; rather than encouraging activists to use language that 
appeals to the values of their perceived opponents, he argues for speaking with the 
conviction of your own values. According to Lakoff, “Framing is about 
understanding those we disagree with” but not conceding to them (ibid.).  
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Lakoff’s communications work does therefore take power relations into account. 
Lakoff studies how ideology structures the human subconscious according to 
frames, norms and values.  As he puts it, “Frames are mental structures that shape 
the way we see the world” (ibid...). Their relation to communicating climate 
justice is obvious. Frames, according to Lakoff, define our political preferences 
and policies; thus “when we successfully reframe public discourse, we change the 
way the public sees the world” (Lakoff, 2014, xii). This is precisely the kind of 
work that the Climate Justice Movement must do. Unfortunately, Lakoff’s work is 
difficult to apply to climate justice activism because it does not challenge the 
hegemonically constructed binary of Democrat vs. Republican that climate justice 
activists (and increasingly the American public) reject.  Lakoff’s work on framing 
operates within and pertains to this construct. Therefore, deploying Lakoff’s 
framing theory on its own limits the possibility of theorizing counterhegemonic 
framings and discursive interventions. Understanding the power rooted in cultural 
hegemony, and the discourses that legitimize and delegitimize it, helps build a 
communication strategy that employs framing but is not limited to Lakoff’s 
political context. I draw upon Laclau and Mouffe to bring discourse theory and 
hegemony back into my analysis. 
 
Identity, Hegemony and Discourse 
  
Solutions to the climate crisis are proposed on the terrain of hegemony and 
counterhegemony. As climate denial loses potency the conservative right are 
finding new ways to articulate the meaning of climate change. Meanwhile, the 
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CJM has already moved to articulate its own terms upon which climate change 
should be understood and engaged. The ensuing struggle can be understood 
discursively, as both sides seek to articulate a set of solutions and vision of the 
future that is legitimized through political culture and public discourse. When I 
refer to hegemony, I do so in a neo-Gramscian sense and mean cultural 
hegemony. I adopt Raymond Williams’ definition of hegemony as the extension 
of politics into daily life, into culture and into what constitutes “common sense” 
(Williams, 1977, 108-114). As Stephen Duncombe explains “the power of cultural 
hegemony lies in its invisibility. Unlike a solider with a gun or a political system 
backed up by a written constitutions, culture resides within us” (Duncombe, 2012, 
222). Drawing from Laclau and Mouffe I extend this view of hegemony to 
discourse and argue that hegemonic and counterhegemonic projects alike must 
constantly structure discursive conditions to legitimize their actions and their 
ideologies (Laclau and Mouffe, 2014). I recognize the neoliberal order as both 
hegemonic and thoroughly contested by subaltern groups. Accordingly, this thesis 
studies climate justice activists’ interventions in the politics of culture and 
common sense. While I fully accept Gramsci’s caveat that struggles for cultural 
hegemony must go hand in hand with struggles for traditional political and 
economic power, cultural hegemony has been undertheorized in the context of 
climate justice and so this is where I focus my research.  
 
Hegemony is constitutive of common sense. This seems to align well with 
Lakoff’s understanding of frames that shape the way all humans interpret the 
world.  Lakoff’s work, however, ceases to be as useful once we recognize that all 
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meaning is articulated into discourses. This is because Lakoff’s work operates 
within strict binaries that he fails to recognize as themselves being discursively 
articulated. 3 The binary between Democrat and Republican that Lakoff uses is a 
hegemonic articulation. Because Lakoff works within this binary, his work can 
only really have significance within the context of the discursively constructed 
ideological polarization of contemporary US electoral politics: namely the limited 
choice between Democrats and Republicans. There is no possibility of politics 
operating outside of this binary and no possibility of discourses constructing other 
realities, other common senses. Everyone is either Republican, Democrat or 
somewhere in the middle. This does not help my work much. Climate justice 
exists within neither camp and neoliberal ideology permeates both parties, so 
while Lakoff’s theory is excellent, his findings are limited to the context in which 
he operates.  Lakoff does recognize the messiness within the binary, however, and 
comes up with the category of the “biconceptual.” He argues most people live 
within this category. The biconceptual’s values and frames exist in various blends 
of Republican and Democrat ideology. The very word biconceptual still suggests 
the binary, though, and for my work I need a concept that fully recognizes that 
messiness and complexity of political alignments in US society. Therefore I have 
settled upon Laclau and Mouffe’s “subject positions” and the discursive theory 
derived from it. 
 
																																																								3	The same accusation could be leveled at my work: Climate Justice vs. Neoliberalism looks like a 
binary too. However, I do not see climate justice as operating as a strict ideology in the same way 
that Lakoff sees Republican and Democrat ideologies. Climate justice is far more fluid and 
malleable; so too is neoliberalism in some ways. The delineations of each are far less certain.	
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Laclau and Mouffe state the purpose of their work very clearly: “Our central 
problem is to identify the discursive conditions for the emergence of a collective 
action, directed towards struggling against inequalities and challenging relations 
of subordination” (Laclau and Mouffe, 2014, 137). They recognize that the project 
of counterhegemony in the Twenty-first century is not to concern itself only with 
identity politics but neither is it to go back to Twentieth century preoccupations 
with class. Rather, it is to find “chains of equivalence” between subject position’s 
forms of resistance, to recognize the vast array of those subject positions, and to 
find ways to build alternatives that fit them all. In other words, the project is to 
build solidarity out of difference and use this to challenge systems of oppression 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 2014, xvii). Climate justice, which is an expression of 
resistance at the heart of so many oppressions, as well as a response to the crisis 
that will define the 21st century, can be an essential part of this project. The first 
step is to abandon the notion of siloed, singular identities and to recognize 
individuals as discursively constructed subject positions into and out of which 
identities flow, form and disassemble (Laclau and Mouffe, 2014, 48). As Laclau 
and Mouffe explain “every social identity becomes the meeting point for a 
multiplicity of articulatory practices, many of them antagonistic” (Laclau and 
Mouffe, 2014, 125). The idea of a subject position allows Laclau and Mouffe to 
avoid the kind of binaries inherent to Lakoff’s work and leads them to declare: 
“The discourse of radical democracy is no longer the discourse of the universal… 
it has been replaced by a polyphony of voices, each of which constructs its own 
irreducible discursive identity” (Laclau and Mouffe, 2014, 175).   Similarly, the 
Climate Justice Movement cannot be reduced to a universalizing discourse 
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because it is comprised of so many resistances, in so many places, locked into a 
struggle for the very survival of the human species – it must embrace difference. 
Subject positions are shaped by (sometimes competing) discourses and often by 
prevailing discursive conditions. If the CJM must make a discursive intervention 
to change narratives around climate change then appealing to people as Democrats 
or Republicans will be less effective than recognizing their complicated 
composition as subject positions. Therefore, I find Laclau and Mouffe’s work on 
subject positions and discursive conditions a more useful lens while being able to 
maintain much of Lakoff’s thoughts on framing and values. 
 
The Climate Justice Movement must recognize that it is in a counterhegemonic 
discursive struggle over the meaning of climate change. Discourse attaches 
meaning to, and shapes the ways in which people interpret, external (or objective) 
reality. The prevailing discourses are hegemonic. For Laclau and Mouffe, 
hegemony is relational; it is a constant struggle over the discourses that will define 
reality, meaning and common sense. They write that “The political meaning of a 
local community movement, of an ecological struggle, of a sexual minority 
movement, is not given from the beginning; it crucially depends upon its 
hegemonic articulation with other struggles and demands” (Laclau and Mouffe, 
2014, 77). For example, climate justice attaches a specific meaning to climate 
change that the CJM must insert into public discourse to supplant the 
ecomodernist and neoliberal discourses on climate change. Shaping or 
“conditioning” discourse plays an essential role here and can be achieved through 
narrative interventions.  Hegemonic forces rely upon discourses to shape a 
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society’s “shared reality” and legitimize relations of power. Laclau and Mouffe 
provide an instructive example that is worth quoting in full:  
The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse 
has nothing to do with whether there is a world external to thought, 
or with the idealism/realism opposition. An earthquake or the 
falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists, in the sense that it 
occurs here and now, independently of my will. But whether their 
specificity as objects is constructed in terms of ‘natural 
phenomena’ or ‘expressions of the wrath of God’, depends upon 
the structuring of the discursive field. (Laclau and Mouffe, 2014, 
94) 
 
An event occurs in objective reality but humans cannot make sense of that event 
without it being mediated to us through a discursive lens. Furthermore, to give 
that event meaning we construct a narrative around it. As such ,struggles over the 
discursive lens used to interpret the external world and its meanings are sites of 
intense competition for power. Which lens is adopted depends upon the 
conditioning or “structuring of the discursive field.” How the discursive field is 
structured depends upon what Laclau and Mouffe call “articulatory practice” 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 2014, 91).  Articulatory practice is the process of aligning 
into a particular discourse elements or events in objective reality that have not had 
a singular meaning or interpretation successfully fixed to them. To use the 
example above, the earthquake would be the event in objective reality and the 
competing interpretations could be a geologist’s and a Christian fundamentalist’s. 
The hegemonic struggle would be over which discourse, Christian or scientific, is 
able to fix meaning to the earthquake so that their meaning becomes common 
sense for everyone else.  Laclau and Mouffe call these elements or events 
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“floating signifiers” because meaning has not been attached to them, they are 
floating and unfixed.  
 
Through articulation meaning is attached to elements and is fixed into a coherent 
discourse.  This has important implications for attaching meaning to climate 
change. Climate change is a floating signifier with contested meanings. If its 
meaning becomes associated with climate justice the actions taken to deal with it 
should follow the principles of climate justice. However, there are also dangers in 
attaching meaning to floating signifiers. As Marshall and Corner might argue, if 
climate change were to become fixed to the CJM it may be only associated with 
the movement and the kind of politics its members represent. This could alienate 
people from climate change action altogether. This is why, as I will show later, 
stories that resonate with their audiences and relatable communicators should 
always accompany articulations of climate justice (Smucker, Boyd and Mitchell, 
2012).  
 
Counterhegemony and Climate Justice 
 
Laclau and Mouffe present a beautiful theory but its value lies in its application. I 
have found it somewhat unwieldy when applied to the daily struggles of climate 
justice activism. However, Kevin DeLuca’s work contextualizes Laclau and 
Mouffe within environmental justice activism in the 1990s and shows how to 
apply their work to climate justice more effectively.  DeLuca writes that social 
movements can “deconstruct the established naming of the world” by engaging in 
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discursive struggles (DeLuca, 1999, 25). He goes on to explain how these 
movements exploit “antagonisms,” which makes possible “the questioning, 
disarticulating, and rearticulating of a hegemonic discourse” (DeLuca, 1999, 40).  
An antagonism, according to DeLuca, “occurs at the point of the relation of the 
discourse to the surrounding lifeworld and shows the impossibility of the 
discourse constituting a permanently closed or sutured totality” (ibid.). In other 
words, an antagonism highlights an inconsistency, contradiction or flawed 
generalization in the discourse. DeLuca gives the example of a toxic waste dump 
that makes possible the disarticulating of the hegemonic discourse of “progress” 
when environmental justice activists show how the siting of the toxic dump is 
rooted in environmental racism and dynamics of oppression (DeLuca, 1999, 42). 
The antagonisms within the concept of progress are exposed. Progress, therefore, 
is no longer a win-win net positive category, but is rearticulated. Progress means 
progress for some and toxic waste dumps and poisoning for others. Meanwhile, 
those experiencing the poisoning are those whom the hegemonic elite and their 
discourses construct as expendable. Antagonisms can mobilize people into a 
counterhegemonic movement against oppressive hegemonic relations.  
 
Antagonisms also allow movements to insert counter discourses into public 
imaginaries.  First though, those antagonisms must themselves be articulated as 
antagonisms. For example, the toxic waste dump is just a toxic waste dump - a 
small but necessary price to pay for progress - in the same way that Laclau and 
Mouffe’s earthquake is just an earthquake – an act of god - until they are 
articulated into a counter discourse and new meaning is ascribed to them. This is 
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where communications, framing and narrative become essential – meaning is 
ultimately the subject of contestation. As Marshall has argued narrative is an 
excellent medium through which to transmit meaning, and as Lakoff adds, 
framing can help that meaning fit into an audience’s existing values (Marshall, 
2014; Lakoff, 2014). To successfully restructure discursive conditions, social 
movements must construct narratives that resonate with the communities in which 
they are articulated and highlight antagonisms in dominant discourses. This does 
not necessarily mean undermining the argument of your opponents but rather 
telling a different story that shows up the antagonism in the dominant story but 
also fits more easily into the frames and values of your target audience. Climate 
justice communicators have to produce narratives that do just this.  
 
Hegemony and the Media 
 
Before moving forwards, a few words should be said about social movements’ 
access to resources and the institutional apparati that mediate discursive struggles. 
Clearly, one side of this struggle has overwhelming access to, and influence 
within, mainstream media – and it is not the Climate Justice Movement. The 
neoliberal framing of climate change is not hegemonic because the polity has 
autonomously decided that the neoliberal approach makes the most sense based on 
witnessing a grand battle of ideas in the public sphere, with full access to, and 
unbiased mediation of, the different arguments. Rather, neoliberal climate 
discourse is hegemonic, at least in part, because neoliberal elites have greater 
access to mainstream media and so are more able to frame the public conversation 
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in their interests. In Gramscian terms their ideology is hegemonic because they 
control many of the institutions within civil society that shape and mediate 
discourse.  
 
Countering discursive hegemony is not simply about gaining greater access to the 
different means of discursive mediation, however. I am not suggesting that if the 
Climate Justice Movement’s communicators simply had the same access to 
resources and media their narratives would automatically sway public discourse in 
favour of climate justice. Certainly, representation in established media 
institutions matters and it is true that mainstream media very often set the terms of 
public debates and choose whose voices get represented and whose are spoken for 
or silenced. It is also true though, that the mainstream media is not a homogenous 
entity and its relationship with public opinion is far from simple. For example, 
media outlets, rather than imposing or generating a set of values for their 
audiences, tend to reinforce their specific target audiences’ pre-existing values and 
politics. In addition, Kevin DeLuca has explored how activists can subvert 
mainstream media discourse when the media framing is hostile (DeLuca, 1999). 
In the context of television, he argues that images are far more powerful than 
words and so even when the media environment seeks to undermine agents of 
change the images that accompany stories about activists can often contradict the 
media’s framing.  Moreover, online media and alternative media are beginning to 
pose a very serious threat to the legitimacy of the mainstream media and the 
stories it chooses to tell.  Thus, to a certain extent, alternative media is 
democratizing the dissemination of information because it is far more accessible 
	 46	
to people with fewer resources. The fact that activists have been taking advantage 
of this forum has been well documented (Meisel, 2012). 
 
A hostile and unbalanced media environment sets the scene for the uphill battle 
that the Climate Justice Movement’s discursive intervention faces. The 
counterhegeominc communication strategies and tactics I have observed in my 
research tend to be sensitive to the disproportionate ability hegemonic voices have 
to frame public debates; however they are not crippled by it. Meanwhile, others 
have documented how communications strategists can confront this disparity far 
more comprehensively than I can within the scope of this thesis (DeLuca, 1999; 
Quiroz, 2013). As such, this thesis is not about how activists can overcome 
limited access to resources and mainstream media. Instead it is about the actual 
substance of contemporary climate justice narratives and how they might shift 
discursive conditions. That being said, the discursive interventions I discuss in 
these pages will certainly be understood within the context of unbalanced access 
to representation.  
 
The Politics of Culture and Political Cultures of Opposition and Creativity 
 
Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of articulation is directly connected to their work on 
subject positions and chains of equivalence and helps show how the articulation of 
climate justice can legitimize counter discourses and opposition to neoliberal 
hegemony. As DeLuca elaborates, “Articulation is a way of understanding how, in 
a postmodern world with neither guarantees nor great soul of revolt, diverse 
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groups practicing an array of micropolitics can forge links that transform their 
local struggles into a broad-based challenge”  (DeLuca, 1999, 82). In cultural 
theory, articulation means to connect specific and often very different interest 
groups into broad and diverse assemblages through discourse (Hall, Morley and 
Chen, 1996). Here, I use the term to discuss the very different subject positions 
that climate justice discourses seek to address and mobilize into action. The 
counter discourses that climate justice generates and inserts into the public 
imaginary must forge chains of equivalence, making them relevant to an array of 
very different groups resisting very different oppressions. John Foran takes up this 
challenge in more explicit terms stating that climate justice communicators must 
“articulate the discourses that will bring together the broadest coalitions ever seen 
onto a global stage” (Foran, 2014, 20). Drawing upon discursive opportunity 
structures can facilitate articulation. Discursive opportunity structures can be 
shared idioms, references to popular culture, or commonly held sentiments that 
can communicators can tap into to evoke a particular understanding of their 
message. According to Holly McCammon, discursive opportunity structures are 
reference points in “broader political culture believed to be “sensible,” “realistic,” 
and “legitimate” and whose presence would thus facilitate reception of specific 
forms of collective action” (McCammon, 2013, 1).  
 
Counterhegemonic communication strategies that tap into these discursive 
opportunity structures, for example, the common but differentiated experience of 
extractivism throughout much of the world can lead to the building of what 
Foran’s political cultures of opposition and creativity (PCOCs). In this way the 
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Climate Justice Movement can both become and help construct a PCOC. PCOCs 
are an essential component of radical social change because as Foran puts it they 
are ”how people make political sense of the social settings that constrict and 
enable their lives, in ways that can sometimes lead to the formation of strong 
social movements” (Foran, Ellis, and Gray, forthcoming). Moreover, they 
represent a much more contemporary and appropriate understanding of how 
collective resistance to hegemony is legitimized and enacted in the Twenty-first 
century. Rather than being formed out of singular ideology, PCOCs are 
configured through cultural idioms, and shared experiences and values that 
mobilize diverse communities into confrontation with hegemonic forces (Foran, 
2014, 7). PCOCs therefore align with Laclau and Mouffe’s chains of equivalence, 
embracing “the plurality and indeterminacy of the social,” and forming the 
“fundamental bases from which a new political imaginary can be constructed” 
while rejecting the privileging of “points of rupture” or specific antagonisms over 
others4 (Laclau and Mouffe, 2014, 136). In this way diverse, local and highly 
contextualized struggles can be encompassed within the broader framework of a 
political culture of opposition and creativity. Through articulation, narrative 
interventions, reframing, and discursive conditioning climate justice could 
become a framework around which diverse campaigns and social movements 
organize, resist, imagine and build.  
 
																																																								4	There is a danger within climate justice discourse of privileging climate change as the point of 
rupture sin qua non. The Climate Justice Movement must avoid this trap and PCOCs as Foran has 
imagined them may help the movement do so. However, perhaps the very name Climate Justice 
privileges climate change or climate injustice as the principal antagonism.		
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Asef Bayat, in his work on social nonmovments, has warned against expecting 
radical social change to emerge from organized resistance, while Laclau and 
Mouffe have argued for chains of equivalence to link dissimilar subject positions 
into a broader discursive framework of resistance and solidarity. This is not 
exactly a contradiction but I think the two can be brought together fruitfully with 
the category of PCOCs. According to Bayat, “nonmovements refers to the 
collective actions of noncollective actors; they embody shared practices of large 
numbers of ordinary people whose fragmented but similar activities trigger much 
social change” (Bayat, 2009, 14).  Bayat’s theory of nonmovments rests upon 
these ordinary people operating in a context in which they are by and large 
atomized and siloed from one another – particularly in urban settings of the 
Global South. Laclau and Mouffe’s chains of equivalence seek to link different 
struggles in collective resistance by reshaping in the discourses that originally 
separated those struggles. Reshaping discursive conditions is therefore a precursor 
to a truly intersectional movement.  Bayat’s work describes the conditions that 
vast number of disenfranchised people experience everyday, thus their organzing 
experiences are essential to building solidarity and a broad-based and diverse 
Climate Justice Movement. While respecting difference between subject 
positions, chains of equivalence call for a more organized form of resistance to 
challenge hegemonic power. As Bayat explains, in many circumstances such 
organization simply isn’t possible.   
 
Using PCOCs to bring these two important contributions together is helpful in the 
context of climate justice because, as George Marshall writes, humans “have 
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virtually unlimited capacity accepting things that might otherwise prove to be 
cognitively challenging once they are supported within a culture of shared 
conviction” (Marshall, 2014, 229). Once a discourse is supported within a culture 
of shared conviction it gets legitimized through social norms (ibid.).  Political 
Cultures of Opposition and Creativity can provide the loose imaginaries and 
organizing principles that links atomized individuals with very different struggles 
and subject positions into a collective form of action. Meanwhile PCOCs are not 
formally organized into discernable ideological units or mobilizing logics. PCOCs 
are fluid, loosely demarcated by adherence to a set of idioms advocating for 
resistance and imagined alternatives.  Therefore they could be much more 
attractive to a larger and more diverse section of society. The meaning the CJM 
attaches to climate change can be nourished and legitimized within a PCOC. One 
strategic goal for the Climate Justice Movement, therefore, is to use discursive 
interventions that tap into discursive opportunity structures to expand these 
political cultures and develop chains of equivalence within and between them. 
 
Story-Based Strategy  
 
Finally, I will discuss the elements of narrative intervention I have encountered 
that might successfully shift discursive conditions, compel different subject 
positions to align with a political culture of opposition and creativity, and engage 
in collective action to challenge hegemonic elites. Patrick Reinsborough and 
Doyle Canning have developed some important insights in their field guide for 
activist communicators entitled RE:Imagining Change – How to use story-based 
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strategy to win campaigns, build movements, and change the world. They place 
the theories of discourse, hegemony and communications discussed throughout 
this literature review into very specific campaign contexts and show how it is 
narrative intervention that synthesizes all of these into a coherent strategy.  
 
Reinsborough and Canning agree with Lakoff when he writes that, “Effective 
reframing is the changing of millions of brains to be prepared to recognize a 
reality” (Lakoff, 2014, 33). However, their emphasis is upon the stories activists 
and “change agents” tell in order to reframe particular issues and prime people’s 
value systems’ to accept and recognize new realities. Importantly, their work is 
much more inclusive than the Democrat/Republican binary that Lakoff sets up. 
Their thoughts and practice also reflect the ideas of Laclau and Mouffe, at least 
implicitly if not explicitly. For Reinsborough and Canning, stories are the means 
by which the discursive field is structured and floating signifiers articulated into 
discourse. In words evocative of Laclau and Mouffe’s analysis of cultural 
hegemony, they write that “popular culture is an ever-evolving, contested space of 
struggle, where competing voices, experiences, and perspectives fight to answer 
the questions: whose maps determine what is meaningful? Whose stories are 
considered true?” (Reinsborough and Canning, 2010, 19). They add that “humans 
understand the world and our role in it through stories, and thus all power 
relations have a narrative dimension” (Reinsborough and Canning, 2010, 20). Just 
like Lalcau and Mouffe they recognize that meaning, and therefore power, is 
dependent upon (hegemonic) discourse but argue that it is shaped through 
narrative.  
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According to Reinsborough and Canning, “Story-based strategy views social 
change through the lens of narrative power and positions storytelling at the center 
of social change strategy” (Reinsborough and Canning, 2010, 12). I will apply this 
to my case studies and examine the extent to which climate justice activists 
successfully deploy this strategy and where it could be developed or improved 
upon. I am particularly interested in what Reinsborough and Canning call winning 
the “battle of the story.” The battle of the story is about persuasion but more 
accurately it is about providing compelling narratives that engage diverse 
audiences and push them into Political Cultures of Opposition and Creativity. 
Reinsbrough and Canning argue that “Since an audience’s existing stories will 
filter new facts or information, change agents need to offer a new story” 
(Reinsborough and Canning, 2010, 46). The goal of my research, therefore, is to 
analyze effective and persuasive narratives and stories concerning climate justice 
that “structure information in a way that convinces people who are not already 
actively supporting the cause” (Reinsborough and Canning, 2010, 45).  
 
In recognizing that communications are ultimately about power, Reinsborough 
and Canning’s story-based strategy provides an excellent modification to the 
supposedly apolitical climate communication theories described in this literature 
review. Reinsborugh and Canning remind activists of the five elements of story: 
Conflict, characters, imagery, foreshadowing, and assumptions (Reinsborugh and 
Canning, 2010, 38). These apply just as much to story-based strategy as they do to 
a good novel. They encourage communicators to ask: 
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What is the conflict upon which the story rests, who are the 
characters supposed to represent, are they relatable?, how does the 
imagery engage with people’s values, what promises or future does 
the story give to the resolution of the conflict, what are the 
underlying assumption that must be accepted in order to believe the 
narrative is true? (ibid.) 
 
The stories that climate justice communicators tell have to do all these things well 
if they are to successfully reshape discursive conditions. They must also resonate 
with a target audience, they must engage with their values, they must make 
climate change personal and urgent yet not so terrifying that action on it seem 
impossible. These stories must be told by relatable spokespeople, embedded in the 
concerns and idioms of communities with whom they are constructed and for 
whom they are intended (Reinsborough and Canning, 2014). Finally, they must 
help audiences envision a future they want to see and show how fighting climate 
change can get them there. In the following chapters I show how the Fossil Free 
and Our Power campaigns both exemplify successful discursive interventions and 
use narrative to counter hegemonic neoliberal climate discourse. 
 
Conclusion  
 
In conclusion, the Climate Justice Movement is now fighting a discursive struggle 
over the very meaning of climate change. It can counter hegemonic neoliberal 
solutions to climate change by disarticulating the meaning of climate change away 
from the neoliberal and Ecomodernist discourses and rearticulating it as a 
fundamental contradiction to neoliberalism and the systems of oppression upon 
which it rests. Climate change communications theory has paved the way for 
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climate justice communicators to learn from and adopt many of the 
communication strategies that helped overcome climate change denial. However, 
these strategies have avoided a sophisticated analysis of power. Lakoff introduces 
the concept of power into communications theory through his work on framing. 
Lakoff’s methodology depends upon ideological binaries that simply do 
accurately not define contemporary American political identities and furthermore 
fails to recognize that this binary is itself ideologically constructed. As such it is 
difficult to apply to politics and political cultures existing outside of the binary. 
Therefore, I have used Laclau and Mouffe’s analysis of hegemony, identity, 
discourse and solidarity to bring to climate justice communication what Lakoff 
and the climate communication scholars couldn’t: a sophisticated and malleable 
concept of power rooted in cultural hegemony.  I have argued that climate justice 
communicators can exploit antagonisms within dominant discourse to insert their 
own counter discourses into public imaginaries. I showed how discursive 
interventions can help articulate different groups and subject positions into a 
broad-based confrontation to neoliberal hegemony. I went on to claim that this can 
help construct the political cultures of opposition and creativity which are 
essential to radical social change. This literature reviewed in this chapter shows 
how the Climate Justice Movement’s discursive interventions can establish a 
broad and diverse base of resistance. This theoretical work led me to ask what it 
might look like in practice.  It is the work of Reinsborough and Canning, which, 
more than any of the other authors, combines theory and praxis into an excellent 
example of narrative communication strategy. Finally, I have used their work to 
successfully reintegrate power into climate communications, making it applicable 
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to climate justice activists. Therefore, I will be testing Reinsborough and 
Canning’s strategy accompanied with Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory 
through the case studies described in the following chapters. 
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II. Case Study One: How Fossil Free UC uses framing narrative to reshape 
discursive conditions surrounding climate change 
 
Introduction  
 
Context 
 
This case study applies the theory of counterhegemony developed in Chapter One 
to Fossil Free, the fossil fuel divestment campaign that, since 2012, has captured 
the collective imagination and passion of thousands of students at over 500 
college campuses in the US and internationally. The divestment campaign has 
picked up momentum in religious institutions, city councils, charitable 
foundations and hundreds of public institutions as well, but for precision’s sake 
this case study provides an indepth account of just one example, Fossil Free UC. 
Fossil Free UC is a coalition of divestment campaigns operating across the ten 
campuses of the University of California (UC). Concentrating on Fossil Free UC 
provides both an illustrative example of the purpose, nature and possible future of 
the broader fossil fuel divestment campaign, while also offering an acutely 
contextualized and intimate account of divestment activism in practice. The case 
study tests the counterhegemonic communication strategies discussed in my 
literature review against the empirical evidence of a concrete example of climate 
change activism. It finds that in many important ways the divestment campaign 
epitomizes the kind of discursive interventions emphasized in this thesis.  
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Purpose 
 
Fossil Free has helped lead a narrative shift that has inspired a generation of 
activists to resist the fossil fuel industry and fight climate change. This case study 
contends that, unlike previous climate discourses that focused on guilt and self-
sacrifice, the divestment narrative provides campaigners and observers alike with 
a clear external enemy whose culpability far outstrips that of any individual. The 
purpose of this case study is to furnish readers with a detailed and critical analysis 
of what the divestment campaign reveals about story-based strategy and 
counterhegemonic discourse in the framework of climate justice.   In the broader 
context of this thesis, the purpose of the study is also to evince the real urgency 
behind integrating discursive understanding and narrative strategy into the 
Climate Justice Movement’s organizing strategy. In so doing, the case study 
exhibits a fascinating instance of discursive theory being put into practice, 
exemplifying what John Dewey has called intelligent praxis. Throughout this 
study it is argued that the narrative divestment seeks to insert into public discourse 
is legitimized not only when institutions commit to divestment but also through 
the public struggle with institutions over whether or not they will in fact divest.  
 
Relevance  
 
As perhaps the most influential example, and certainly the most coherent 
articulation, of youth activism on climate change in the Global North, fossil fuel 
divestment is an extremely relevant case study (Rast, 2015). Boasting active 
	 58	
campaigns on over 500 college campuses and total assets now withheld from 
fossil fuels valued at $3.4 trillion, fossil fuel divestment has become very popular 
amongst young people and student-activists (Fossil Free, 2016). The divestment 
movement has had its rhetoric adopted by everyone from President Obama to 
Senator Bernie Sanders (Obama, 2013; Goldenberg, 2015). At the Paris COP 21 
hundreds of young people abandoned the COP and instead publicly rallied around 
the Indigenous Environmental Network’s Keep It In The Ground Declaration, 
again invoking divestment’s rhetoric (LeQuesne, 2016). As the most widespread 
and prolific climate campaign on college campuses today, examining Fossil Free’s 
discursive implications for climate justice is incredibly important. Fossil fuel 
divestment has captured young people’s imagination like no other climate 
campaign and this case study grants readers a fascinating insight into why the 
campaign has attracted so many young climate campaigners where others have 
ultimately failed.  
 
Where this case study is situated is also significant. The university is undeniably a 
site of discursive competition so its relevance to the parameters of this thesis 
cannot be overstated. Haiven and Khasnabish put this into perspective writing 
that: 
A huge proportion of the population in the Global North now passes 
through university, rendering it an acute site of struggle… 
Numerically speaking, more people may today pass through the doors 
of a university (as students, as workers, as contractees, etc.) than ever 
passed through the gates of a factory in years gone by. (Haiven and 
Khasnabish, 2014, 38) 
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With such influence, college campuses are sites of intense hegemonic struggle. 
This is true not only in the classrooms and lecture halls, or even all the 
publications of its academics, but also when we understand the university as a site 
in which young people learn about themselves and their relationship to other 
people, discover their own agency, and make choices that may define the rest of 
their lives. Analyzing the impact that divestment’s discursive intervention has had 
on this stage is therefore very important.  
 
Finally, as this case study will show, fossil fuel divestment demonstrates a very 
deliberate attempt to cultivate new stories and reframe existing ones surrounding 
the climate crisis. When used intentionally, divestment can be a potent tool that 
can reshape discursive conditions so that space for climate justice solutions may 
be opened up. Fossil Free UC is one campaign that has been intentional about 
incorporating climate justice into their organizing. Fossil fuel divestment, 
particularly at the University of California, is therefore an excellent example of 
the narrative and framing strategies elaborated upon in Chapter One and an 
extremely relevant elucidation of the argument presented in this thesis.  
 
Contents 
 
The divestment campaign is only four years old and continuing to unfold. 
Consequently little in the way of analysis or even histories of the campaign exists. 
As such this study depends upon primary resources. The evidence presented in 
this case study is drawn from a series of interviews with prominent campaign 
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spokespeople, experience directly participating in the campaign, and an extensive 
review of the contemporary journalism, scholarly articles, blogs, and reports 
pertinent to the campaign. In discussing Fossil Free UC’s discursive impact, the 
study also relies on a textual analysis of media reactions to the UC’s decision to 
divest from coal and tar sands industries.  
 
The case study takes the following format: First it explains exactly what fossil fuel 
divestment is, its purpose, its driving logic, as well as providing a brief history of 
the Fossil Free and Fossil Free UC campaigns. Then it explores the ways in which 
divestment constitutes an example of framing narrative strategy before placing 
that strategy in the context of confrontational climate politics. Next, it asks the all-
important question “is divestment working?” and explores the complex contours 
of answering that question. And finally, it looks at divestment’s future in terms of 
solidarity, reinvestment, prefiguring climate justice solutions and its linkages to 
this thesis’s second case study in Richmond, California.  
 
Fossil Free and Divestment 
 
What is divestment? 
 
In simplest terms divestment is the opposite of investment. To divest means to 
take investments out of a particular institution or industry – in this case the fossil 
fuel industry. Interestingly, to divest also means to deprive someone or something 
of their power or rights. The Fossil Free campaign seeks to do both. Fossil Free 
	 61	
UC, like most fossil fuel divestment campaigns operating on universities and 
institutions with public influence, targets the 200 most polluting fossil fuel 
companies (Fossilfreeuc.org, 2013). Fossil fuel divestment campaigns call upon 
the managers of these institutions to pull their endowments, pension funds and 
foundations’ investments out of the fossil fuel industry.  Fundamentally, 
divestment campaigns are moral campaigns; therefore an act of divestment 
responding to pressure from divestment campaigns is supposed to reflect a moral 
judgment upon the industry or institution that has been divested from. It is true 
divestment is ultimately a symbolic act, but symbols have enormous power.  
 
One classic example is the highly successful South Africa divestment campaign 
targeting companies operating in South Africa under conditions of Apartheid 
(Phinney, 2015). So successful was this campaign that upon visiting the US after 
his release from prison Nelson Mandela’s first stop was not to the White House 
but to UC Berkeley to thank students there for the role their divestment campaign 
played in turning the international community against the Apartheid regime 
(McKibben, 2012).  Another excellent example of the divestment tactic’s success 
was against the tobacco industry. The Centre for Responsive Politics reports 
“The tobacco industry, once a lobbying juggernaut, has watched its political 
influence wane as its cancer-causing products became increasingly toxic, 
politically speaking” (Opensecrets.org, 2016).  The tobacco industry’s influence 
over politicians and public consciousness has severely declined since the 
campaign to delegitimize their brand through divestment took hold. As will 
become apparent in this case study, divestment is essentially a narrative tool to 
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intervene in public consciousness and shift understanding of a particular issue or 
condition. It is important to remember that divestment is a tactic; it is not a 
solution to the climate crisis in and of itself. As the California divestment 
campaign director, Silver Hannon, explains “divestment is a tactic, climate justice 
is the goal” (Hannon, 2015).  
 
The Logic Driving Divestment  
 
350.org cofounder Bill McKibben’s famous phrase “If it’s wrong to wreck the 
planet then it’s wrong to profit from that wreckage” has come to define the basic 
logic defining the divestment campaign (Fossil Free, 2016). However, as many 
divestment campaigners were keen to assure me, the logic is far deeper and more 
complex than pithy one-liners (Rast, 2015; Hannon, 2015). The traditionally 
accepted logic driving fossil fuel divestment is as follows: to avoid catastrophic 
climate change global warming must be kept below a two-degree Celsius rise on 
pre-industrial levels. Humans can therefore only burn 565 gigatons of carbon or 
equivalent green house gases before exceeding the two-degree limit (a gigaton is 
one billion tons). At current emission rates this means the world has about 15 
years until that “carbon budget” is reached (350.org, 2015). Fossil fuel companies 
and countries that act like fossil fuel companies currently have over 2795 gigatons 
in their reserves which they have committed to burning. They are also spending 
millions of dollars searching for new reserves to develop (Carbon Tracker, 2012). 
The fossil fuel industry therefore has at least five times more coal, oil and gas in 
its reserves than even the most conservative climate estimates say is safe to burn 
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and maintain a reasonably stable climate (McKibben, 2012). At least financially, 
however, those reserves may as well be above ground as they are included within 
the asset value of fossil fuel companies.  As such the industry spends millions on 
political campaigns, and lobbying to guarantee a weak regulatory environment 
and ensure its ability to extract and burn everything in its reserves (ibid.). Its 
interests are diametrically opposed to maintaining relative climate stability. 
Therefore, divestment activists argue that it is unconscionable for institutions to 
remain invested in an industry whose business plan relies on the wreckage of the 
climate upon which human civilization depends (Fernandez, 2015).  
 
Recently, an additional refrain has been introduced to account for what some 
divestment campaigners argued was an oversight of the logic derived from the 
first phrase. The second axiom corrects this: “if it is wrong to poison communities 
then it is wrong to profit from that poisoning” (Fossil Free USA, 2016). This 
second formation suggests a more human-centric as opposed to statistic-centric 
approach and is better aligned with the principles of climate justice. Derived from 
this axiom is the logic that it is morally unconscionable for institutions that claim 
to operate in the public good to undermine that commitment by investing in 
industries –like the fossil fuel industry – that threaten public health, safety and 
vitality. In the case of universities, so the argument goes, the institution’s 
commitment to the education and future of their students is undermined by 
investments in the fossil fuel industry (Soiffer, 2015a). In all cases the act of 
divestment distances these institutions from the actions of the fossil fuel industry 
and helps delegitimize them in the eyes of the public. In this way, the industry’s 
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influence over political decision-making wanes and room can be made for 
alternatives to fossil fuels (McKibben, 2012). 
 
What is the Purpose of Divestment? 
 
Delegitimizing the fossil fuel industry may drive the logic behind fossil fuel 
divestment but the question remains – Why is it strategic to delegitimize the fossil 
fuel industry? Yes, fossil fuel companies are responsible for an inordinate amount 
of destruction but surely politicians with regulatory power or even those who 
actually consume the industry’s product are more sensible targets? In fact, the 
delegitimizing of the industry is by no means the sole or even primary purpose of 
the campaign. As the following excerpts from interviews with Fossil Free activists 
and organizers demonstrate, a more complex and far more interesting dynamic is 
underway: 
The purpose of divestment is to clearly articulate a common enemy 
in the fight against climate change and polarize public opinion away 
from the fossil fuel industry to create space for popular and political 
demands to be met. (Rast, 2015)  
 
The purpose of divestment is to [get] large communities like those at 
universities or churches to become aware of who are the perpetuators 
of climate change, who funds it, and what aspects of our society 
uphold that, and in doing so create space for many other fights. 
(Anonymous, 2015)  
 
For me the point of divestment is to… uplift the narrative publicly 
and push for climate legislation and other avenues for a just 
transition in our energy. (Hannon, 2015) 
 
Divestment names an enemy. It helps reframe the narrative around 
climate change as not just one of individual consumer-based 
decisions like recycling or changing your light bulbs… it names 
climate change as a collective struggle. (Soiffer, 2015a) 
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The purpose of the campaign, therefore, is not simply “to turn a generation against 
the fossil fuel industry” as divestment critic Rachelle Peterson would have it 
(Peterson, 2015, 1), but also to insert a reframed narrative about the very nature of 
the climate crisis into public discourse. It is trying to change the story about who 
is responsible for climate change and what the solutions must be. It is establishing 
a narrative in which responsibility is allocated proportionately and thereby 
changes dominant perceptions about where solutions should come from and what 
those solutions should be. In the hopes of galvanizing political and social 
momentum, the divestment campaign creates a new story complete with plot, 
conflict, good guys and bad guys, foreshadowing, and imagery to help rearticulate 
the terms upon which climate change is understood. When institutions divest they 
help legitimize, publicize and reproduce this new story. The purpose of fossil fuel 
divestment is therefore to generate a discursive shift that opens up possibilities for 
the rearticulation of climate change solutions. Before discussing exactly how the 
campaign does this, the case study will first provide evidence of the extent to 
which divestment has become an influential force in climate politics through a 
brief history of the campaign and its accomplishments to date. 
 
History of Fossil Fuel Divestment 
 
Divestment veteran and Divestment Student Network organizer, Jess Grady-
Benson has written the most comprehensive early history of the campaign in her 
senior year dissertation: Fossil Fuel Divestment: The Power and Promise of a 
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Student Movement for Climate Justice. Here she argues that divestment as a 
climate justice tactic first emerged in early spring of 2011 at Swarthmore College 
in Pennsylvania (Grady-Benson, 2014). It began with Swarthmore Mountain 
Justice, a student group organizing with communities adversely affected by the 
coal extraction process known as mountain top removal. They decided they could 
most effectively act in solidarity with those communities by urging their college 
to divest from coal companies carrying out the process in the local Appalachian 
Mountains. Grady-Benson quotes Will Lawrence, a founding member of the 
divestment campaign at Swarthmore saying: 
We felt really strongly that peoples’ awareness of mountaintop 
removal and the issues would be greatly enhanced if there was a 
struggle happening at our school and we could find a way to make it 
relevant to the policy at Swarthmore… The financial connections 
were a way to do that. (Lawrence, quoted in Grady-Benson, 2014, 
26) 
 
The Sierra Club picked up this simple logic with the Sierra Students Coalition’s 
Campuses Beyond Coal campaign and the fledging campaign spread to the 
University of North Carolina Chapel Hill and the University of Illinois Urbana-
Champaign (Grady-Benson, 2014, 26). The California Student Sustainability 
Coalition (CSSC) adopted the campaign soon afterwards, and with support from 
the Divest Coal Coalition comprised of several foundations and NGOs, the 
campaign ballooned into a targeted strategy against the “Filthy Fifteen” – the 
fifteen most polluting coal companies. As of the spring of 2012, however, the 
nascent divestment campaign had yet to extend its influence beyond more than a 
dozen or so campuses across the US.  
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This was to change in the summer of 2012. On July 19th Bill McKibben published 
a highly influential article entitled “Global Warming’s Terrifying New Math – 
Three simple numbers that add up to catastrophe and make clear who the enemy 
is.” This article laid out the fundamental logic that drives the divestment 
campaign. The article appeared in Rolling Stone magazine and was immensely 
popular. It was the issue with pop icon Justin Bieber on the cover and, as 
McKibben is fond of reminding audiences, his article got ten times more likes on 
Facebook than Justin Bieber’s (350.org, 2013). The article has been liked and 
shared on social media thousands of times and it is no exaggeration to say that it is 
now one of the most influential pieces of climate journalism ever written. 
 
In fall 2012, riding on the waves of success and popularity of the article, climate 
change NGO 350.org adopted the campaign, launched it under the name Fossil 
Free and deployed the revamped strategy against the 200 most polluting fossil fuel 
companies (Fossil Free, 2016). With impressive funding and resources, Fossil 
Free has become the face of the now global divestment campaign calling upon 
publicly visible institutions like universities to divest their holdings from oil, coal 
and gas companies. Accompanying the campaign’s launch McKibben and the 
350.org team set off on a tour of college campuses around the US, helping to 
establish some of the first Fossil Free campus campaigns. In 2013 recently 
graduated alumni and student activists set up the Divestment Student Network 
(DSN) to support campaigns across the US with trainings, organizing 
convergences, and most importantly bringing a specifically climate justice 
orientation to the forefront of the movement (Fossil Fuel Divestment Student 
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Network, 2016).  As of this writing there exist more than 500 hundred Fossil Free 
campaigns on college campuses across the US, Europe, and Australasia (Fossil 
Free, 2016).  
 
The approximate value of assets that have now been withheld from coal and/or 
gas, and/or oil stands at $3.4 trillion, with several billion having been directly 
divested from coal, oil or gas companies (ibid.). Worldwide a total of 503 
institutions have committed to divestment, primarily in the United States. Notable 
divestment commitments include the Rockefeller Brother’s Fund, The World 
Council of Churches, the British Medical Association, the Guardian Media Group, 
the University of Warwick, Oxford University (coal and tar sands only) and 
Stanford University (from coal only) (ibid.). In the summer of 2015 the University 
of California withdrew its direct holdings from coal and tar sands development. 
However it did not establish a policy preventing reinvestment in these companies 
in the future (Gordon, 2015). A report from The Smith’s School of Environment 
and Enterprise at Oxford University found that the fossil fuel divestment 
campaign is the fastest growing divestment campaign ever (Ansar, Caldecott and 
Tilbury, 2013). The influence this campaign has had on youth climate activism in 
the global North is clearly formidable; as such it is important that the campaign’s 
contribution to climate politics and discourse is understood fully and 
systematically. 
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Fossil Free UC – Background and History 
 
This case study is primarily concerned with the example of the fossil fuel 
divestment campaign operating on campuses throughout the University of 
California system. Fossil Free UC is a particularly illustrative and interesting 
example not only because it is one of the oldest and hard fought divestment 
campaigns in the US but also because the ambiguity of its apparent success to date 
forces observers to ask critical questions about the actual influence and power the 
broader campaign has had. As an example of a campaign very intentionally 
oriented around climate justice (Rast, 2015), it also offers readers a glimpse of the 
complicated relationship between climate justice and fossil fuel divestment. 
 
Managing funds worth around $91 billion, representing 10 campuses, 238,000 
students, 190,000 faculty and staff, and 1.7 million living alumni, the UC is 
undoubtedly an institution with enormous political clout and public influence 
(University	of	California, 2016; ucop.edu, 2016). Fossil Free came to the UC in 
late 2012 and early 2013 and campaigns are most active at UC Berkeley, UC 
Santa Cruz and UC Santa Barbara. These campaigns tend to have a membership 
of between 10-20 students and all have the backing of their respective student 
bodies (fossilfreeuc.org, 2016). UC Santa Barbara, UC Santa Cruz, and UC San 
Diego Fossil Free campaigns have the backing of their respective faculty senates 
as well. The UCLA and UC San Diego campaigns have taken longer to establish 
themselves but are currently growing. The campaign at UC Davis lost momentum 
when its more experienced organizers graduated, while attempts to organize 
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campaigns at UC Irvine, UC Merced and UC Riverside have been made but have 
had difficulty gaining traction (fossilfreeuc.org, 2016).   
 
The Fossil Free UC campaign is comprised of student organizers coordinating 
divestment campaigns on all of the operational UC campuses. Fossil Free UC 
operates on two fields; the first is the individual campus level. At each campus 
student activists lobby local stakeholders and officials, organize events and 
actions, educate the student body, and build a broad base of understanding and 
support amongst the campus population. On the second field they specifically 
lobby the UC Regents, their advisors and particularly the Chief Investment 
Officer (CIO). These are the people with the power to actually divest the UC 
endowment from fossil fuels but students believe they will only do so when they 
are under enough pressure from students and other UC stakeholders. This kind of 
pressure can include anything from having lunch with Regents or lobbying them 
in committees, to escalatory actions such as sit ins, mike checks, walk outs, as 
well as full scale protests and embarrassing publicity stunts at the quarterly 
Regents’ meetings (Hannon, 2015). 
 
There is a Fossil Free UC core team that mediates between the two very different 
fields and plans UC-wide strategy. More general strategy and campaign direction 
is then agreed upon at campus convergences and retreats. Fossil Free UC currently 
operates with a core-organizing group comprised of student representatives from 
UCLA, UC Berkeley, UC Santa Barbara and UC Santa Cruz. The Fossil Free UC 
campaign director from the California Students Sustainability Coalition (CSSC) 
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tends to facilitate the core group. CSSC also employs two field organizers to help 
train campus activists and take care of administration. The campaign strategy has 
been to open the door for negotiations with power-holders while increasing 
pressure through building student power, gaining endorsements from influential 
stakeholders, and holding campus demonstrations. While some have argued for a 
more antagonistic strategy, for legitimacy’s sake it is seen as important to ensure 
that the democratic channels of communication are exhausted before escalating 
with more confrontational tactics (Soiffer, 2015a). 
 
Fossil Free UC first took divestment to the UC Regents in May of 2013 where, 
after presenting in public comment, they were by and large ignored. Undeterred 
and inspired by each other’s presence students went back to their respective 
campuses to build a movement that the Regents could not ignore. Eventually the 
campaign was rewarded with the Regent’s promise of a taskforce committee to 
investigate the question of divestment and advise the Regents’ Committee on 
Investments (COI).  Despite their own report finding that divestment would have 
negligible to no impact on investment returns the taskforce decided against 
divestment (Soiffer, Fernandez and Brodie, 2015). The taskforce met in person for 
a total of four hours over the five months of its existence and disbanded after the 
CIO, Jagdeep Bachher, made a decision on divestment without consulting it. In 
the spring of 2014, Fossil Free UC’s core team discovered that Mr. Bachher 
would not wait for the taskforce’s recommendation and would make a 
recommendation to the Regents himself, advising them to reject divestment 
(Hannon, 2015). He was only forced to back down when dozens of angry 
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students, professors and alumni telephoned the CIO’s office to demand an 
explanation. 
 
Perhaps in the hopes of appeasing the student campaigners the UC Regents voted 
to ignore divestment and instead introduce an Environmental and Social 
Governance (ESG) investment framework along with committing $1 billion 
towards “climate solutions” in September 2014 (Leuty, 2014). Far from appeased, 
students were inspired by the seemingly direct impact of their lobbying on the 
UC’s investment policy. Divestment campaigners committed to redoubling their 
efforts in the knowledge that their actions were able to influence UC decision 
makers. At roughly the same time divestment campaigns around the US where 
students had had their divestment demands denied, began escalating their own 
campaigns with civil disobedience and several arrests (Fossil Free Yale, 2016; 
Divest Harvard, 2016).  Finally, in September 2015, at a meeting divestment 
campaigners had not even been told about, Jagdeep Bachher announced that the 
UC had finished “dis-investing” from direct holdings in coal companies and tar 
sands development (Bachher, 2015a). As of writing, the Fossil Free UC campaign 
is redoubling its efforts on campuses, urging the UC to “divest the rest” and go 
100% fossil free as well as laying the foundations for a push towards reinvestment 
campaigning too.  
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Reading Divestment as a (Re)Framing Narrative in the Context of Climate 
Discourse: 
To revoke public support from the fossil fuel industry, we need to 
win the battle of the story. The public usually hears two different 
narratives – one from our movement, and the other from our 
opponents. Their story says that everything is okay, the industry and 
the government will take care of this crisis. Our story says that this 
crisis can only be solved if we break the power of the fossil fuel 
industry, which is incompatible with a just and stable future. (Fossil 
Free, 2016) 
 
It is this case study’s contention that fossil fuel divestment can and should be read 
as a reframing narrative strategy. As argued in Chapter One, structuring discursive 
conditions through narrative, and stories more generally, is a potent form of 
maintaining social control or mobilizing social change (Selbin, 2010). This 
section exposes the Fossil Free campaign’s narrative qualities before 
demonstrating their significance in the context of climate politics. 
 
The Climate Discourse that Divestment’s Narrative Seeks to Change 
 
Divestment deliberately seeks to change narrative and public discourse around 
climate change to one that is perceived as more suited to the crisis at hand by 
forming a new narrative. This narrative legitimizes a particular set of climate 
solutions Fossil Free activists believe to be both necessary and just (Soiffer, 
2015a). The divestment narrative helps creates a major shift away from the 
climate discourses of the 1990s and early 2000s and the false solutions divestment 
activists argue they legitimized (ibid.). Divestment campaigners recognize that 
individual changes in lifestyle are not going to solve the climate crisis. Instead 
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they argue that not only do the attempts to encourage changes in individual 
consumption fail to excite or inspire audiences, but they also trivialize the crisis 
by matching it with inadequate, individualistic solutions (Fernandez, 2015). 
Moreover, these atomized individualist solutions let the real culprits off the hook 
(Soiffer, 2015a).  To paraphrase one UCSC divestment campaigner, there are 
systemic factors, like the inordinate amount of power fossil fuel companies have 
over politicians, which must be resolved to solve the systemic crisis of climate 
change (Phinney, 2015). Divestment campaigns therefore reproduce, legitimize 
and disseminate a narrative that turns climate change into a collective political, 
economic and moral crisis, one that cannot be solved by changing light bulbs, or 
buying a Prius, or becoming a vegan. The narrative represents a broader shift 
away from mainstream environmentalism and towards a hybrid movement of 
movements demanding systemic change. In this sense, then, it is a 
counterhegemonic climate justice narrative.  
 
The Divestment Narrative 
 
In the divestment narrative climate change ceases to be an apolitical abstraction, 
devoid of agency and appeased only by the individual’s sacrifice of their 
consumerist lifestyle, and instead becomes a socially mediated force unleashed 
upon the world by a group of wealthy elites and politicians in the pocket of fossil 
fuel lobbyists. Their interests must be resisted through galvanizing social 
momentum and mobilizing an almighty political struggle. Needless to say, the 
trope of the big greedy corporation screwing the little guy is hardly original but 
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the popularity with which this narrative has already met suggests that divestment’s 
narrative has more to offer. 
 
Reinsborough and Canning at the Centre for Story-Based Strategy (CSS) argue 
that social change narratives, just like any other narrative, must include five key 
elements: Characters, conflict, imagery, foreshadowing and underlying 
assumptions (Reinsborough and Canning, 2010, 38-9). They encourage agents of 
social change to ask the following: What is the conflict upon which the story 
rests? Who are the characters supposed to represent, are they relatable? How does 
the imagery engage with people’s values? What promises or future does the story 
give to the resolution of the conflict? What are the underlying assumptions that 
must be accepted in order to believe the narrative is true (ibid.)? The narrative that 
the divestment campaign seeks to legitimize exhibits all of these components as 
demonstrated through the subsequent examples. 
 
What is the Conflict Upon Which the Story Rests? 
 
The conflict upon which divestment’s narrative rests is a simple one of good 
versus evil. Like most good stories the conflict is an intensely moral one. There is 
no ambiguity as to who represents the “good guys” and who represents the “bad 
guys.” The conflict transforms climate change into a profoundly moral question. 
As 350.org’s divestment organizer Becca Rast says, it forces a “choice point” 
(Rast, 2015). Those engaging with the story must choose between the fossil fuel 
industry and frontline communities whose lives and livelihoods they threaten, or 
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between the fossil fuel industry and young people whose future and security they 
threaten. In this story audiences must choose whether they will support and fight 
along side the climate movement against the fossil fuel industry or whether they 
will remain complacent and submit to the industry’s interests. At the local level 
the conflict is over the morality of remaining invested in fossil fuel companies 
while being fully aware of the destruction they have and are prepared to unleash. 
At the macro level, however, the conflict is over whether or not the fossil fuel 
industry will be prevented from extracting and burning five times more coal oil 
and gas than even the most conservative estimates say is safe to burn. It is a 
civilizational and existential conflict in which only one outcome may guarantee 
survival. 
  
Who Are the Characters Supposed to Represent, Are They Relatable? 
 
The characters, already alluded to, represent those whom the fossil fuel industry 
and the climate crisis threaten most: young people and frontline communities – 
particularly indigenous communities and low-income communities of color. 
Students therefore play a central role in representing young people resisting the 
fossil fuel industry’s extractivism as well as drawing attention to the resilience of 
communities fighting the injustice of fossil fuel infrastructure located in their 
neighborhoods and which render their lives and livelihoods expendable (Hannon, 
2015).  These are clearly the protagonists of the story while the fossil fuel industry 
is just as obviously the antagonist. The role of politicians and university decision 
makers, for example, is more ambiguous, however. Politicians are the ones who 
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take the money from fossil fuel industries yet divestment is also supposed to 
create the political cover for politicians to enforce more ambitious climate 
legislation. Similarly decision makers like the UC Regents or the CIOs are often 
construed as colluding with the fossil fuel industry while also being the ones who 
will ultimately make the decision to divest.  
 
How Does the Imagery Engage With People’s Values?  
 
The metaphors and symbolism that the divestment narrative employs are carefully 
constructed to demonize and delegitimize the industry and make those fighting it 
more relatable. The crucial image, however, is not a portrayal of either the good 
guys or the bad guys but of the climate crisis itself. Rejecting the emaciated polar 
bears and distant melting ice caps of the old environmentalism, the divestment 
narrative deploys imagery evoking the human face of climate change and the 
human face of the struggle against extractivism. This imagery is integral to the 
moral claims that make divestment and its sub-imagery all the more tangible. 
“The resistance” to fossil fuel infrastructure, for example, is a consistent image 
that the divestment narrative evokes. Those fighting on the frontlines are 
portrayed as heroes but their resistance is also humanized to the extent that 
everyone at national divestment convergences knows the name of Crystal 
Lameman and her tribe, the Beaver Lake Cree, fighting tar sands extraction in 
Alberta, Canada (Klein, 2014). Meanwhile, the fossil fuel industry is 
dehumanized, lumped in with the amorphous, ill-defined but very definitely 
malevolent “system” against which the resistance is targeted. To a certain extent 
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the university’s endowment and investments could also be an example of imagery. 
These investments represent the direct link between the institutions students pay 
for and study at and funding of the climate crisis. One of the divestment 
campaign’s most basic slogans is “stop funding the climate crisis.” Student 
activists often demonstrate the hypocrisy of attending an institution that is 
supposed to prepare them for the future while also having that future destroyed for 
them thanks to the investment decisions of that very same institution.  
 
What Promises or Future Does the Story Give to the Resolution of the Conflict?  
 
The divestment narrative foreshadows two futures: one in which, as McKibben 
puts it “the planet tanks” (350.org, 2013), and one in which climate catastrophe is 
not only averted, but, when a climate justice lens is added, a more just and 
sustainable society is established. Again audiences must choose, this time between 
these two futures – which will they support and fight for? Fossil Free has also 
begun experimenting with the inclusion of a reinvestment campaign to accompany 
the narrative (Fernandez, 2015). This makes foreshadowing an even more 
prominent feature of the campaign. For example campaigns are likely to begin 
challenging their institutions to “move a portion of [their] money into community-
owned energy projects” (Rast, 2015). Divestment from fossil fuel and 
reinvestment in community-owned energy projects is an excellent example of the 
kind of foreshadowing of solutions that climate justice-oriented divestment 
activists want to see. 
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What Are the Underlying Assumptions That Must Be Accepted in Order to Believe 
the Narrative is True? 
The divestment narrative rests on several assumptions that its audience must 
accept in order to believe it is true. The first and most obvious is that climate 
change is real and is caused by humans. The divestment narrative doesn’t make 
much sense to those who do not believe in climate change. Another assumption is 
that investors should make investment decisions in alignment with their morals. 
Many investors try to keep the two separate so the divestment message has little 
purchase on them. Finally, the audience must buy into the assumption that 
preventing the climate crisis and preventing the fossil fuel industry from burning 
all of its reserves is the morally right thing to do. Many of the narrative’s sub-
frames help audiences accept these assumptions but it has to be noted that 
narratives exist in contested environments and are rarely simply accepted. 
 
Fossil fuel divestment includes all the classic elements of narrative. Reinsborough 
and Canning also explain social change narratives need to do more: “Organizers 
rely on storytelling to build relationships, unite constituencies, name problems, 
and mobilize people” (Reinsborough and Canning, 2010, 12). Therefore it is 
important to examine the extent to which the divestment narrative accomplishes 
these. Divestment has built relationships through a message that unites 
constituencies.  Student campaigners are united with frontline communities and 
the broader climate justice movement through confronting the same crisis. The 
divestment narrative also names the problem very explicitly as the fossil fuel 
industry’s willingness to let warming exceed two degrees. Finally, the divestment 
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movement mobilizes people, particularly students, by showing them their stake in 
the crisis and a clear path to confronting it. The divestment narrative clearly 
includes all the elements of a successful social change narrative.  
 
Divestment is a (Re)Framing Narrative  
 
George Marshall writes that “we interpret climate change through frames, which 
focus our attention but limit our understanding” (Marshall, 2014, 233). 
Divestment’s narrative seeks to persuade its audiences that responsibility for the 
climate crisis lies first and foremost with the industry doing most to cause it and 
the politicians letting them get away with it. This reframes the climate crisis. 
“Frames,” according to Marshall, “define battle grounds” and as George Lakoff 
famously remarked “whoever frames the debate tends to win the debate” (ibid.; 
Lakoff quoted in Reinsborough and Canning, 2010, 38). Framing theory is 
incredibly important to the divestment context because reframing climate change 
is precisely what divestment’s narrative does.  
 
George Marshall best describes the situation divestment seeks to reframe when he 
writes: “The early focus on tailpipe emissions rather than wellhead production 
became a meta-frame that influenced all subsequent narratives concerning the 
definition of the problem, moral responsibility, and policy solutions” (Marshall, 
2014, 228). The focus on tailpipe emissions, or individual responsibility, is the 
meta-frame that divestment seeks to displace. The tailpipe represents pollution 
from cars’ exhaust fumes and so emphasizes consumption. The “tailpipe 
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emissions” frame has reinforced neoliberal individualism, atomized responses, 
and ultimately seen the rise of many false solutions to the crisis. The wellhead 
production represents an emphasis on the responsibility of producers of fossil 
fuels, i.e. fossil fuel companies. The shift from tailpipe emissions to wellhead 
production shifts responsibility. It moves climate narratives away from the 
unsuccessful fear and guilt-based appeals of mainstream environmentalism that 
serve only to anger or paralyze their audience and sends them toward a critique of 
the industry and the power that the existing political order upholds (Weintrobe et 
al., 2013, 36, 93; Marshall, 2014, 227).  
 
The divestment narrative contains three core frames and several sub-frames that 
can be found in the Fossil Free online communications toolkit:  
 
• “Frame: The fossil fuel industry is incompatible with a just & sustainable 
future. 
o Message example: “If it is wrong to wreck the planet, then it is 
wrong to profit from that wreckage.” 
• Frame: Social, racial, & economic justice 
o Message example: “The fossil fuel industry perpetuates racial & 
economic injustice.” 
o Message example: “If it is wrong to poison communities, then it is 
wrong to profit from that poisoning.” 
• Frame: Our social & moral responsibility as institutions for the greater 
good. 
o Message example: “Investments in fossil fuels are a denial of 
climate science”” (Fossil Free USA, 2016).  
 
They list some of the campaign’s sub-frames more briefly: 
 
• Urgency of climate crisis 
• Fiscal responsibility 
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• Social responsibility & moral imperative 
• The future of our generation 
• Historical importance of student movements 
• The fossil fuel industry’s business plan is incompatible with life on this 
planet 
• Reinvestment in just & sustainable solutions (ibid.). 
 
These frames lead into some of the fundamental arguments divestment campaigns 
deploy to convince a wide range of audiences. Crucially, different frames can be 
deployed and emphasized depending on different audiences (Soiffer, 2015a). For 
example when lobbying a UC Regent campaigners tend to emphasize fiscal 
responsibility or how divestment will impact the university’s legacy. When 
engaging with media, however, campaigners emphasize the moral imperative and 
social responsibility driving divestment decisions. All these framings help 
undermine the legitimacy of the fossil fuel industry and shift the terms of the 
debate.  
 
Reinsborough and Canning explain that “since an audience’s existing stories will 
filter new facts or information, change agents need to offer a new story” (2010, 
46). It is therefore necessary to reframe the terms of understanding. Reframing 
undermines assumptions of the old story and presents issues in a different, more 
persuasive light (Reinsborough and Canning, 2010, 52). By offering a new story 
with new characters, new frames and new terms of understanding, divestment 
activists are deploying what could be called a reframing narrative.  According to 
Reinsborough and Canning, “frames operate as pre-existing narrative lenses in our 
minds” (Reinsborough and Canning, 2010, 121).  Divestment as a story creates a 
new lens through which to see the climate crisis, and, as such, is both a frame and 
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a narrative at the same time. George Lakoff writes that  “Facts are all-important. 
They are crucial. But they must be framed appropriately if they are to be an 
effective part of public discourse” (Lakoff, 2014, 154). The divestment narrative 
reframes the facts of climate change within an accessible and engaging story and 
displaces previous framings which have been alienating, boring, or 
counterproductive (Anderson, 2012; Marshall, 2014; McKibben, 2012; Weintrobe 
et al., 2013). This counter narrative is capable of creating discursive opportunities 
for counterhegemony and radical social change. 
 
How Does Divestment Counter Hegemonic Climate Discourse? 
 
That divestment is a counterhegemonic strategy is not immediately obvious and 
indeed, as many interviewees with Fossil Free UC activists made clear, 
divestment only truly confronts dominant power structures when intentionally 
deployed to do so (Hannon, 2015; Phinney, 2015; Rast, 2015). Divestment is not 
necessarily counterhegemonic because simply undermining the power of the fossil 
fuel industry (or “big oil” which could just as easily be replaced by “big solar”) 
arguably leaves contemporary structures of power and discursive hegemony 
mostly intact. However, it is also the case that much of the divestment 
movement’s leadership has embraced a climate justice lens and is intentionally 
moving the campaign in the direction of confronting deep-rooted power structures 
(Rast, 2015).  When divestment campaigns align themselves with the principles of 
climate justice and work to create discursive space for alternative climate 
solutions they can be considered counterhegemonic. More importantly, most 
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divestment campaigns are oriented towards climate justice (ibid.). As the addition 
of “If it is wrong to wreck the planter, it is wrong to profit from that wreckage” to 
“If it is wrong to poison communities, it is wrong to profit from that poisoning” in 
the Fossil Free communications tool kit shows, climate justice and an emphasis on 
the communities most effected are being institutionalized in the campaign’s 
messaging.  This is also something the Fossil Free UC campaign has very 
deliberately cultivated. 
 
The divestment narrative can be used to construct counterhegemonic climate 
discourse in several ways. Firstly, its framing shifts the terms of the debate from 
Marshall’s “tailpipe to wellhead” narrative. Secondly, as Rast puts it, it forces a 
“choice point” – the construction of a clear enemy persuades audiences to choose 
the side of resistance. Thirdly, it helps create discursive space for subaltern 
climate solutions. And finally, it shifts the broader climate movement’s 
orientation toward embracing the climate justice lens. Together, these four 
processes undermine prevailing climate change narratives and position climate 
justice as a contending alternative. When institutions with a large public audience 
divest from fossil fuels they are helping to legitimize this counter narrative and 
subaltern solutions. 
 
From Tailpipe Emissions to Wellhead Production 
 
As explained my literature review, Kevin Anderson’s research shows that the 
climate crisis cannot be resolved within neoliberalism’s growth paradigm 
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(Anderson, 2012). Naomi Klein has gone farther to make the case that capitalism 
itself is incompatible with a stable climate (Klein, 2014). Changes in individual 
consumer choice are not going to stop the climate crisis, nor are market forces on 
their own, nor a reliance on future technologies (ibid.). Chapter One also argued 
that climate communications, and particularly climate justice communicators, 
must catch up with this reality. Divestment can and does help communicate this 
reality. The previous section showed how the divestment framing narrative shifts 
emphasis away from the atomized individual and onto the social causes of climate 
change. It places particular emphasis on the inordinate amount of influence the 
fossil fuel industry has over political decision makers but also more generally the 
role that economic elites and neoliberal globalization have played in eroding 
democracy (Fernandez, 2015). This exemplifies the framing shift from tailpipe 
emissions to wellhead production.  
 
Leading activists in the Fossil Free UC campaign regard this element of the 
narrative as integral to divestment’s overall purpose. As Victoria Fernandez put is 
“the way we're talking about climate now is that there are certain actors who are 
in positions of power … and those actors aren't held accountable to the decisions 
that they've been making” (ibid.). Alden Phinney is more blunt: “I think 
divestment has opened this giant conversation about "what the fuck are we 
doing?!” “How have we let this happen?!”” (Phinney, 2015). These two former 
student members of the UC Regent’s taskforce on divestment provide some of the 
more biting critiques based on confronting the tailpipe emissions narrative and 
how divestment challenges it. The extent to which divestment is tied to a systemic 
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critique of the power allotted to economic elites and the positioning of economic 
growth as an unquestionable imperative is revealed in interviews with each of the 
Fossil Free UC activists. However, the critique is also implicit in Fossil Free’s 
frames. Fossil Free’s critique may be of the fossil fuel industry but it draws upon a 
discursive opportunity structure that has etched an understanding of economic 
elites corrupting democracy into public consciousness since at least the Occupy 
Wall Street protests (Gitlin, 2012; Rast, 2015). In this way the fossil fuel industry 
and its lobbying power is inherently attached to a broader understanding of 
corporate power and the hijacking of democratic institutions.  
 
The tailpipe emissions narrative and the emphasis on individual consumption have 
excluded an enormous segment of the population (Fernandez, 2015). As many 
critiques of the popular film Cowspiracy point out, going vegan to reduce one’s 
personal contribution to agricultural emissions is certainly important but many 
people cannot afford a healthy vegan lifestyle, and many frontlines communities 
depend upon hunting and fishing for their livelihoods (Chivers, 2016). Similarly, 
condemning those who drive pick up trucks is alienating, calling for people to 
install solar panels fails to recognize it as an option available only for the 
relatively wealthy, and demanding everyone change their light bulbs is both 
farcically inadequate and downplays the severity of the crisis. Meanwhile just 90 
fossil fuel companies are responsible for two-thirds of all fossil fuel emissions 
since 1750, just seven are responsible for almost fifteen-percent of global 
emissions, and according to the IMF, the world’s governments subsidize this at 
$10 million a minute (Clark, 2013; Carrington, 2015). Scrolling through the 
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different Fossil Free UC social media pages yields all this information very 
efficiently. The wellhead frame that divestment reinforces thus helps audiences 
reprioritize solutions, engage with them sensibly, and demonstrates how the real 
problem is not only the fossil fuel companies but also a political establishment 
that enables them to do what they do (Fernandez, 2015). This all serves to 
undermine the legitimacy of that establishment and create discursive space for 
climate justice solutions. 
 
Creating an Enemy and Choosing Sides 
 
The subtitle of McKibben’s crucial article reads: Three simple numbers that add 
up to global catastrophe - and that make clear who the real enemy is. In this 
opening salvo McKibben sets the tone of an important element that has helped 
define the divestment campaign – the creation of an enemy. In reframing the 
terms of the debate, divestment forces a choice point (Rast, 2015). It seeks to 
establish a simple dualism – the audience must choose between siding with the 
fossil fuel industry or those resisting it. The characters and conflict in the narrative 
are obviously constructed to persuade audiences to side with the latter. Clearly 
matters are more complicated than this dualism, particularly with regards to oil 
field workers or coal miners who stand to lose their livelihoods if the fossil fuel 
industry collapses. Moreover, audiences, like the UC Regents for example, can 
always choose to reject the premise of the story altogether and therefore reject this 
dualism. However, for the less critical audience the reasons for siding with the 
resistance are compelling and it is not difficult to portray an industry with an 
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environmental injustice and human rights track record as abysmal as fossil fuel 
companies’ as the “bad guys.” By siding with the resistance against fossil fuel 
infrastructure the audience bolsters their support and provides cover for politicians 
and decision makers to turn against fossil fuel interests, as well as legitimizing a 
set of solutions that the resistance to fossil fuels presents. 
 
This choice point also exposes the relationship politicians have with industry and 
seeks to break it (Fernandez, 2015). This is essential if divestment is to work. 
Politicians must be seen as siding with the enemy when they take money from the 
industry, subsidize it, or support its infrastructure (Rast, 2015). If this reaches 
critical mass, at least according to the logic of divestment (and certainly supported 
by previous campaigns and Oxford’s Smith’s School report), then politicians will 
be less likely to risk association with the industry, thereby undermining its 
political influence. This is significant for climate justice firstly because when the 
power of the fossil fuel industry decreases, frontlines resistance to fossil fuel 
infrastructure will become easier. It is also important because while the ultimate 
objective of climate justice is radical system change, having politicians in power 
who will not contest climate justice solutions – or who might even facilitate a just 
transition – is more likely when they are not under the influence of the fossil fuel 
industry. An important caveat is of course, that just because fossil fuel lobbyists 
are no longer able to influence politicians doesn’t mean other corporate sponsors 
whose interests do not align with climate justice won’t influence them. While true, 
removing the fossil fuel industry as an impediment to climate justice solutions 
would still be an important victory for climate justice. 
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Creating Discursive Space for Subaltern Solutions  
 
Reinsborough and Canning write that “popular culture is an ever-evolving, 
contested space of struggle, where competing voices, experiences, and 
perspectives fight to answer the questions: whose maps determine what is 
meaningful? Whose stories are considered true?” (Reinsborough and Canning, 
2010, 19). Divestment intervenes in this struggle to provide a piece of one such 
map. The dominant discourses in which prevailing climate narratives are 
embedded legitimize solutions that reproduce and reinforce contemporary 
dynamics of power. Divestment undermines prevailing climate narratives and in 
so doing undermines the solutions and power structures these narratives 
legitimize. In a Gramscian sense the legitimacy crisis in hegemonic climate 
discourse that divestment creates could help subaltern solutions break into public 
consciousness. As activists from Fossil Free UC make clear they are very 
intentionally trying to create the discursive space for climate justice analysis and 
solutions to be accepted into popular culture.  For example, one activist who 
wished to remain anonymous remarked, “I see divestment as opening up spaces 
for those fights to be heard and to be uplifted;” divestment is “rooted in using your 
position at the university to create space to share these stories” (Anonymous, 
2015). In this way Fossil Free both magnifies struggles that for too long have 
fallen under what Rob Nixon would call slow violence and draws attention to the 
solutions frontline communities have pioneered.  
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Divestment campaigns and narratives can also provide an excellent base from 
which to launch a more critical analysis.  Alden Phinney explains this well, stating 
that: 
You're never really going to end the capitalist system with a tactic 
that relies on capitalism…It really provides a space that’s not too 
scary to jump into…[to] get involved in divestment and see that 
there is a lot more wrong with the world than just fossil fuel 
subsidies.” (Phinney, 2015) 
 
Activists and audiences alike engage with the divestment narrative and connect it 
to many of the systemic problems that have led to the climate crisis. In time a 
more radical critique can be cultivated and the credibility of subaltern solutions is 
strengthened. Moreover, through nascent reinvestment campaigns Fossil Free 
seeks to consolidate upon the discursive space it has won for the movement by 
directing investments towards climate justice solutions that frontline communities 
are developing (Rast, 2015). Investments in the subaltern solutions, or even just 
the struggle to get institutions like the UC to invest in them, could have a huge 
discursive impact in terms of bringing them into the public eye and legitimizing 
them.  
 
Changing the Climate Movement From the Inside Out 
  
Finally, divestment helps to counter hegemonic climate discourse by shifting the 
terms of debate within the mainstream climate movement. This is perhaps where 
Fossil Free has been most successful. Transforming climate change into the moral 
crisis that it is also undermines the technocratic and managerial approach of 
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hegemonic climate discourse. As Jake Soiffer puts it “people who joined the 
movement with a very whitewashed perspective now get climate justice a lot 
better and are much more committed to long term organizing” (Soiffer, 2015a). 
He went on to say that: 
Ten years ago the youth environmental movement was very much 
controlled by capitalists, middle and upper middle class white folks 
who didn't share political analysis, who were not committed to 
confrontation or long term organizing. Divestment has started to 
change that. (ibid.) 
 
Divestment has helped politicize the movement. Becca Rast affirms this and adds 
that there has been a “narrative shift to humanize the impacts of the climate crisis 
and weave that into divestment over the past three years” (Rast, 2015). 
Divestment’s role in humanizing the climate crisis has been significant. The 
divestment narrative draws attention to the fossil fuel industry’s abuses and the 
frontlines communities resisting fossil fuel infrastructure as well as the changes in 
climate the industry is already causing. In giving its climate narrative relatable 
characters and a worthy struggle divestment helps humanize the crisis. Almost all 
the interviews with the Fossil Free activists demonstrate that it was this 
humanizing frame that brought them into the divestment campaign. Abandoning 
the polar bears and melting ice caps imagery for frames that encapsulate the 
human cost of climate change has been a vital shift key to the climate movement’s 
survival. 
 
The impacts of divestment’s humanizing rhetoric, its call to “keep it in the 
ground” and the educating role it has played in bringing the struggles of 
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indigenous communities to the heart of youth climate organizing were all on 
display at the COP 21 in Paris of 2015 (LeQuesne, 2016). On the final day of the 
COP hundreds of youth climate activists from all political spectrums of climate 
activism – many of whom were active in divestment campaigns – marched out of 
the conference centers, rejecting the false solutions being forced through the COP 
and instead embraced the Indigenous Environmental Networks’ Keep it in the 
Ground Declaration (ibid.). The declaration is ultimately a climate justice 
manifesto and to see some of the youth climate movements’ most active members 
endorse it is testament to the shift that has changed the movement from the inside 
out (IEN, 2015). In this way the broader, better funded, and more visible climate 
movement may be beginning to adopt the lens of climate justice. When 
institutions like the UC divest from fossil fuels for moral reasons the humanized 
climate narrative is popularized and reinforced. This is all very well, but the 
question we must now ask is, “is it working?” 
 
Is Divestment Working? 
 
The answer to whether on not divestment is successfully shifting discursive 
conditions is the lynchpin upon which this case study depends. If, despite all its 
intentions, Fossil Free has had no discursive impact upon its intended audiences 
then encouraging other climate justice campaigns to adopt similar narrative 
strategies is not justifiable – at least on these terms. If on the other hand, this case 
study can show that Fossil Free has either galvanized or reinforced a discursive 
shift through narrative strategy, then it may set an example that other climate 
	 93	
justice campaigns could draw upon. Unfortunately, tracing a particular narrative 
shift in the space of less than five years back to a single campaign is exceedingly 
difficult. Also, while one of the most significant examples, Fossil Free is by no 
means the only climate campaign experimenting with rhetoric and narrative of the 
kind discussed in this thesis. Moreover, how to actually measure discursive shifts 
is a problem that for brevity’s sake must remain outside the remit of this work. To 
make matters more simple, this case study asks a series of questions that may help 
readers arrive upon a more satisfactory answer. In answering these, the study finds 
strong evidence suggesting that divestment is indeed working but also that the 
campaign must do much more to affect larger and more diverse audiences. 
 
Why Should it Work? 
 
Divestment, understood as a narrative strategy, should work for all the reasons 
outlined in the previous section. According to the theory presented in Chapter One 
and the testimonies of activists presented throughout this case study, reframing the 
story, reorienting the climate movement, creating a clear enemy, presenting a 
clear struggle and humanizing the crisis should all work to displace dominant 
climate narratives and insert subaltern ones.  Moreover, the much alluded to report 
from Oxford University – the one that found that the fossil fuel divestment 
campaign is the fastest growing divestment campaign ever – provides some more 
tangible analysis of the direct impact divestment is having on the fossil fuel 
industry (Ansar, Caldecott and Tilbury, 2013). First and foremost, it must be 
noted that the purpose of divestment is not to bankrupt the fossil fuel industry. As 
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McKibben himself has said, the fossil fuel industry is “the wealthiest industry in 
the history of money,” divestment commitments will not hurt their profits at least 
in the short term (350.org, 2015; Grady-Benson, 2014, 119). The Oxford report 
concurs: 
Even if the maximum possible capital was divested from fossil fuel 
companies, their share prices are unlikely to suffer precipitous 
declines over any length of time...sizeable withdrawals are likely to 
escape the attention of fossil fuel management since oil and gas 
stocks are some of the world’s most liquid public equities. (Ansar, 
Caldecott and Tilbury, 2013, 70)  
 
In other words, even a few hundred divestment commitments do not do much to 
dent the industry’s profits because other, less scrupulous, investors simply buy up 
the sold off assets (Although it is feasible that the price of those shares could fall). 
Rather, the direct threat fossil fuel divestment poses to the fossil fuel industry is 
public stigmatization (Ansar, Caldecott and Tilbury, 2013, 12).  
 
In a quotation that Fossil Free activists have shared dozens of times since it was 
published the Oxford report exposes the power of divestment: 
The outcome of the stigmatisation process, which the fossil fuel 
divestment campaign has now triggered, poses the most far-reaching 
threat to fossil fuel companies and the vast energy value chain. Any 
direct impacts pale in comparison. (Ansar, Caldecott and Tilbury, 
2013, 13) 
 
Presenting the fossil fuel industry as an enemy against which all those who care 
about their future, or their children’s future, or human civilization’s future must 
struggle has power. The report continues in great detail on the topic of stigma. For 
example: “firms heavily criticised in the media suffer from a bad image that scares 
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away suppliers, subcontractors, potential employees, and customers,” or  
“Governments and politicians prefer to engage with ‘clean’ firms  to prevent 
adverse spill-overs that could taint their reputation or jeopardise their re-election,” 
or  “Negative consequences of stigma also include cancellation of multibillion-
dollar contracts or mergers/acquisitions” (Ansar, Caldecott and Tilbury, 2013, 14). 
This last example became all too true when the toy company Lego announced it 
would not renew contracts with Shell Oil after a successful and imaginative 
Greenpeace campaign in late 2014 (Vaughan, 2014). Finally, all of the prior 
divestment campaigns the report reviewed resulted in stronger regulation imposed 
on the targeted entity. The Oxford report’s findings are vital to the logic behind 
why divestment should work and Fossil Free activist’s depend upon them to 
justify their tactic (Soiffer, 2015a). 
 
How Should Divestment’s Success be Measured? 
 
The Oxford report mostly focuses on the direct and indirect impact divestment has 
on the fossil fuel industry – particularly coal – but places less emphasis on the 
discursive implications of the campaign’s climate narrative. In fairness, an 
investigation into divestment as a narrative strategy was not within the clearly 
delineated parameters of the report; however, its omission raises the important 
question: how should divestment’s success as a narrative strategy be measured?  
 
One way is to simply add up the number of divestment commitments and their 
total value. Based on the Oxford report’s findings it could be assumed that the 
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more money divested translates into more stigmatization and greater dominance in 
public consciousness. This approach has a number of flaws. Firstly, the numbers 
can be manipulated very easily. For example, ahead of COP 21 350.org 
announced that up to $3.4 trillion worth of assets had been withheld from fossil 
fuel companies with around $50 billion having been directly divested (Fossil Free 
2016). Critics were quick to expose the simple numbers trick (Divestment Facts, 
2015). The $3.4trillion included divestment commitments like those of the UC, 
which only applied to coal and tar sands industries, or Stanford’s commitment to 
divest from coal, and presented these under the broader category of fossil fuel 
industries – removing the UC’s divestment reveals a rather different picture 
(ibid.). This could be called propaganda of the deed but, other than undermining 
the integrity of the campaign a little, is relatively harmless. More seriously, 
however, some activists have critiqued Fossil Free’s seeming obsession with 
racking up divestment commitments while ignoring commitments to long-term 
organizing and training of young activists (Anonymous, 2015). One activist who 
wished to remain anonymous said that this approach “Doesn’t leave space for us 
to say the university didn't divest but we created all these other movements and 
groups on campus and student conversations on climate justice issues”(ibid.). The 
very narrow definition of success can very easily lead to demoralization and burn 
out (ibid.).  
 
Recognizing the commitment to long-term organizing and training of activists as a 
victory in and of itself may be another way to measure the campaign’s success. 
This is certainly a more climate justice-oriented approach. The CJM needs young 
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activists who are trained to resist fossil fuel infrastructure and divestment is 
creating theses at an incredible rate. The importance of including this analysis is 
well recognized by the Divestment Student Network which has sought to cultivate 
activists able to organize over longer periods of time in hostile environments 
(Fossil Fuel Divestment Student Network, 2016). Furthermore, Rachelle Peterson 
has argued, what really matters when it comes to divestment’s message is the 
struggle and the publicizing of the struggle (Peterson, 2015, 27). This is what 
“turns a generation of young people against fossil fuels.” Therefore a long drawn-
out fight with administrations, like the campaign at the UC, is not necessarily a 
bad thing. The more dramatic the fight, the more media attention the narrative 
gets, and perhaps the more supporters student activists can garner.   
 
Another way to measure divestment’s success could be to look for changes in 
market norms. This may be particularly helpful in the case of the demise of coal 
companies in the US and abroad. The Oxford report warned of this effect stating 
that: 
Even when divestment outflows are small or short term and do not 
directly effect future cash flows, if they trigger a change in market 
norms that closes off channels of previously available money, then a 
downward pressure on the stock price of a targeted firm is possible. 
(Ansar, Caldecott and Tilbury, 2013, 12) 
 
While a strong regulatory environment and stiff competition from renewables and 
fracked gas have been the key reasons for coal’s instability, Victoria Fernandez 
argues that its demise has been accelerated by a change in market norms initiated 
through divestment commitments (Fernandez, 2015). Indeed, coal is the most 
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popular industry to divest from because of its perceived instability. Perceptions of 
its instability are strengthened through divestment pledges leading to a change in 
market norms. Even coal companies like the industry giant, Peabody Energy, 
supports this argument. Just a few months before it declared bankruptcy, Peabody 
referred to divestment as a threat to the company’s longevity:  
Concerns about the environmental impacts of coal combustion, 
including perceived impacts on global climate issues, are resulting in 
increased regulation of coal combustion in many jurisdictions, 
unfavorable lending policies by government-backed lending 
institutions and development banks toward the financing of new 
overseas coal-fueled power plants and divestment efforts affecting 
the investment community, which could significantly affect demand 
for our products or our securities. (Peabody Energy Corporation, 
2015, my emphasis) 
 
While it is important to show divestment having a material impact on fossil fuel 
companies, this measure does not represent a discursive shift outside of stock 
markets and the investment world. 
 
Perhaps a more reliable measure of divestment’s impact on public discourse is to 
examine the extent to which media outlets, politicians, and authority figures have 
adopted and reinforced its rhetoric and frames. It is worth briefly mentioning 
some of the media outlets and politicians that have engaged with and responded to 
Fossil Free. “Keep It In The Ground” is a key frame around which divestment is 
premised. Where the exact phrase “Keep it in the Ground” originated is not 
entirely clear but 350.org’s rhetoric around the Keystone XL pipeline seems 
likely. While many climate justice campaigns have had similar sentiments and 
goals, the words “Keep It In The Ground” are now usually tied to divestment 
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campaigns. The insertion of this phrase into public discourse is perhaps the easiest 
frame to follow and trace back to its early appropriation by the divestment 
movement. The phrase saw a leap in momentum around March 2015. Pledging its 
own divestment commitment, the British Newspaper The Guardian launched its 
“Keep It In The Ground” campaign targeting two of the world’s largest charitable 
foundations, calling upon them to divest from fossil fuels (Rusbridger, 2015). 
Though tied to 350.org’s divestment campaigns, “Keep it in the ground” is a 
frame that has recently taken on a life of its own. Bill McKibben for example, has 
begun writing about the “Keep It In The Ground” movement to describe broad-
based resistance to fossil fuel infrastructure and escalations against fossil fuel 
infrastructure planned for May of 2016 (McKibben, 2016a). In November 2015 
Presidential candidate Bernie Sanders along with seven other senators brought the 
Keep It in the Ground Act to the US Senate (Goldenberg, 2015). Several 
Democratic congressmen followed suit and introduced a bill under the same name 
to Congress in February 2016 (Milman, 2016). IEN also used the frame to title 
their declaration rejecting the COP and embracing climate justice solutions in 
Paris (IEN, 2015). These are just a few examples of the frame’s popularity, and 
admittedly they appear mostly amongst outlets that are preaching to the choir, but 
they do demonstrate yet another way to measure the success of divestment.   
 
What Happened When the UC Divested? 
 
On September 9th 2015 Jagdeep Bachher, the UC’s Chief Investment Officer 
announced to the UC Regents’ Committee on Investments that he had completed 
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the process of “dis-investing” the UC’s endowment and pension fund holdings 
from coal companies and companies focused on operating in tar sands projects 
(Gordon, 2015). A textual analysis of 20 news media hits, blogs, and press 
releases covering the UC’s divestment commitment, alongside evidence from 
several interviews with Fossil Free UC activists, provides an illustrative example 
of divestment actually working, as well as exposing some of its limitations.  All of 
these articles come from online sources and are ones very likely to have been 
shared and spread via Twitter or Facebook. This analysis studies these articles’ 
headlines, any accompanying visuals, and quotations that frame the story, to 
construct a comprehensive depiction of the narrative that was generated. If the 
narrative that gets reinforced in this process is Fossil Free UC’s then it is clear that 
divestment is working. 
 
Mr. Bachher explained his “dis-investment” reasoning in a statement to the UC 
Regent’s Committee on Investments: “A slowing global demand, an increasingly 
unfavorable regulatory environment, and a high threat of substitution pose 
insurmountable challenges to coal mining companies” (ibid.). A spokeswoman for 
the UC later clarified the UC’s position: “Dianne Klein told Reuters that UC is 
still free to invest in such companies “if the market circumstances warrant it”” and 
that “There are no plans to extend the sell-off into oil and natural gas” 
(Mosbergen, 2015). The decision amounted to a drawn-out process in which the 
UC took investments out of coal and tar sands industries with no policy 
preventing it from reinvesting in them and outright refusing to divest from oil and 
gas industries. Void of any moral rhetoric or Fossil Free’s framing the 
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announcement was hardly the triumphant divestment commitment Fossil Free 
activists might have hoped for. Nevertheless, with ambitions to expose gained 
ground the Fossil Free UC core team made a strategic decision to frame the 
announcement as a victory (fossilfreeuc.org, 2015).  What followed in the media 
was not only a struggle over the framing of the climate crisis, but also a struggle 
over the terms upon which the UC’s decision should be understood. 
 
How Fossil Free UC responded to the UC’s announcement was a major theme in 
several discussions with divestment activists. Most campaigers made the case that 
it was up to student activists to take hold of the narrative when divestment 
happens and not to rely on the relevant institution to use Fossil Free’s frames or 
acknowledge their narrative.  For example when asked whether the UC’s decision 
really did anything to legitimize and communicate the divestment narrative Jake 
Soiffer responded: “if they [the UC Regents] divest it’s going to be because 
students pressed them to … we have access to the narrative of why they divested 
and we shape the media response like the public impression of why they divested” 
(Soiffer, 2015a). In response to a similar question Becca Rast replied: “it is our 
responsibility as campaigners to tell the story that we want to tell… and we did 
just that… social movements always have a responsibility and are not successful 
unless they are willing to claim ownership over victory ” (Rast, 2015). These 
divestment activists therefore recognized that claiming victory and capturing the 
narrative was up to them and that expecting the UC to use Fossil Free’s frames 
would have been “icing on the cake,” to use Rast’s words. The following textual 
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analysis examines just how successfully Fossil Free UC campaigners achieved 
this. 
 
The 20 articles in question range from those published in The Guardian and The 
LA Times to Yahoo News, to UC campus newspapers, as well as assorted press 
releases and blogs.  They represent the discursive struggle to humanize the climate 
crisis in a fascinating microcosm. It is first of all important to address the 
headlines, as these tend to capture reader’s attention. In an interview Soiffer said 
that “most people who found out about the recent UC divestment probably didn't 
read the UC's statements, they just saw the headline. As long as there is visible 
student momentum that leads up to a decision to divest, especially with full 
divestment, we'll win the narrative” (Soiffer, 2015a). However, relying on 
headlines to convey divestment frames is perhaps a risky strategy. Of the 20 
articles reviewed eleven did not even contain the words divest or divestment. 
Most opted instead for the words “dumps” or the more neutral “Sells-off.” While 
perhaps a minor point, those who do not read beyond the headlines may not even 
have had divestment’s frames triggered in their minds. If so, headlines such as 
“UC sells off $200 million in coal and oil sands investments,” as found in The LA 
Times, may do little to legitimize or communicate Fossil Free’s narrative. The 
word “divest” taps into the discursive opportunity structure divestment activists 
have sought to construct. “Sells off,” on the other hand, may uphold the UC’s 
position that disinvestment was only a financial decision with only financial 
implications. Moreover, this supposedly neutral framing could even undermine 
Fossil Free’s position because the purpose of the word divestment is to trigger a 
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sense of moral outrage amongst its audiences. If divestment is not perceived as 
having occurred for ethical reasons, it does not help reinforce Fossil Free UC’s 
narrative. There were, however, nine articles in which the words divestment or 
divest did appear in the headline, including some of the larger outlets such as 
Huffington Post, the Guardian, and Yahoo News. The point here is that even in the 
headlines the narrative being communicated is a contested one and that simply 
looking at the headlines to determine whether divestment’s narrative was 
communicated yields ambiguous results. 
     
Next to an article’s headline, the accompanying image tends to help capture and 
also focus an audience’s attention. In his excellent book, Image Politics, Kevin 
DeLuca argued that in discursive terms images dominate over words. Moreover, 
he says that images can actually contradict the framing of the story, pointing to 
dissonance in the conventional frame. Consequently, even when a hostile media is 
framing the story, activists’ images can still activate the values and thoughts 
intended (DeLuca, 1999, 122). As such DeLuca suggests that when applying 
discourse analysis methodology it is important to read the accompanying images 
as well as the text (DeLuca, 1999, 19). DeLuca argues this in the context of 
televised mediums; however, there seems to be no reason why this shouldn’t 
apply to the format of the articles discussed in this case study as well. Of the 20 
articles reviewed, nine provided photos of Fossil Free UC activists demonstrating 
or holding up banners, two depicted polluting smokestacks, two depicted Jagdeep 
Bachher and/or the Regents’ investment committee, one provided a cartoon 
illustrating a young person representing future generations locked behind bars of 
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smokestacks representing coal pollution, one provided two video clips of Mr. 
Bachher’s statement to the COI and their response, and the rest did not provide 
images.  
 
The photos of Fossil Free UC activists (many of whom are holding up banners 
communicating divestment’s frames) at various demonstrations may help to 
undermine the UC’s position that divestment was undertaken exclusively in the 
interests of financial prudence. At the very least these images insinuate that there 
is more to the story than the UC selling off investments. Similarly, the images of 
the smokestacks billowing grey smoke suggest at the pollution associated with the 
industries being divested from. Again it appears that there is more to the story. 
The cartoon also explicitly fulfils this role, drawing upon Fossil Free’s argument 
that coal companies are locking future generations into climate catastrophe. In all, 
this adds up to 14 out of 20 articles in which the purpose of divestment was either 
directly or indirectly alluded to through images. One of the articles providing an 
image of Jagdeep Bachher gave room for divestment narrative to be 
communicated and the other gave some credit to divestment activists but adopted 
the UC’s framing. What makes this imagery significant is that even in instances 
where the framing of the story favoured the UC’s position or took a neutral 
position, imagery could still have played an important role in drawing audiences’ 
attention towards the divestment campaign’s frames. In this way, images used in 
reporting on the UC’s divestment decision may have inadvertently helped 
communicate the ethical struggle for divestment and legitimize the narrative 
driving it.  
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While headlines and images are an essential component, the substance of the 
article, and particularly the quotations that frame it, matter too. It is in the 
substance of these articles that the framing struggle over the UC’s position and the 
Fossil Free UC activists is best exposed. What becomes most clear is the way in 
which the UC’s administration very deliberately sought to frame their decision as 
“disinvestment” and premised exclusively on economic expediency. As interviews 
with Fossil Free UC activists revealed, it was up to Fossil Free spokespeople to 
subvert this framing and counter it with their own narrative – humanizing climate 
change, framing it on political and moral terms, and holding those most 
responsible to account etc. Teasing out key themes, studying the exact quotations 
that each side gave, and deciding which frames the articles themselves reinforced 
yields a strong indication of which side won the narrative struggle.  
 
Perhaps the most quoted sentence amongst these articles is CIO Jagdeep 
Bachher’s statement on why he made the decision to disinvest: "Slowing global 
demand, an increasingly unfavorable regulatory environment, and a high threat of 
substitution pose insurmountable challenges to coal mining companies" (Carroll, 
2015). Most articles also quoted him saying ““sustainability issues” had made 
investment in tar sands too risky (Gordon, 2015).  This became the quotation 
many articles opened with and framed the rest of their story. In addition these 
articles often quoted the UC’s spokeswoman Diane Klein saying that  “the 
university has no plans to let go of its holdings and stocks in oil and natural gas.” 
And that the “UC is still free to invest in such companies “if the market 
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circumstances” warrant it” (Mosbergen, 2015). Reuters placed the divestment 
decision in a context that many other articles adopted: “The profitability of 
companies focused on developing crude from Canadian oil sands has also fallen 
amid low global oil prices, Bachher said, making those companies increasingly 
risky investments” (Carroll, 2015). Meanwhile the UC most clearly articulated 
their position in a statement they gave to Yahoo News:  
We firmly believe that if we don’t consider these aspects of a 
potential investment, such as its impact on climate change and other 
factors we are going to lose money, long term… Our chief 
responsibility is fiduciary… We do believe that our taking a stand on 
these issues is influential. But I would not portray us in a moral 
sense; this is smart investing.  (Yahoo.com, 2015) 
 
The UC’s desperation to ensure that the decision was understood solely on 
financial terms and more explicitly to depoliticize that decision is tangible. Indeed 
the profitably of fossil fuel investments became a leading frame in many of these 
articles. Had this alone been the story, particularly when paired with headlines 
that did not mention the word divestment, it is unlikely that divestments frames 
would have been triggered. Neither the communication of Fossil Free’s role in the 
UC’s decision nor the legitimization of the divestment narrative could have been 
possible had the UC’s framing simply been accepted. 
 
Fortunately for the Fossil Free UC campaign, most articles did acknowledge – and 
many even emphasized – the role that Fossil Free UC had played in making 
divestment happen, as well as making reference to the global divestment 
campaign and its narrative. Admittedly, the very existence of the global 
divestment campaign made the UC’s divestment decision difficult for media 
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outlets to ignore. This reveals a gap between the discursive impact of framing and 
the concrete decision taken to address divestment. Nevertheless, Fossil Free UC 
spokespeople were able to offer a compelling counter narrative – claiming the 
decision as a partial victory and a vindication of the power of student activism. 
Alden Phinney’s quote, “I think it’s a really good move by the university. But it 
doesn’t mean we are going to stop pushing for full divestment soon,” was picked 
up in several articles (Gordon, 2015). It embraces the win and pivots the 
conversation towards full divestment. Alden expands on this in a statement to 
Yahoo News, saying that “This is a big deal, and an important first step that takes 
$200 million away from companies like Peabody… but we need our schools to 
take a stance against Exxon and Shell too… they’re every bit as responsible for 
the climate crisis” (Yahoo.com, 2015). Meanwhile, Jake Soiffer’s longer 
statement appeared in Mother Jones, providing readers with some of divestment’s 
key frames: 
They have divested from coal and from oil sands, but the major 
players profiting off of environmental destruction in California are 
oil and natural gas. They haven't done anything about those… We 
need to be using the institutions we have access to as a platform for 
climate justice, and calling out the way a system has been set up to 
keep power in the hands of a few… and highlight how those few are 
wrecking our planet. (Canon, 2015) 
 
Jake is quoted in a similar context in several other articles saying, “This is a much 
needed first step, but oil and natural gas are the most powerful polluters in 
California, and we expect the UC to take robust action on the biggest climate 
villains in their backyard” (Greenmoneyjournal.com, 2015). CSSC summed up 
student activists’ position in their press release stating,  “While we applaud their 
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[the UC Regents’] decision, let us not forget that student leadership was the 
fundamental impetus and catalyst for this victory” (CSSC, 2015, italics in 
original). In sum, 17 out of 20 of the press releases and articles discussed helped 
to reinforce the divestment narrative and directly quoted Fossil Free UC 
spokespeople. Only three articles did not quote Fossil Free activists at all.   
 
The difficulty for Fossil Free UC activists seems to have been to communicate all 
of the key components of their message in every article. Alden’s first and shortest 
statement was the most quoted, and while it claims victory for students, it does not 
do much more than that. In addition, Jake’s excellent articulation of the 
campaign’s position only appeared in Mother Jones, while more truncated 
versions appeared elsewhere. A full articulation of claiming the win for students, 
and the divestment narrative, and where the campaign is heading was absent from 
most articles. For example, Victoria Fernandez’ incredibly important quote in 
Fossil Free UC’s press release which draws upon all the vital frames of the 
campaign seems to have been omitted from other reports completely: 
If the Regents are serious about climate solutions that means not just 
divesting from fossil fuel companies, but investing in a just 
transition away from fossil fuels and towards the non-extractive 
economy. There is no stopping this movement. We have glimpsed a 
future of dignity, justice and sustainability, and we are determined to 
make it real. (fossilfreeuc.org, 2015) 
 
All the major post-divestment talking points can be discerned in this one 
statement but reporters did not use it. Divestment spokespeople may have been 
ready with the right quotes but these were rarely acknowledged in full. Meanwhile 
the difficulty for the UC was clearly articulating a position in which their decision 
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to divest was understood entirely outside the context of the global fossil fuel 
divestment movement and student pressure on their own campuses. The very 
presence of the Fossil Free UC campaign therefore made it very difficult for the 
UC to compellingly argue that its decision had nothing to do with the global 
divestment campaign.  
 
Ultimately, the narrative struggle between the UC’s spokespeople and Fossil Free 
UC’s communicators became the story upon which these articles focused. Almost 
every article considered whether Fossil Free UC was right to claim the divestment 
decision as a victory for student activism. The story communicated in many of 
these articles was not the divestment narrative but the discussion over whether or 
not the UC’s divestment decision was a victory for Fossil Free UC. In many cases 
this still offered space for divestment activists to present their narrative, but often 
it also reinforced the idea that the UC’s decision was primarily based on financial 
pragmatism. Like the headlines that did not use the word divest, the focus on the 
struggle with UC Regents may have obscured the story divestment activists hoped 
to tell about resisting the fossil fuel industry. 
 
The reasons Fossil Free UC sought to claim victory are obvious; mobilizing the 
base, demonstrating student power, and showing divestment’s progress ahead of 
the Paris COP are just some of them. But perhaps divestment activists could have 
been more cautious in claiming victory and instead focused their responses on 
why partial divestment was not enough. The divestment event was an excellent 
opportunity for activists to tell their story but in trying to present the event as a 
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victory their story got sidelined.  In hindsight it’s easy to say Fossil Free UC 
communicators could have been equipped with stronger reasoning behind why 
they chose to declare victory or that they could have reinforced their narrative 
with demands for full divestment. On the other hand, perhaps capturing the UC’s 
decision as a movement victory was an important step in legitimizing the narrative 
of the broader divestment movement – again forcing a choice point that audiences 
had to respond to. After all the UC’s is the largest university endowment to have 
even partially divested so far and framing this decision as a result of the fossil fuel 
divestment movement’s efforts certainly lends credibility to the broader narrative. 
Either way it is important to recognize that narrative operates in a contested 
sphere of narrative and counter narrative. As this analysis shows the assumption 
that one narrative will win outright should be avoided. Fossil Free UC joined the 
contest avoiding such assumptions and successfully challenged the UC on their 
own terms. 
 
Before closing this section, it is worth briefly discussing an opinion piece Jagdeep 
Bachher wrote for The Santa Barbara Independent. His article provides a detailed 
account of his personal reasons for disinvesting the UC from coal and tar sands 
companies. Interestingly, Bachher’s reasoning somewhat contradicts the economic 
pragmatism frames the UC so fastidiously sought to communicate. For example in 
this excerpt Baccher explains the significance of the COI’s new ESG investment 
framework: 
Our approach to sustainability counters the timeworn trope that 
institutional investors can adopt a values-based investment strategy 
only if they can guarantee targeted returns. In our view, institutions 
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that ignore societal values in their investment strategy imperil their 
bottom line – today and for years to come… As our students return 
to campus with the certainty of purpose that divestment is the only 
solution to society’s woes, we are integrating sustainability into our 
investment framework as a philosophy of long-term investing in and 
for the future, and as a key metric for evaluating risk. By doing so, 
we will not only be able to generate competitive, risk-adjusted, long-
term investment returns, but also help save the world. (Bachher, 
2015b) 
 
While challenging the notion that full divestment is necessary, and indulging in a 
rather peculiar fantasy about helping save the world, Bachher makes his argument 
on intensely ethical terms. In the article he writes of the role that implementing the 
Environmental and Social Governance investment framework had on his decision 
to divest from coal and tar sand and engage in ethical investing. His argument 
undermines the value-neutral, or more accurately put finance-oriented, approach 
the UC’s spokeswoman, Dianne Klein, sought to communicate. In this way 
Bachher reinforces the divestment campaign’s frames demanding that institutions 
invest ethically. He certainly criticizes what he regards as students’ “single-
mindedness” but he seems eager to present himself as an ethical investor who can 
help lower barriers to a sustainable economy. Bachher’s illusions and contortions 
epitomize the hegemonic neoliberal climate solutions against which the CJM 
fights. However, he does share some of the same values as Fossil Free and while 
he may be unable to apply these values to investing in oil and gas companies, it is 
important to recognize that Bachher’s decisions are driven by an ethical, if rather 
self-righteous, code. Furthermore, Bachher’s reference to the ESG framework 
helps to prove the impact that divestment activists have had on the UC’s decision 
and particularly on making up Bachher’s mind. Pressure from Fossil Free UC led 
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directly to the Regents’ committee on investments establishing an ESG 
investment framework, which, as Bachher made clear, led him to divest from coal 
and tar sands. Fossil Free UC is certainly vindicated in claiming a partial victory. 
 
Finally, despite the UC administration’s best efforts, their decision to divest 
sparked a moment in which Fossil Free UC could engage in an important struggle 
to communicate the divestment narrative to a far broader audience. While neither 
side prevailed completely, and many reports were far too willing to embrace the 
UC’s frames, 16 of the 20 articles examined helped present the divestment 
narrative in some shape or form. It is in this incremental but essential way that the 
divestment movement is certainly working. 
 
Is Divestment Shaping Discursive Conditions Amongst Audiences External to 
Climate Movement?  
 
It is important to answer this question before drawing conclusions on the 
counterhegemonic efficacy of fossil fuel divestment campaigns. Rachelle 
Peterson, a harsh critic of the divestment campaign, has argued that the tactics of 
divestment, rather than uniting constituents against a common enemy, serve to 
alienate outsiders, divide those working towards action on climate change, and 
turn students and administrations against each another (Peterson, 2015). 
Meanwhile, members of Fossil Free UC have voiced their own concerns about 
whether the material resources at the campaign’s disposal are enough to reach a 
significant proportion of population (Fernandez, 2015). Others still have argued 
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that if the campaign is to influence the narratives of audiences outside the climate 
movement it must be made more relevant to their local contexts (Rast, 2015). 
Addressing these critiques exposes the extent to which divestment campaigns 
have reached beyond the bubble of climate activism while also demonstrating how 
much further the campaign has to go. 
 
In a caustic 300 page report on the Fossil Free campaign (which may itself be 
indicative of the Fossil Free’s impact) Rachelle Peterson asserts that Fossil Free is 
“is an attack on freedom of inquiry and responsible social advocacy in American 
higher education” (Peterson, 2015, 10). She goes on to argue that Fossil Free 
campaigners’ “self-avowed strategy is to intimidate the uncommitted into joining, 
or at least not opposing, divestment,” that the campaign “smears opponents and 
bullies dissenters” and that Fossil Free campaigns consist of “A minority of 
indignant and dedicated special interests” who believe they can “prevail in the 
democratic court of public opinion by bullying opponents and polarizing what 
were once straightforward pragmatic questions”  (Peterson, 2015, 19). If these 
allegations are true then Fossil Free campaigns are unlikely to draw in a diverse 
audience, will alienate large swathes of campuses, and their narrative will 
certainly fall on deaf or hostile ears.  
 
Such allegations are far from true and indeed disproving them shows the extent to 
which Fossil Free campaigns and particularly Fossil Free UC have sought to work 
within the democratic channels available. For example, student governments 
representing the student bodies at UCSB, UCSC, UC Berkeley, UC Davis, UC 
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Irvine, and UCSD, have all passed resolutions calling upon the UC to divest, and 
UCSB, UCSC and UCSD’s Academic Senates also passed such a resolution 
(Fossilfreeuc.org, 2016). Fossil Free UC activists have spoken at almost every 
public comment at every Regent’s meeting since the campaign begun to ask for 
meetings with UC Regents only to be denied or ignored (Phinney, 2015). Fossil 
Free UC very deliberately seeks to engage in the democratic channels available to 
students to legitimize their cause. Problems arise when those channels are shut 
down or designed to distance decision makers from the will of the student body, 
making more escalatory tactics necessary (Hannon, 2015). Furthermore, 
Peterson’s critique is founded upon one campus, Swarthmore – where divestment 
began, and is then applied to all Fossil Free campaigns. Even if such claims were 
true of the Swarthmore campaign there is absolutely no reason why they should 
therefore apply to all campaigns across the US and indeed across the world. 
Sweeping generalizations like these hardly constitute evidence but they could be 
useful ammunition for institutions trying to undermine divestment campaigns. It is 
important, therefore, that campaigns do not fall into activities that reinforce this 
narrative. Finally, as it transpires, Peterson wrote this report for the National 
Association of Scholars (NAS). NAS is a notoriously conservative institution 
whose president, Peter Wood, has on multiple occasions been accused of denying 
the existence of climate change (Littlemore, 2011). While this relationship alone 
is not reason enough to discount Peterson’s findings, it should be noted that she is 
writing with a very clear purpose accompanied by very transparent biases. 
 
Peterson raises another more troubling argument, however. She claims that:  
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83 percent of all divested colleges and universities in the United 
States are located in states that The Gallup Poll ranks as either 
“solid” or “leaning” toward the Democratic Party. The remaining 17 
percent are in “competitive” states. No state that is “solid” or 
“leaning” Republican has any divested colleges or universities 
(Peterson, 2015, 13).  
 
This suggests that Fossil Free’s framing, particularly constructing the fossil fuel 
industry as an enemy, may appeal to the values of liberals and progressives but 
does not appeal to conservative and Republican values. While hardly surprising, it 
does mean that Fossil Free campaigns in more conservative areas can do more to 
frame their arguments and narrative in ways that appeal to values that transcend 
party lines in the US. However, the campaign cannot abandon its antagonistic 
position towards the fossil fuel industry because the very purpose of the campaign 
would be eliminated. Therefore it seems that activists being strategic over which 
frames they emphasize to whom is essential. It also underlines the point that 
appropriate messaging depends upon the audiences for whom it is intended. 
Perhaps in so called “Red States” messaging on climate jobs would resonate 
better.  
 
All this being said, Peterson’s numbers are not entirely accurate. For example, 
Ohio is a predominantly conservative state but the University of Dayton based 
there divested fully from Fossil Fuels in 2014 (Udayton.edu, 2014). Furthermore, 
some Fossil Free framings, specifically those associated with fiduciary risk and 
responsibility, are convincing more traditionally conservative institutions. For 
example, insurance companies like Axa or foundations like the Rockefeller 
Brothers’ Fund have fully divested. Moreover, the Governor of the Bank of 
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England, Mark Carney, stating that “the vast majority of reserves are unburnable” 
has also voiced concern at the risk investments in fossil fuel companies pose to 
investment portfolios (Shankleman, 2014). In addition, many churches in very 
conservative states using deeply moral framings have also divested from fossil 
fuels (Fossil Free, 2016). From anarcho-syndicalists to the governor of the Bank 
of England, a vast diversity of opinions and values has found Fossil Free’s 
framings persuasive. This suggests that contrary to Peterson’s findings, Fossil 
Free can appeal to large and diverse audiences depending on the frames 
employed.  If anything, then, Peterson’s extensive and minutely detailed report 
demonstrates that Fossil Free is in fact reaching broader audiences and this is 
worrying power holders.  
 
While accusations of bullying and silencing clearly aren’t among them, Fossil 
Free does face some very real challenges to amplifying its narrative. Victoria 
Fernandez, for example, explained that while there is little wrong with the 
messaging itself, getting that message heard beyond the echo chamber of climate 
change activism and campus organizing can be difficult (Fernandez, 2015). Fossil 
Free may lack some of the material resources needed to reach a significant 
proportion of population. Indeed, this is not a problem that only Fossil Free has 
had to contend with. The report, Echoing Justice: Communication Strategies for 
Community Organizing in the 21st Century, documents this problem arising again 
and again amongst social justice campaigns (Quiroz, 2013). As the report puts it 
“To win front end framing victories, local communities need media rules that keep 
media platforms accessible, affordable, and accountable” (Quiroz, 2013, 4). Thus 
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the report shows that not only must activists develop new framings and narrative 
strategies they must also contend with “insufficient funding, training, media 
resources, and infrastructure for communications” (Quiroz, 2013, 14-17). Fossil 
Free is not an exception but even so it is much better resourced and funded than 
many of the campaigns discussed in Echoing Justice. Fossil Free has the support 
of the giant climate NGO 350.org as well as and many state-wide campaign hubs 
like CSSC. However, in the context of local campus campaigns, gaining access to 
mainstream media platforms is still very difficult. As democratic channels of 
communication are shut down, forcing campaigns to escalate, it is likely that their 
access to mainstream media platforms will increase.  
 
Finally, Becca Rast has made the case that if the Fossil Free UC campaign is to 
affect discursive conditions external to campuses and the climate movement it has 
to listen to the values and context of Californians who are already fighting or 
threatened by fossil fuel extraction in their backyards, and use frames that appeal 
to their concerns (Rast, 2015). As she put it, “California likes to portray itself as 
extremely progressive; yes we are, but we are also are a key export state for liquid 
natural gas, for coal, and for oil moving forward” (ibid.). California has witnessed 
a great deal of fossil fuel extraction as well as an unprecedented drought that 
climate change has likely exacerbated. Fossil Free UC has an opportunity to draw 
upon the experiences of those most affected by fracking, drought, oil spills, and 
respiratory diseases associated with proximity to oil refineries (ibid.). It can weave 
this into their frames and narrative, and, as Rast suggests, make the case that the 
UC Regents, as leaders of a public institution, have a responsibility to those upon 
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whom environmental racism and injustices are exacted everyday in California. 
Many UC campus campaigns have already been making these connections. For 
example, in May 2015 an oil spill near to UC Santa Barbara galvanized students 
into action. It was quickly discovered that the ruptured pipeline had been carrying 
Exxon Mobil’s oil and the case was made that the oil spill had been “paid for by 
UC Regents.” The proximity of the oil spill and the potential threat it posed to the 
student population helped to bring 75 students out to the Chancellors office and 
demand divestment (Jacobs, 2015). While opportunities to capture the narrative at 
moments such as these are rare, California’s long history of environmental racism 
and injustice can be drawn upon to hold Regents and the fossil fuel industry 
accountable, as well as tapping into the values, experiences and frames of those 
most affected. 
 
As the divestment narrative is split into sub-frames, each targeting specific 
audiences, the campaign itself matures and expands its influence over discursive 
conditions. Clearly, however, its work is not finished. It’s rhetoric and frames are 
beginning to find a foothold in some political discourses but divestment’s counter 
narrative has yet to establish itself in a significant proportion of public 
consciousness. Where it has been most successful is amongst institutions at which 
divestment actually occurs. Members and participants in those institutions have a 
lot more at stake than observers. At the UC for example, many students know of 
and support the campaign, but outside the UC in the rest of California however, 
divestment only reached broader audiences in the moment that the UC announced 
it would divest. Challenges that the campaign still has to overcome include 
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accessing far-reaching media platforms, avoiding accusations of bullying and 
silencing, and deploying frames that tap into local contextualized discursive 
opportunity structures. Importantly, however, its frames and narrative so far do 
not seem to be an impediment and are certainly bringing hundreds of people 
(young people in particular) into a movement that for a long time had seemed 
alienating, hostile or even boring.  
 
Reinvestment in a Just Transition  
 
Fossil Free UC, along with several other campaigns across the country, is 
beginning to make an important shift towards a reinvestment narrative (Hannon, 
2015). Campaigners will not only demand that their institutions divest from fossil 
fuels but also that a percentage of those divested funds be reinvested in 
sustainable projects that frontline communities have pioneered. Some of the more 
radical divestment campaigners are recognizing that even when universities divest 
they tend to simply reinvest in the extractive economy. They are still invested in 
deforestation, mining, prisons, warfare, and countless other elements of the 
extractive economy that perpetuate environmental and social injustice. Drawing 
upon the rhetoric and actions of frontline communities, through reinvestment 
divestment activists will demand that some of the divested funds be diverted 
towards the non-extractive or “the living economy” (Fernandez, 2015).  
Universities and other institutions will be directly invested in the just transition 
away from fossil fuel dependent extractivism. The shift has both material and 
discursive implications for climate justice and represents an opportunity for 
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divestment activists to prove their climate justice credentials. As campaigns 
evolve and adopt the reinvestment approach their alignment with the principles of 
climate justice become much clearer (Soiffer, 2015a). In this way the reinvestment 
component of the campaign helps open up space for climate justice solutions. 
 
Reinvestment is an important way that Fossil Free UC can engage with and listen 
to a much more diverse audience, in the way Becca Rast suggested, while holding 
the UC accountable. As one DSN strategist at the California Divestment 
Convergence in October 2015 explained, reinvestment in a just transition would 
channel resources to community-owned sustainable energy projects, energy 
cooperatives and community adaptation and resiliency projects. This money 
would go into what she called a “non-extractive finance fund” and would be 
governed by grassroots groups who set terms of investments and loans. 
Community-led solutions to declining water supplies, to food deserts, to energy 
monopolies, and alternatives to fracking, oil trains and spills could all be 
legitimized and made possible through reinvestment. 
 
If divestment sounded difficult, reinvestment may sound impossible. However, 
Fossil Free activists are under no illusions of how difficult it will be to achieve 
reinvestment in community-led solutions. It requires CIOs and investment 
committees to completely reimagine the very concept of investment.  A good 
investment would no longer necessarily be one that provides the best returns, nor 
one that does the least harm, but rather one that actively builds a livable and just 
future. This transition could also mean empowering students. Universities would 
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hand over control of a small percentage of their endowments to students who than 
place it at the disposal of frontline communities. The details of this process are 
still being imagined and experimented with at the time of writing. The difficult 
part is getting campaigners to believe such institutional reform is possible. 
Reinvestment will be a long-term project that will require its own form of cultural 
change. As such, reinvestment campaigns will depend upon long term organizing 
structures that are resilient to the fluctuations of student participation over many 
years. 
 
Reinvestment in a just transition can also be read as a counterhegemonic project. 
The communications scholar Marshall McLuhan famously said “the medium is 
the message.” The projects towards which redirected funds would flow are those 
that prefigure the just and sustainable world climate justice activists strive for. In 
this sense they are both the medium and the message.  In other words, the 
possibility of energy democracy, of achieving climate justice, is the message and 
the project already doing so are the medium through which that message is 
communicated. When institutions like the UC invest in those solutions they 
legitimize that message and spread the story that, to quote Arundhati Roy, 
“another world is not only possible, she is on her way.” This belief is at the heart 
of any counterhegemoic project and the divestment movement has the potential to 
be a part of it. The reinvestment component of divestment represents an attempt at 
prefigurative politics or the political culture of creation in John Foran’s concept of 
PCOCs (Foran, 2014). 
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Finally, by redirecting financial resources towards just transition initiatives, 
reinvestment campaigns can act in solidarity with frontline communities not only 
rhetorically (which as this case study has shown is essential) but also materially. 
One excellent example is Richmond, California. As the next case study will 
elaborate, Richmond is a frontline community fighting against the influence of 
Chevron and its ambitions to expand their refinery in the city. The UC could 
divest from the cause of a great deal of suffering and corruption in the city, i.e. 
Chevron, and redirect investments towards local sustainability projects, and 
community regeneration. Fossil Free campaigns in California often claim to be 
acting in solidarity with climate justice activists in Richmond and indeed 
frontlines communities have also expressed their solidarity with divestment 
campaigns, but reinvestment could be an important way for that solidarity to be 
expressed in more than words, strengthening ties between the frontlines and youth 
activists (Rast, 2015).  
 
Conclusion  
 
Divestment works. Slowly but surely, fossil fuel divestment is helping to reframe 
the facts of climate change within an accessible and empowering counter narrative 
that engages larger, more diverse audiences. The shift in frames concentrated on 
tailpipe emissions to those emphasizing wellhead production can help to structure 
a discursive field more amenable to climate justice and open up further 
opportunities for counterhegemony and radical social change. As the example of 
Fossil Free UC demonstrates, when institutions divest they can help to legitimize 
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this shift but activists must be prepared for a hard fight to ensure divestment 
commitments do actually reinforce their narrative. While the divestment narrative 
is indeed shifting paradigms, Fossil Free has much further to go to affect larger 
and more diverse audiences. As the diversity amongst divestment supporters 
demonstrates, divestment’s narrative and frames do not seem to be the problem, 
however. The difficulty for divestment campaigns seems to lie in accessing media 
platforms that will broadcast their narrative to larger and more diverse audiences. 
That being said, discursive shifts do not necessarily happen in moments but spread 
over time, and this is certainly the case with Fossil Free. The growing ubiquity of 
divestment’s “keep it in the ground” rhetoric is testament to this.  
 
The divestment campaign is maturing and adopting climate justice into its driving 
logic. In doing so Fossil Free campaigns are taking seriously the question of who 
their target audiences are and how to listen to those audiences. If the campaign is 
to successfully resonate with the lived experiences of larger, more diverse 
audiences it will have to make itself relevant to their specific contexts. Fossil Free 
UC can start by engaging in meaningful ways with frontline communities and 
those most affected by drought in California and is already beginning to do so. 
The adoption of reinvestment campaigns alongside divestment campaigns is an 
excellent example of this. Reinvestment is a material recognition of the solidarity 
that must exist between young people whose futures climate change threatens and 
frontline communities who today resist the expansion of fossil fuel infrastructure 
and in doing so help to protect that future. Reinvestment not only diverts 
resources away from the extractive economy but also helps to legitimize the 
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prefiguration of a more just and sustainable world. Through embracing climate 
justice and initiating reinvestment campaigns divestment becomes a truly 
counterhegemonic project. 
 
In conclusion, fossil fuel divestment is a narrative tool that can be used to 
intervene in public consciousness. Fossil Free UC exhibits the kind of discursive 
interventions that counter hegemonic climate justice campaigns can deploy to 
shift the terms on which the climate crisis is understood and reshape dominant 
discursive conditions that create space for climate justice solutions. The narrative 
that divestment campaigns convey humanizes climate change, turning it into a 
moral, political and systemic crisis. It forces a choice point upon audiences who 
must decide whether they will side with the fossil fuel industry or with those 
resisting it. Its construction of the fossil fuel industry as “the enemy” subverts 
dominant climate change discourses by reframing who is responsible for climate 
change and thereby reframing how it must be combated. The campaign is already 
shifting discursive conditions within the climate movement, particularly amongst 
youth activists – these can and must be extended to a broader discursive field. 
Fossil Free UC is an inspiring expression of resistance, anger, empowerment and 
successful story based strategy. The campaign’s contribution to climate politics 
and discourse must be seen as a sign of things to come. 
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III. Case Study 2: Climate Justice, Our Power and Discursive Interventions 
in Richmond, CA 
 
Introduction 
Recent political upheavals in the city of Richmond in California provide an 
excellent insight into the politics of climate justice and a campaign that has 
radically shifted public discourse in a relatively short space of time at the local 
level. This case study offers scholars and movement strategists an example of how 
the global Climate Justice Movement can successfully shift discursive conditions 
locally and then consolidate its wins through gaining power in local institutions 
like city councils. Covering a very different demographic engaged in a very 
different type of struggle, Richmond’s grassroots climate and environmental 
justice organizations present an important contrast to the fossil fuel divestment 
movement discussed in my first case study. Nevertheless, when the case studies 
are discussed side by side the two complement one another just as much as they 
differ, and indeed together provide a far more complete picture of climate justice 
strategy in the US than does either one on their own. 
 
In particular this case study is concerned with the Our Power campaign that has 
run a pilot project in Richmond and has brought together a coalition of social and 
environmental justice organizations cohering around the principles of climate 
justice. I apply the communication and discourse theories developed in my 
literature review to the recent victories that the Our Power coalition partners, 
along with the Richmond Progressive Alliance, have won against the Chevron 
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Corporation’s influence that has dominated Richmond’s political landscape and 
discourse for decades. I argue that Chevron has enjoyed a form of hegemony over 
the city and that climate justice narratives have helped counter that hegemony. 
Finally, I show how a discursive intervention based on narrative communication 
has been a central component to the victories for climate justice in the city.  
 
Context 
 
For over 100 years Standard Oil, and then Chevron, have operated an oil refinery 
in the city of Richmond. Until 2006 Chevron and its industry allies had more or 
less successfully bought out the city council and controlled most of the city’s 
decision-making processes  (Moyers, 2014). Council members and mayors would 
come and go but Chevron’s influence always held fast. Gradually, however, 
grassroots social and environmental justice campaigns have been winning power 
from the industry interests that controlled the city and brought community voices 
into decision-making (Choy and Orozco, 2009). Their mounting pressure led, in 
no small way, to the formation of the Richmond Progressive Alliance and the 
subsequent election of Richmond’s first Green Party mayor of Richmond, Gayle 
McLaughlin, in 2006. Since then grassroots community organizing and discursive 
conditioning has been crucial to consolidating these victories (not without 
considerable setbacks) through the rhetoric and practice of climate justice. 
 
This case study tracks the decline of Chevron’s influence in Richmond and seeks 
to determine the strategies that Our Power and its anchor organizations in the city 
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deployed that resulted in a significant shift in the city’s balance of power.  It also 
defends the claim that Chevron has acted as a culturally hegemonic force in the 
city, thus opening up the interesting possibility for non-state actors to exercise 
hegemony. The study concludes that the Our Power campaign and the Richmond 
Progressive Alliance’s successful reshaping of discursive conditions is having a 
substantial impact on city politics and culture. There is potential for climate 
justice activists to learn much from the successes and setbacks of Richmond’s 
progressive struggle. In addition, this case study shows up some of the concrete 
climate justice alternatives that Richmond’s community have implemented in 
response to the city’s interconnected crises and systems of oppression. This sets 
up a further line of inquiry discussed in my final chapter – can the prefiguring of 
climate justice alternatives be a tool for discursive interventions? 
 
Part 1: A History of Richmond’s Relationship with Chevron 
 
Richmond is a site of intense hegemonic struggle. Powerful and intersectional 
groups of grassroots activists and community organizers have made an important 
stand, forcing hegemonic relations into the open. The city sits on the East Bay 
adjacent to San Francisco and is home to almost 104,000 residents most of whom 
comprise working class communities of color (Our Power, 2015).  It is a racially 
diverse city with forty-percent of the population identifying as Latino, twenty-
seven-percent as African-American, thirteen-percent as Asian and twenty-percent 
as Caucasian (Moyers, 2014). More than sixteen-percent of the population is 
below the poverty line (Rein, 2012, 8). Richmond’s racial demographics have 
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shifted considerably over past fifty years and this has had important implications 
for the balance of power in the city (Soto, 2016). Up until the 1980s it was a 
majority Euro-American working class city. It attracted tens of thousands of 
migrants from across the US in search of work in naval shipyards during the 
1940s and, promoting itself as a business-friendly environment, went on to attract 
chemical and shipping industries, as well as maintaining its close relations with 
the coastal oil refinery (ibid.).  
 
In the 1980s the city experienced “white flight” and African Americans 
established themselves as the majority population and gradually started taking 
over management of the city’s affairs. By 2002 every departmental head and most 
of the governing bureaucracy was controlled by African Americans. Chevron, 
meanwhile, successfully co-opted the leadership of the African American 
community and ensured the city remained friendly to the company’s interests 
(ibid.). By 2015 the city’s racial demographics had shifted again, with the 
majority now being represented by Latino residents. In addition, a progressive 
middle class white population is on the rise as Richmond’s as they seek out 
cheaper housing in the Bay Area (ibid.).  As community organizer Andrés Soto 
argues, “With changing demographics, the people who were historically loyal to 
Chevron because they received contributions from the company have been in 
decline.” Chevron has not been quick enough to respond to these shifting 
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demographics. Demographics alone, however, do not explain the tremendous shift 
in public discourse surrounding Chevron and climate justice.5 
 
Richmond presents a classic example of a city ravaged by neoliberal extractivist 
logic before being largely abandoned to austerity. In the 1980s the Richmond’s 
downtown was largely divested from as corporate investment moved away to 
more profitable locations. Shops and businesses closed down with the 
development of an out of town shopping mall and with that the community’s 
sense of itself began to collapse. High rates of crime, poverty and violence 
ensued. In addition, capital flight, police brutality, corruption, racial segregation 
and severe environmental degradation are all huge concerns for the community. 
However, to paint the residents of Richmond as mere victims devoid of their own 
agency would be mistake. For decades systemic racial and economic injustices 
have met with resistance and demands for dignity, a healthy environment and 
equity (Choy and Orozco, 2009). Understandably, over the past twenty-five years 
environmental justice activism has found a particularly strong foothold in the city 
(Soto, 2016). The Chevron refinery’s pollution disproportionately impacts 
Richmond’s communities of color and lower income communities and is located 
within those communities (Lopez et al., 2009). Between 1989 and 1995 the 
Chevron refinery had 304 industrial accidents, leading to “severe injuries and 
illnesses” amongst Richmond residents (Sherman, 2004). In 1993 grassroots 
																																																								
5 It is important not to be essentialist or reductive when discussing the community of Richmond as 
a whole. For example Richmond’s communities of color are not a united or homogenized entity. 
Indeed deep schisms exist, particularly within Richmond’s African-American community between 
the wealthier, business-oriented residents and those living on the frontlines of poverty and 
environmental racism (Soiffer, 2015b).  
	 130	
environmental justice organizations like the West Coast Toxics Coalition 
mobilized the city’s residents and won five million dollars from Chevron to help 
develop community projects (ibid.).  Today, community organizing around 
climate justice has launched a sophisticated attack on Chevron and the ideology it 
espouses but has also drawn upon this legacy of resistance and disaffection. 
 
Chevron 
 
Nestled within the city and deeply ingrained in the community’s consciousness is 
Chevron’s oil refinery that has dominated the local politics ever since it was built. 
The refinery was opened in 1902 and the city of Richmond was incorporated in 
1907, so, as Andrés Soto puts it, “the refinery and the city have grown up 
together” (Soto, 2016). The refinery was first owned by Standard Oil California, 
Chevron’s parent company, and became Chevron’s refinery in the 1980s. 
Richmond itself has become known as Chevron’s company town. The refinery 
occupies 3000 acres, taking up some thirteen-percent of Richmond’s land (Rein, 
2012, 9). According to the Our Power campaign it is also the state of California’s 
“largest stationary emitter of greenhouse gases” (Our Power, 2015). In addition 
the refinery and other industrial projects in the area have been linked to rates of 
asthma in the amongst children and long term residents that soar above the 
national average and which disproportionally affect low income communities of 
color (Lopez et al., 2009, 10). While these concerns were repeatedly brought to 
council’s attention little in the way of regulation emerged. Organizations like 
West Coast Toxics Coalition, Communities for a Better Environment (CBE) and 
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Asian Pacific Environmental Network (APEN) argue that this is because Chevron 
has a notorious reputation for buying the support of local councilors to ensure low 
taxes and deregulation (apen4ej.org, 2016; Cbecal.org, 2016a).  W.W. Scott, an 
employee of Chevron’s parent company, Standard Oil, “was elected Mayor of 
Richmond on four occasions” (Soiffer, 2015b). Gayle McLaughlin, a former 
mayor representing the Richmond Progressive Alliance and now a councilmember 
on Richmond city council, confirms this stating: “we’ve been ruled as a city for a 
hundred years by the Chevron Corporation, because Chevron did control the 
council” (Moyers, 2014). Trying to gain back control of the council, Chevron 
funded the November 2014 city council candidates’ campaigns with $3 million 
through an expenditure campaign committee called Moving Forward and is not 
afraid of heavy spending on supportive local politicians (Rowan, 2014).  
 
Chevron looms large in the community’s shared imagination. Chevron, like 
Standard Oil before them, has maintained its power over the city, in part, by 
holding influence over local mediators of discourse and culture (Soto, 2016). For 
example, Chevron executives sit on the boards of several influential organizations 
in the city including charities and an online news service. The Richmond refinery 
owners helped establish and continue to support a local new service called The 
Richmond Standard and they helped set up 4Richmond, a nonprofit organization 
that, according to their mission statement is “dedicated to promoting jobs, health, 
safety and educational opportunities for Richmond residents.”  Rather ominously 
their website reads, “Working together with all community members, we seek to 
actively transform the city we call home.” 4Richmond would like to extend “it’s 
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sincere gratitude to Chevron for continuing its longstanding, generous support of 
[their] work” (4Richmond, 2016). Meanwhile Andrés Soto argues that through 
4Richmond Chevron has “created a permanent presence in Richmond for 
distributing cash and organizing events” (Soto, 2016). Chevron’s officer for 
policy, Government and Public Affairs, Joe Lorenz, sits on 4Richmond’s board of 
directors. 
 
The Richmond Standard is very upfront about its connections to Chevron, stating 
on its about page: “This news website is brought to you by Chevron Richmond. 
We aim to provide Richmond residents with important information about what’s 
going on in the community, and to provide a voice for Chevron Richmond on 
civic issues” (Richmond Standard, 2016). They also have a page on their website 
entitled “Chevron Speaks” which is intended “for the Chevron Richmond 
Refinery to share its news and views on issues important to the company and the 
Richmond, CA community” (ibid.). A cursory scroll through the featured news 
articles yields, for example, a piece entitled “Why the Election Mattered” – 
referring to the 2014 local election in which all the Chevron backed candidates 
were defeated – where Chevron is given space to defend its unprecedented 
political spending on Richmond’s election (Richmond Standard, 2014). Soto 
dismisses the Richmond Standard as “a completely bogus news service ” (Soto, 
2016). Finally, and perhaps most demonstrative of all these examples is Richmond 
High’s high school mascot: The Oilers. Soto explains that “the mascot on the side 
of the football field or in the gym for basket ball games is a guy dressed up as an 
oil can, a funnel on top and painted in the school colors of red and navy blue” 
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(Soto, 2016). The Oilers mascot is testament to how pervasive the refinery’s 
influence has been throughout the culture and the community. Chevron executives 
have sought to control the city’s discursive mediators and cultural institutions 
because they understand that control over these institutions is just as important as 
control over the city’s political institutions. Thus for a very long time Chevron’s 
will and the political ideologies that facilitate it in the city have been hegemonic. 
 
Cultural hegemony, as an analytical category, can be applied to state actors and 
non-state actors alike. Chevron’s dominance is a powerful indicator of this and I 
very deliberately use the concept of hegemony to describe power dynamics in 
Richmond. Indeed, drawing upon Antonio Gramsci, a founding theorist of cultural 
hegemony, gives me license to argue that Chevron is hegemonic in the context of 
Richmond’s city politics. Gramsci writes that, “In any given society nobody is 
disorganized and without party, provided that one takes organization and party in 
a broad and not formal sense” (Gramsci, 1977, 264). Understood informally, 
neither Chevron nor resistance to it are disorganized and without party. They are 
part of different parties and each organizes to insert their party’s discourses into 
the public consciousness and into what constitutes common sense. Richmond’s 
power dynamics cannot be fully understood outside the framework of cultural 
hegemony. Gramsci describes how those in power cannot rule through coercion 
alone for very long but must shape what constitutes common sense, thus ensuring 
consent to, and the legitimacy of, that power. This means controlling the 
institutions of civil society that shape and mediate culture and discourse (ibid.). 
While his observations are in many regards limited to the context of Italian class 
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struggle in the 1930s, and while his theories have been adapted, evolved and 
improved a great deal since, I think the core of Gramci’s writing is easily 
applicable to the dynamics of power in Richmond. Both Chevron and groups 
opposing its power recognize the importance of discursive conditions friendly to 
Chevron and have sought to reinforce those conditions or disrupt and change 
them, respectively.  
 
The Richmond Progressive Alliance 
 
Richmond’s long history of resistance and environmental justice activism 
eventually produced a political culture ripe for a new political party – or rather a 
new political alliance. In 2003 community organizers, local politicians and 
activists including Andrés Soto and Gayle McLaughlin set up the Richmond 
Progressive Alliance (RPA) to unite a broad group of progressives. The group 
included members of the Green Party, Democrats and Independents, all 
disillusioned with the city’s steady shift to the centre right but unwilling to risk 
splitting the vote that right wing and neoliberal candidates could easily exploit. 
(According to Soto, at the time seventy-seven-percent of the registered voters in 
the city identified as Democrat). While the local elections are supposedly non-
partisan, traditionally the candidates elected to council almost always ran on a 
pro-business, and particularly pro-Chevron, neoliberal consensus. The RPA was 
designed to help give voice to growing discontent with this apparent political 
consensus. The purpose of the alliance was to help run progressive candidates 
against candidates representing Chevron and to disrupt Chevron’s brand of 
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neoliberal politics that had proved so detrimental to the health, wellbeing and 
livelihoods of so many in the city. The RPA has both helped to expose the cultural 
and political dominance Chevron (and Standard Oil before them) enjoyed over 
Richmond and has begun playing a pivotal role in Richmond’s local politics. It 
has also helped organize progressive voices and voters around a platform aligning 
closely with the principles of climate justice.  
 
The RPA has undermined Chevron’s influence over city and provided Richmond 
voters with a viable alternative to the Chevron-supporting neoliberal consensus.   
Sharing many of the same organizers and founders, the RPA is responsive to, and 
in many ways accountable to, important local grassroots organizations like 
Communities for a Better Environment, Asian Pacific Environmental Network 
and of course the Our Power campaign. The RPA first ran candidates in 2004, 
McLaughlin won a seat on the council and Soto lost narrowly. During the early 
2000s Richmond had been experiencing the brunt of austerity politics, as the 
funding was cut and corruption rife. The city was $34 million in debt and only had 
an operating budget of $100 million to start with. Soto describes the situation 
succinctly: “Services were slashed. Over 250 city workers were laid off, every 
community centre was closed, all the branch libraries were closed the main library 
was only open 20 hours a week, street and park maintenance was halted – so it 
was a very difficult time” (Soto, 2016). Harsh austerity, however, provided an 
opening that the RPA could exploit and, in 2006, the Green Party’s Gayle 
McLaughlin was elected Richmond’s mayor. Pledging to refuse any corporate 
funding and running successful campaigns the RPA started winning more seats. A 
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blow had been dealt to Chevron’s legitimacy and the politics it espoused. 
Nevertheless, as the RPA started winning Chevron and other corporate interests 
started spending (ibid.). As Soto explains Chevron “used to spend $100,000-
150,000 on an election but over time that went up. By 2010 they were spending $1 
milion dollars then $1.25 million in 2012” (ibid.). Chevron won back some seats 
but struggled to gain overall control of the council from McLaughlin’s victory 
onwards. In 2014 the company spent $3 million on the local election and not a 
single one of the Chevron backed candidates won their election bid (ibid.).  It is 
important to understand the growing popularity of the RPA and their platform 
amongst Richmond voters because it helps explain the success of a coherent 
climate justice resistance that has placed Richmond on the global map of climate 
justice activism.  To help analyze why Chevron started loosing to the RPA we 
must examine the character of the resistance climate justice organizations have 
been implementing in the city. This resistance has been defined by a coherent and 
highly strategic discursive intervention. 
 
Resistance to Chevron 
 
The history of Chevron’s recent political battles displays an important shift in 
discourse in Richmond as well as the kind of climate justice resistance Chevron 
must now contend with. With the election of Gayle McLaughlin in late 2006, 
grassroots community organizations like the West Coast Toxins Coalition, CBE 
and APEN that were working alongside the Richmond Progressive Alliance won 
an important victory. These groups began campaigning to halt the planned 
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expansion of the Chevron refinery that would have allowed it to process heavier 
crude oil from the tar sands transported from Alberta, Canada (Choy and Orozco, 
2009, 43).  
These expansion proposals were accompanied by petitions for permits to allow 
trains carrying crude oil from the tar sands into Richmond. The transportation of 
oil by trains is becoming more necessary as activists block pipelines across the 
US. The colloquially termed “crude-by-rail” or “bomb trains” are becoming very 
controversial. The transportation of crude oil by train is incredibly dangerous, 
particularly through residential neighborhoods. Carriages carrying oil can derail 
and when they do so they are prone to explosions (Lim, 2014). Many of 
Richmond’s poorer communities and communities of color live within the blast 
zone of these trains. The most infamous example of a crude by rail explosion 
happened in downtown Lac-Mégantic, Quebec, in 2013, killing 43 people (ibid.). 
Understandably crude by rail has become an important campaign issue in 
Richmond, as Chevron has sought to ensure its product is easily transportable and 
accessible (Soto, 2016).  
In 2008 the council had given Chevron permission to start expanding its Richmond 
refinery; however, this decision had been greatly contested (Early, 2014). In 2008, 
with the help of the Richmond Progressive Alliance and grassroots community 
organizing, progressive and left-leaning candidates won overall control of the city 
council for the first time in the Richmond’s history and, responding to movement 
pressure, were able to halt expansion of the refinery. On August 6, 2012, amidst 
Chevron’s determined counter offensive against grassroots campaigners and 
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Richmond’s progressive council, an explosion occurred at the Chevron refinery 
nearly killing 20 workers and sending 15,000 Richmond residents to the hospital 
(Ourpowercampaign.org, 2015). Just months before the November city council 
elections Chevron seemed to be about to undergo a public relations disaster. 
Fortunately for the company, however, it also had public relations experts on its 
payroll (Chan, 2014). With a $1.7 million campaign budget (an impressive amount 
for a population the size of Richmond’s) and the help of PR man, Sam Springer, 
Chevron was able to win back a seat on the council and defend the seat of its firm 
supporter, Nat Bates, swaying the balance of power back to a position more 
favorable to the company’s interests. In 2012 progressives lost their majority and 
the possibility of the Chevron refinery expansion was again on the table. In 2014, 
before the November election, Chevron was given permission to expand its 
refinery despite huge opposition (Early, 2014; Soto, 2016). However, with the 
election of a progressive majority back onto the council in November 2014, 
Chevron’s refinery expansion plans have again been thrown into question. 
 
The recent history of Chevron’s expansion bid has helped define climate justice 
resistance in Richmond and sets the scene for a crucial shift in discourse and 
politics. While Chevron may have successfully managed the PR fallout from the 
2012 fire at the refinery in the short term, in the longer term it gave grassroots 
climate justice campaigns like Our Power an opportunity to begin attacking and 
undermining Chevron’s political and cultural influence more consistently.  It also 
gave activists the opportunity to start experimenting more explicitly with climate 
justice framings and rhetoric in Richmond. The 2014 election for example, makes 
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it very clear that the battle over Chevron’s refinery plans had begun to frame 
Richmond’s political discourse and that climate justice has been at the center of 
this discourse (Moyers, 2014). Furthermore, the recent victories of grassroots 
campaigners have led to ever more overt confrontations with Chevron’s power and 
history of political control, thus outing the, often hidden, influence Chevron 
executives have had over the city. Over the past ten years, as Chevron’s influence 
has become more overt, its power over city politics has diminished.   
 
 While I am less interested in the city’s electoral politics per se, and much more 
interested in the discourses that the city’s grassroots organizations have 
established, climate justice narratives and framings were on full display throughout 
Richmond’s recent election cycles and so this history unveils some useful insights 
into shifting discursive conditions. Choy and Orozco write that “Refinery towns, 
like other oil-affected communities, are classic battlegrounds for corporate control 
and environmental justice” (Choy and Orozco, 2009, 45). Recently, however, 
refinery towns and fossil fuel extraction projects are increasingly becoming the 
battlegrounds of a new struggle – the struggle for solutions based on the principles 
of climate justice. In Richmond the shift towards climate justice has manifested 
itself with the introduction of the Our Power campaign. I have presented this 
history of Richmond’s political context because it embeds my analysis of climate 
justice discourses in Richmond’s particular context.   I will now offer a description 
of the local grassroots organizations that have anchored the Our Power campaign 
and led Richmond’s resistance to Chevron, before formally introducing the Our 
Power campaign itself. 
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Richmond’s Grassroots Climate and Environmental Justice Organizations  
 
Communities for a Better Environment – CBE is an Environmental Justice 
organization predominantly working alongside low-income communities of color 
and empowering those communities with the tools and knowledge necessary to 
confront environmental injustice. CBE “provides residents in blighted and heavily 
polluted urban communities in California with organizing skills, leadership training 
and legal, scientific and technical assistance, so that they can successfully confront 
threats to their health and well-being” (Cbecal.org, 2016a). The organization has 
been operating in Richmond for twenty years, working with residents to confront 
the industrial pollution and the impact it has had on the community’s health. It also 
seeks to empower Richmond’s residents with the tools necessary to make the 
transition from fossil fuels to building “a new healthier, thriving economy” (ibid.). 
CBE is now a key coalition partner in the Our Power campaign and is one of the 
organizations driving the Our Power campaign in Richmond. 
 
The Asian Pacific Environmental Network – APEN is also an environmental justice 
organization operating in Richmond and much of the surrounding region. APEN 
was founded in 1993 and has won several major environmental justice victories 
including helping to halt the expansion of the Chevron Refinery in 2010, alongside 
CBE and the RPA. APEN focuses on the environmental injustices inflicted upon 
the Asian Pacific Islander communities in the San Francisco Bay Area. APEN is 
“bringing together a collective voice to develop an alternative agenda for 
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environmental, social and economic justice” (apen4ej.org, 2016). They are 
movement builders who work on rallying low-income Asian Pacific Islander 
immigrant communities around environmental justice. They are creating an 
organized and empowered base of membership and movement leaders to make 
demands upon the local council and the state of California. Both APEN and CBE 
are inherently intersectional organizations, recognizing that intersections of race 
class and gender are inextricably linked to higher levels of pollution, toxicity and 
risks to health and livelihoods. Along with CBE, APEN have also joined 
Richmond’s Our Power coalition and are helping to spearhead the campaign. With 
the Our Power campaign both organizations are shifting to an explicitly climate 
justice-based orientation. 
 
The Our Power Campaign – The Climate Justice Alliance (CJA) set up the Our 
Power campaign to bring climate justice and a just transition framework into the 
heart of intersectional grassroots organizing in the US at both the local and 
statewide level. CJA is “a collaborative of over 35 community-based and 
movement support organizations uniting frontline communities to forge a scalable, 
and socio-economically just transition away from unsustainable energy towards 
local living economies to address the root causes of climate change” 
(ourpowercampaign.org, 2016). The CJA is one of the most prominent coalitions of 
climate justice organizations in the US and also has a global presence represented 
at the annual UN climate talks. The CJA is a nation-wide coalition that organizes 
Indigenous, African-American, Latino, Asian, Pacific Islander, and working class 
communities around the principles of climate justice. It is deeply intersectional – 
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recognizing the importance of linking struggles of race, class, gender, food 
sovereignty and healthy environments. It launched the Our Power campaign to help 
bring the principles of climate justice into local organizing frameworks in the US. 
The campaigns stated goals are to “end the era of extreme energy” and to 
“implement a just transition to a local living economy” (ibid.). Espousing some of 
the key elements of climate justice, the Our Power campaign is 
creating transition pathways to end the era of extreme energy like 
fossil fuels, nuclear power, waste and biomass incineration, landfill 
gas, mega-hydro, and agrofuels, which pose extreme risks to 
human and ecosystem health, community resilience, economic 
equity and climate stability. This would reduce carbon emissions in 
line with what science says is necessary to avoid catastrophic 
climate change while preserving healthy local ecosystems and 
communities. (ibid.) 
 
The campaign is also particularly aware of the fact that more than simply ending 
extreme energy, it must also help establish an alternative; thus the just transition it 
works towards is one in which “in which 10 million good, green, and family-
supporting jobs are created for unemployed, and underemployed people, and 
workers formerly employed by extreme energy industries” (ibid.). Moreover, on a 
national scale they hope to help build a “climate jobs program” over the next five 
to ten years. Finally, their alternatives are rooted in local community and 
democratic control of resources. As they put it “Our re-localized economies will 
be ecologically grounded, produce community wellbeing, democratize decision-
making, and promote local control of resources” (ibid.). Climate justice therefore 
permeates every element of this campaign’s structure and it is an innovative and 
exciting new project that has enormous transformative potential. 
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 The Our Power Campaign is based on four founding principles. These principles 
are root cause remedies, ensuring that solutions proposed to the climate crisis are 
ones that respond to its systemic nature based on endless growth and profit 
maximization; rights, any solution proposed must respect and enhance the rights 
of indigenous people, women, humans and nonhumans, the right to self-
determination and so on; reparations, proposed solutions must recognize the 
responsibility of historically responsible for the joint crises humans now face 
while relations between those who have been most responsible and those least so 
must be repaired; and finally representation, solutions must ensure “that people 
will have directly democratic control over the decisions that affect their daily lives 
and that those who have been most victimized by the systems which got us here 
must lead the way to solutions” (ibid.).  
The Climate Justice Alliance has launched six pilot Our Power Campaigns in 
communities that are “key grassroots groups who are poised to take on the extreme 
energy interests while creating grassroots solutions for a just transition.” CJA’s 
resources are therefore focused on these six campaigns where shifting culture, 
politics and discourse towards climate justice solutions can act as a catalyst and 
example for similar shifts across the county. Ultimately the purpose of the Our 
Power campaigns is to bring a climate justice lens to community organizing in 
these strategically chosen communities, strengthen the coalitions already operating 
on the ground in these communities and develop models of just transitions that are 
tailored to each communities’ specific context (ibid.).  
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APEN and CBE “anchor” the Our Power campaign in Richmond. Summing up 
their work together in the city they write 
In the face of poverty and pollution, Richmond, California 
community members are on the frontlines of organizing to create a 
clean, democratic and equitable economy. This grassroots effort, 
driven by Richmond’s low-income communities of color, is leading 
Richmond out of the shadows of the Chevron Refinery into the 
sunlight of a resilient and thriving local clean energy future. (ibid.) 
 
They are rejecting the fossil fuelled extractive economy and, rooted in the needs 
of the community, they are reinforcing and to a certain extent reshaping, 
grassroots efforts to make the transition to a sustainable and more just way of life. 
With the sustained innovation and activism of Richmond’s local community 
organizers, along with a largely supportive city council, the Richmond community 
is making sustainability work for some of America’s poorest and most 
marginalized citizens. CBE organizer and RPA cofounder, Andrés Soto explains 
that the Our Power campaign helped bring a clear climate justice focus to 
organizing in Richmond. Moreover, the campaign has helped place Richmond on 
the national map of communities at the centre of confronting extreme energy and 
working towards a just transition model.  In this way, the campaign shows people 
in Richmond that they are not alone in this and that they are linked to 
communities around the country who are also engaging in the struggle. As Soto 
puts it, Our Power “creates collegiality and friendship that helps facilitate the 
movement” (Soto, 2016). Thus the Our Campaign is helping to strengthen and 
retool grassroots organizations already operating on the ground in Richmond.  
Soto says that this campaign is “not just showing the bad it also shows what 
people in Richmond are doing to create the good" (ibid.). It is in the Our Power 
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campaign and the broader systemic analysis it brings to community organizing 
that principles of climate justice in Richmond are really starting to emerge in a 
confident and consistent manner. This serves as an important reminder for climate 
justice communicators because it demonstrates how the global crisis must be 
internalized and rooted in local struggles– and indeed how local community 
organizing may in turn be mobilized to confront the global climate crisis. 
 
Part 2: Discursive Hegemony and the Struggle for Richmond’s Hearts and 
Minds 
 
In its early days the Standard Oil refinery employed most of the people who lived 
under its shadow and, while most refinery workers no longer reside in Richmond, 
it remains the city’s largest employer (Choy and Orozco, 2009; City of Richmond, 
2015). For some time this alone was enough to maintain its legitimacy. However, 
as demographics shifted and employment fell, the predominantly white working 
class community moved out of Richmond and Chevron found it important to 
impose its legitimacy through political cultural interventions that are pervasive 
throughout the city (Soto, 2016). This is partly because those who were most 
affected by Chevron’s pollution were no longer those receiving the benefits of its 
employment. As the history of the city shows, Chevron has donated millions of 
dollars to local charities, cultural events and civil society, not to mention the 
chamber of commerce and local councilors campaigns (Choy and Orozco, 2009). 
Furthermore, Choy and Orozco point out that Chevron has also tried “to drive a 
wedge between environmental justice and community groups and some very 
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important labor groups by claiming that many jobs were lost because of the halt 
on the expansion project” (2009, 44). In addition, Chevron (along with other 
business interests) have helped fund election campaigns for city council members 
and candidates like Nat Bates in return for legislation amenable to the company’s 
interests. Bates defended this relationship pointing to the funding that Chevron 
has devoted to “youth sports, programs for seniors and nonprofit organizations 
that operate in the city” (Johnson, 2014). In this way, covertly and largely 
unchallenged, Chevron (and before them Standard Oil) successfully maintained 
political and cultural dominance over the city for 100 years.  
 
Chevron’s refinery has placed the community’s health and well being at great risk. 
For nearly twenty-five years grassroots environmental justice organizations have 
been showing how this heightened risk is tied to the racial and economic 
inequalities that have also plagued the city. CBE, APEN and West Coast Toxics 
Coalition have demonstrated how the health risks disproportionately threaten low-
income people and people of color and how these communities see few benefits 
from the refinery located next to their homes. Of course this has generated a great 
deal of anger and resentment towards Chevron and the politicians who did its 
bidding. This anger is hardly a recent development – racial and income inequality 
is not new to the city, nor is the refinery itself, nor even is grassroots activism to 
upend some of these injustices. The question I think needs asking therefore is why 
now? What has changed in the city that has led to recent victories of Our Power, 
CBE, APEN and the communities they empower, over Chevron and its hegemonic 
neoliberal logic? To answer this question I will focus in more detail upon the 
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rhetoric and discursive interventions used in the 2014 November election that 
Chevron spent $3 million trying to influence yet experienced a decisive defeat. 
 
Richmond’s November Election 2014 
 
While there are drawbacks to focusing my analysis on a single local election 
result, I do see 2014 election in particular as highly indicative of a broader 
discursive shift that the Richmond Progressive Alliance and Our Power coalition 
partners have been able to generate. After the 2012 refinery explosion the city 
council and CBE sued Chevron for its negligence and the harm it had done to the 
Richmond. Naturally Chevron wanted councilors in office that, in Gayle 
McLaughlin’s words, would “settle for pennies.” McLaughlin explains 
that “[Chevron are] mad at us in the progressive movement because we stand up 
to them. We work with a mobilized community to make gains on our own behalf” 
(Moyers, 2014). Chevron had successfully defended itself in the elections directly 
after the 2012 fire but two years of community organizing around climate justice 
had rendered it even less trustworthy in the public’s eye. Recognizing the threat 
and an opportunity to subvert it in the 2014 city council elections, Chevron and its 
campaign expenditure committee, Moving Forward, launched coordinated attack 
on the Richmond Progressive Alliance and the grassroots organizers it works with 
(Soto, 2016).   
 
The city council election campaign in 2014 became a famous story in US national 
news. Chevron committed $3 million to the election campaign, buying up almost 
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every billboard in town, paying for television ads for the first time and spending 
heavily on canvassers and expensive flyers (Jones, 2014; Soto, 2016).  Chevron’s 
$3 million amounted to the company spending $72 per registered voter in 
Richmond (Baires, 2014). According to McLaughlin, never before has such a 
large amount of money been spent on a small local election (Moyers, 2014).  This 
alone makes the Richmond case study noteworthy. However, if the amount spent 
on the campaign was historic so too was the result. All of the Chevron-supported 
candidates were defeated and balance of power against Chevron’s influence 
increased to 6-1 on the council. The Green Party’s Mayor McLaughlin stood 
down after her tenure was up and was replaced by RPA ally Tom Butt. Five 
members of The Richmond Progressive Alliance were returned to office, 
including McLaughlin running as a council member. So how was such an unlikely 
victory achieved and more importantly what deeper and broader shifts does it 
suggest have occurred in the community?  
 
Discourse, Narrative and Framing Strategy 
 
An essential component of Our Power’s intervention has been to explicitly target 
Chevron’s influence in the city, to highlight it in the public imagination, and to 
present coherent, viable, and exciting alternatives to Chevron’s hegemony. They 
have led this intervention using story-based strategy. They are shifting discursive 
conditions by inserting new, compelling stories into the public imaginary and 
discussion. These stories have enormous power as they attach new meanings to 
the struggles Richmond’s residents currently face. From climate change to the 
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corruption of local democracy, Our Power and its allies have helped align these 
concerns into new coherent stories that bring the principles of climate justice into 
the hearts and minds of their audiences. Some excellent examples of climate 
justice stories like these were presented at a convergence that the Our Power 
campaign hosted in the city in the summer of 2014. The convergence was held in 
the summer prior to the November election and 450 delegates from across the 
country were present (Soto, 2016). At this convergence a great deal of space was 
given to the kind of stories Our Power campaigners could use to communicate 
climate justice in their communities. These were recorded and called the Our 
Power Stories (storify.com, 2014).  
 
Succinctly and poignantly, Mey Saechao, a member of APEN and a resident of 
the city tells a story all too familiar amongst Richmond’s residents. A shortened 
transcript appears below:  
I have lived in Richmond for thirty years and since 2005 my 
illnesses have gotten worse. I live very close to the Chevron rail so 
if there was an explosion I would be the first to one to go… After 
the Chevron explosion in 2012 I tried but I didn’t get the treatment 
I really needed…. Why can’t they leave dirty oil where it is? Here 
it harms and kills us… I am happy to be part of this movement so 
my children and grandchildren can have green jobs and healthier 
lives.” (ibid.) 
 
Stephanie Hervey, also a resident of Richmond and a member of CBE, recounts 
how she started working on climate justice and a just transition.  
When I got to Richmond and there was an explosion at Chevron, 
that’s when I realized that I had to do something about this, that I 
was not going to sit by and allow some big corporation to just 
pollute the air and walk away without remedy and without 
accountability and so that’s when I started to get involved with 
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Communities for a Better Environment... This Our Power 
campaign… gives us the opportunity to talk amongst each other 
about solutions… We need to feel confident that we have the 
answers within ourselves, that we don’t need anyone to tell us how 
to do this, we are in the front lines but we have a vision and so we 
also have a solution. (ibid.) 
 
Hervey gave an example of a community-owned garden in what is being called 
Richmond’s “Green Way” or Green Zone that is designed to protect Richmond’s 
low-income communities from food insecurity and pollution, foster community 
relationships and enhance food sovereignty.  
 
The Our Power stories were then paraphrased and turned into photos that could be 
reproduced and shared across the social media via Twitter, Instagram and 
Facebook. In one photo Mey Saechao stands smiling next to her quote 
superimposed on the image: “We live everyday on the frontlines of the climate 
crisis – with illness and danger of explosions… I am happy to be part of this new 
journey so my children and grandchildren can live a better, healthier life” (ibid.). 
Stephanie Hervey stands beside her quote capturing the essence of her own story: 
“We have the expertise and people power to create a sustainable future. We won’t 
wait, we are moving ahead and making a switch to a path where policy makers 
and corporations will soon follow” (ibid.). The Our Power stories were turned into 
memes that could be shared online. Reinsborough and Canning explain that 
“Memes can act as capsules for stories to spread virally through cultures” 
(Reinsborough and Canning, 2010, 36). In a similar way, stories such as these 
spread through culture and reframe the problems and the solutions. The format in 
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which these stories are presented through videos and images make them 
accessible, easy to communicate and transmit via the Internet. 
 
These stories focus in on two of the city’s major concerns: high unemployment 
and pollution. In this way the stories become almost universal. They are centered 
on the concerns of the community, told by community members, and engage with 
the values of the community. Moreover, they defy the “hegemonic jobs vs. 
environment” frame that neoliberal elites have sought to maintain with a new 
frame: “climate jobs.” In these stories healthy communities and meaningful 
employment is not an oppositional binary but are inherently bound together in 
fighting climate change, corruption, pollution and poverty. They present the good 
with the bad, showing that the situation is not hopeless. Hervey’s example of 
building a community garden in the Green Way seems so simple, yet it has 
restored community bonds, reduced dependency on fossil fuel consumption and 
provides healthy and cheap sources of food. Presenting the problem as Chevron 
and the politics it espouses, alongside positive alternatives like working towards 
accountability, democracy, health, employment and community makes combating 
the root causes of climate change seem not only urgent and necessary but also 
possible and exciting.  It is also important to notice that in these stories climate 
change itself is rarely mentioned, but rather some of its systemic causes are called 
out and confronted in ways that empower communities on the frontlines. Stories 
like these empower the community with local relatable storytellers making change 
seem possible and exciting as well as lowering the bar to taking action. 
Recounting stories like these during in the lead up to the election campaign was 
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an important part of the discursive shift now underway in Richmond. These 
stories continue to be told long after the election and are by no means limited to 
crass electioneering contexts. They are heartfelt, honest and hopeful stories that 
people tell not because they want to win elections because they are genuinely 
believe in them.  In addition, they are also excellent examples of new narratives 
that Richmond’s citizens have warmed to and strengthened through their votes in 
the 2014 election. 
 
In these stories Chevron is constructed as the source of Richmond’s problems and 
while that framing may not be entirely true, it has helped to tie Chevron to racial 
inequality and neoliberal extractivist ideology that certainly are determining 
factors in the struggles many of the city’s residents face.  Tying Chevron to 
threatening images and ones of corruption and greed made candidates’ 
relationships with the company hard to justify. Chevron and the extractivist 
politics it supports are becoming understood as one and the same, and candidates 
with the RPA and supported by the Our Power campaign have been eager to 
reinforce this conflation in the city’s popular imagination. 
 
The Our Power campaign and the RPA have been able to demonize Chevron’s 
activities in the city through a carefully constructed narrative that links Chevron to 
the extractivist economy that has made people sick (ourpowercampaign.com, 
2015). Meanwhile, Our Power has been experimenting with positive alternative 
models to Chevron’s status quo politics that RPA candidates have been eager to 
adopt, making them a more popular option.  In previous election campaigns the 
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link between Chevron and the candidates it supported had been less obvious and 
so the detrimental consequences of neoliberal extractivist ideology attached to 
Chevron weren’t necessarily associated with Chevron-supported candidates. In 
2014, however, Chevron’s massive financial backing of status quo neoliberal 
candidates almost proved their corruption and helped to frame the election 
campaign in favor of counterhegemonic groups. 
 
Our Power stories reinforced the notion that wealthy industries are seeking to buy 
political influence through their election spending.  As the election became a 
referendum on Chevron’s power over the city, every attack ad, and all the 
billboards and mailers that the Chevron-funded Moving Forward paid for, served 
the framing narrative that Chevron was leading a corporate coup to install 
business-friendly politicians (Prupis, 2014). In the meantime Chevron fell back 
upon the rather stale framing of environment vs. jobs. This framing was outdated 
not because jobs and livelihoods are not a concern in Richmond, but rather 
because the grassroots organizers successfully argued that few of the jobs that the 
Chevron refinery generates go to residents of the city and, moreover, that healthy 
communities and meaningful work are in fact two sides of the same coin (Rein, 
2012, 8). With very clear alternative models on the table that enhanced 
community health and employment the jobs vs. environment frame was less 
persuasive. Chevron may remain the city’s biggest employer but those numbers 
have decreased to just over one-point-eight-percent of the city’s total population 
(City of Richmond, 2015). As such, there are far fewer people Chevron can rely 
upon to trust in its jobs vs. environment frame. 
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A narrative that forces the dominant hegemons’s power into the open can be very 
effective in turning people against that hegemon (Selbin, 2010). Chevron has been 
forced into the open and in the context of election spending, proved itself to be 
untrustworthy. So exposing Chevron’s history in the city certainly helped frame 
the election and the political environment directly preceding and succeeding it as 
Chevron vs. the People – a frame that Chevron-supported candidates seemed 
unable to counter. However, there is much more to this victory than simply 
drawing Chevron into the open. The successful delegitimizing of Chevron’s 
candidates alone isn’t enough to explain recent discursive shifts. We must also 
look at the kind of alternatives the RPA promised and that Our Power now holds 
them to.  These are based fundamentally upon the principals of climate justice. 
They recognize the disproportionate impacts that fossil fuel extraction and climate 
change have on low-income communities and communities of color, and argue 
that leadership on solutions to the climate crisis, deeply engrained racism and 
structural inequality must come from the communities most affected. Alternative 
models, those based on climate justice and community that Our Power and its 
anchor organizations helped flourish prior to the election, provided promising 
examples that progressive candidates could point to and help scale up.  
 
Narrative Power Analysis of Our Power Stories 
 
As Reinsborough and Canning explain “narratives can often function as a glue to 
hold the legitimacy of power structures in place and maintain the status quo” 
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(Reinsborough and Canning, 2010, 21). The narratives that have begun changing 
discourse in Richmond have also helped delegitimize Chevron’s narratives and 
legitimize alternative models based on the principles of climate justice.  CBE 
helpfully sums up the story that the climate justice organizations in Richmond 
want to tell: “In the face of Chevron’s pollution, CBE and residents are creating a 
healthier Richmond by working towards a greener and more democratic local 
economy powered by renewable energy” (cbecal.org, 2016a). Many of the core 
elements of climate justice can be teased out from this shortened version of the 
new Richmond story.  Along with the rejection of fossil fuel infrastructure climate 
justice stories point to solutions that are led by the grassroots, where democratic 
empowerment is vital. This includes aspirations towards economic as well as 
political democracy and specifically community control over sustainable energy 
production. We find many of the values of the community reflected in these 
demands, and this is what makes them so potent. Even more excitingly, Our 
Power activists have shown how their messaging on climate justice is inherently 
linked to the values of Richmond’s residents and have successfully built a 
movement which addresses the climate crisis, the values of the community, and 
structural economic and racial inequality through a story that is itself ultimately 
about climate justice. 
 
Reinsborough and Canning write that “a narrative power analysis recognizes that 
humans understand the world and our role in it through stories, and thus all power 
relations have a narrative dimension” (Reinsborough and Canning, 2010, 20). 
Narrative power analysis understands that when it comes to storytelling it is 
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meaning and not truth that matters. For example, Chevron can empirically show 
that it remains the Richmond’s largest employer and thus the city remains 
economically dependent upon Chevron’s good will, yet the Our Power stories 
convey meaning that renders Chevron’s truth less important. We can use a 
narrative power analysis to expose the meaning conveyed through the stories that 
climate justice activists are telling in Richmond.  When applying a narrative 
power analysis to stories Reinsborough and Canning suggest focusing on five key 
elements of story: conflict, characters, imagery, foreshadowing, and assumptions 
(Reinsborough and Canning, 2010, 38-39). Story analysts must ask several 
questions as well: What is the conflict upon which the story rests? Who are the 
characters supposed to represent, are they relatable? How does the imagery 
engage with people’s values? What promises of the future does the narrative make 
about the resolution of the conflict? What are the underlying assumptions that 
must be accepted in order to believe the narrative is true? Applying these 
questions to the stories that Our Power campaigners are telling yields important 
insights into the meaning they convey and reasons for their popularity. 
 
Conflict: What is the Conflict Upon Which the Story Rests?  
As I have demonstrated the conflict that Richmond’s climate justice activists have 
successfully framed is one of Chevron and the politics it espouses vs. the people 
of Richmond. More specifically, it is about Chevron manipulating public opinion, 
corrupting local democracy and polluting the local community. As Chevron’s 
refinery is California’s largest stationary emitter of greenhouse gases, climate 
justice activists have added Chevron’s accountability for climate change into the 
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conflict as well. In this framing the people of Richmond must fight back against 
Chevron and protect their health, communities, democracy and climate. In doing 
so, the story goes, they can bring about a fairer, healthier, sustainable and 
democratic society – and these are all things worth fighting for. To get there, 
Chevron’s influence and its politics must be removed. The conflict is a compelling 
one with clear good guys and bad guys, an embattled community fighting for a 
better way of life, an adversary threatening their lives and livelihoods, and, in 
Hervey and Saechao’s very real lived experiences, the possibility of exploding 
trains and refineries and the struggle for something bigger than themselves.  
 
Characters: Who Are the Characters Supposed to Represent, Are They Relatable?  
Recognizing the human face of the conflict is essential. The characters are often 
the messengers communicating the moral or meaning of the story. As 
Reinsborough and Canning explain, “Messengers are just as important (if not 
more important) as the message itself because they embody the message.” Thus 
the characters in this conflict must be relatable people that audiences can 
empathize with, feel connected to and even rally around. The Our Power stories 
and the story of climate justice in Richmond are told by local residents and 
activists who understand, connect with and look like members of their 
community. They are not the hairy white hippies that so often get associated with 
environmentalism but really just like the rest of the community living and 
working in Richmond. Mey Saechao and Stephanie Hervey, for example, were 
neither alienating nor threatening but rather part of the community with a genuine 
concern for their community at the heart of their story. This not only gives 
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characters like Hervey and Saechao credibility amongst their audiences but also 
makes their understanding of the problem more accessible. Moreover, the actions 
they’ve taken derived from their articulation of the problem appear possible and 
exciting for others to replicate.  
 
The characters in this story are community members standing up to Chevron’s 
corruption and reclaiming power for themselves to build the solutions they deem 
necessary. These are the “good guys” and they are very relatable. Chevron, on the 
other hand, represents the “bad guys.” They are a faceless, monolithic corporation 
that has been dehumanized and indeed is framed as void of humanity. Chevron 
threatens the livelihoods and health of the people’s families today and their 
children’s security tomorrow. Furthermore, Chevron is made to represent an 
ideology that has caused so many of the problems that Richmond’s resident’s 
have experienced – from austerity to police brutality to respiratory illness. This 
makes it a target and an enemy against which the people of Richmond can rally 
and force out of the way so that they can reclaim decision making power over 
their own lives. Audiences are not supposed to empathize with Chevron but to rile 
against its presence in the city and the local politicians who support it. 
 
Imagery: How Does the Story’s Imagery Engage With the Audience’s Values and 
Allow Them to Come to Their Own Conclusions? 
If a story’s imagery is to work successfully it must help show the story’s moral or 
meaning rather than simply tell it. Moreover, imagery can help audiences come to 
understand the story’s meaning of their own accord. Our Power storytellers have 
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used this with great effect. To communicate the nature of the problem they use 
images like “bomb trains,” refinery explosions and the proximity of their homes to 
the refinery or the train tracks via which oil is transported to the refinery. For 
example, Mey Saechao and Stephanie Hervey both invoke the image of the 2012 
Chevron refinery explosion in their stories and talk about how it impacted their 
health or how it got them involved in community organizing. Saechao also 
expresses her anger and fear when she says “I live very close to the Chevron rail 
so if there was an explosion I would be the first to one to go.” The image of 
exploding trains and refineries speak for themselves, particularly as Richmond 
residents have experienced more than their fair share of refinery explosions and 
fires. The image it conjures is one that Richmond’s residents know well and are 
rightly concerned about. Similarly, the image of “bomb trains” carrying crude oil 
evokes a sense of danger and profound insecurity as trains transport their 
incendiary product into the heart of the community. Concerns about the impact of 
their proximity to the refinery on their health are communicated in these stories. 
Proximity and frontlines to this dangerous infrastructure becomes an important 
image too. The image of families living directly next to the refinery leading to 
children with respiratory illnesses also summons a powerful sense of anger and 
unfairness.  Ultimately they are intended to evoke emotional responses and a deep 
sense of injustice, which they do with chilling effectiveness. 
 
Climate justice campaigners must also use positive imagery around which people 
can rally and in which they can see their values reflected. The Our Power stories 
and climate justice activists in Richmond use imagery that taps into community, 
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ownership, security, meaningful employment, and being part of something bigger. 
“Climate jobs” is an excellent example of this imagery. These are jobs that do not 
negatively impact the health of the community or its environment, that are 
meaningful and secure, and that move the community onto a path towards greater 
democratic ownership of their workplaces, while shifting power away from the 
likes of Chevron. The image is one that does not repeat the jobs vs. environment 
frame but combines employment needs and environmental sustainability into part 
of the solution to current economic, political and environmental crises.  The idea 
of “community” itself is also a powerful image that inspires many. Community 
implies solidarity and a collective form of power that can be wielded to determine 
for themselves the circumstances under which Richmond’s residents live. 
Community also evokes ideas of friendship, peace and security. A sense of 
community was largely gutted from the city during years of austerity and 
corporate divestment from the city center. Restoring and reinforcing this sense of 
community is a powerful image that is worth striving for. Finally, the children and 
grandchildren of the city’s residents are an image that activists invoke to bring 
their message into the most intimate concerns of Richmond’s families. Mey 
Saechao concludes her story: “I am happy to be part of this movement so my 
children and grandchildren can have green jobs and healthier lives.” The 
invocation of children and providing them with a better life than their forebears 
helps tie the struggle for climate justice to parents’ desires to do right by their 
children. 
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Foreshadowing: What promises of the future does the narrative make about the 
resolution of the conflict? 
Inherent to these stories are promises of the future. Climate justice organizers are 
already experimenting with models that could replace the ideology, politics and 
economics that dominated the city under Chevron’s influence. These models help 
to foreshadow the future that climate justice activists want to help build alongside 
the city’s residents. Part of this envisioning of the future entails reclaiming power 
and democracy for the community as a whole. As Stephanie Hervey says, “We 
need to feel confident that we have the answers within ourselves, that we don’t 
need anyone to tell us how to do this, we are in the front lines but we have a 
vision and so we also have a solution.” An example of a community-led response 
is CBE’s Green Way or Green Zone that Hervey has helped work on. According 
to CBE “a Green Zone designation provides a local framework to protect the 
environmental and economic health of a community heavily affected by local 
pollution” (cbecal.org, 2016b). Green Zones can transform a community “from a 
highly polluted, economically depressed neighborhood into a vibrant area with 
green business practices, a healthier environment and a stronger economic future” 
(ibid.). In this example the jobs and environment frame is used to foreshadow a 
future in which the community is empowered and leads the transformation away 
from extractive economies towards new sustainable and equitable models. In 
Hervey’s Our Power story she says she is part of a community garden in 
Richmond’s Green Way and finds this empowering not just because she has cheap 
access to local healthy food or because it enhances food sovereignty and reduces 
dependency on out of town supermarkets, or even because it brings community 
	 162	
back into the city, but because it is a project that is led by and for the residents of 
Richmond.  
On the last day of the 2014 Our Power Convening in Richmond, organizers hosted 
a Day of Action to “amplify the grassroots-led solutions of Richmond and other 
communities on the frontlines of energy injustice and social injustice” 
(ourpowercampaign.org, 2014). They showed off the new models that community 
members had been pioneering, making a new way of doing things seem not only 
possible and accessible but also exciting and empowering. As the event 
description explains: 
Communities are taking action to directly meet their needs by 
creating jobs that foster healthy communities, by building up the 
local economy through clean community power, local food 
systems, worker cooperatives and strengthened housing rights, 
while addressing pollution, health, and safety issues at the Chevron 
refinery and in the community. (ibid.) 
The day was designed to be a material expression of the stories that Our Power 
has been cultivating in the city. At the beginning of the Day of Action attendees 
took part in “The March for a Just Transition,” starting at the Kinder Morgan rail 
yard, where oil-transporting trains enter the city, and towards the Green Way, 
where new sustainable and equitable models are being experimented with. The 
march was steeped in symbolism as community members marched away from 
what they perceived as the problem and towards solutions. The march helped to 
foreshadow a better and brighter future for the people of Richmond, or as the 
event organizers’ put it: “Together we can not only stop the expansion of 
dangerous, polluting refineries and pipelines, but begin a just transition away from 
fossil fuels and towards clean energy, good jobs, and healthy thriving 
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communities” (ibid.). Hervey’s story and the Day of Action are just two examples 
of the kind of foreshadowing that storytellers have used to rally Richmond around 
a vision of the future. In this way activists are prefiguring the alternatives they 
want to see and using this as a discursive device to make these alternatives appear 
accessible, credible and scalable. 
Assumptions: What are the underlying assumptions that must be accepted in order 
to believe the narrative is true? What do they tell us about the storyteller’s 
worldview and values? 
Understanding the assumptions upon which a story is based provides insight into 
the shared worldview and values that hold a group’s narratives together 
(Reinsborough and Canning, 2010, 40). In the Our Power stories some of the 
underlying assumptions that must be accepted in order to believe that the narrative 
is true are that access to meaningful employment, more democracy, healthier 
communities and greater sustainability are all worthwhile and should be strived 
for. If residents don’t value democracy, health, sustainability and jobs the Our 
Power stories may fall on deaf ears. It seems, however, that the community does 
care about these things and this is important because it makes communicating 
climate justice somewhat easier. It is unsurprising that people value these things 
but they have been turned into central issues by the city’s environmental justice 
organizations that have spent twenty-five years educating, organizing and working 
with people in Richmond to fight economic inequality, systemic racism and 
environmental degradation. Thus there was already a discursive opportunity 
structure set up that climate justice activists could rest their stories’ assumptions 
upon.  
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The assumptions upon which the conflict is premised reveal the potential for 
communicating climate justice across a set of shared values that goes beyond 
ideology or political preference. While they may not be values shared universally 
they do spread across time, space and politics. This is exciting because where 
these value-based assumptions are accepted climate justice can very easily be 
framed to fit into those values. Indeed, the community’s values reflect the 
principles of climate justice remarkably closely. Communicators just have to use 
framing that makes these shared values clear, and more importantly appear 
achievable. While respecting context and local specificity of placed-based 
struggles, this shows that there is also a high possibility that many of these climate 
justice stories can be transferable to other communities with similar struggles and 
values.6 
Stories that climate justice activists have told in Richmond have a compelling, 
plausible conflict, have relatable empathetic characters, are told by credible local 
storytellers, use imagery that shows the problem without the need for long 
explanations and that residents can easily engage with based on their own lived 
experiences. They also foreshadow a future and resolution to the conflict that 
involves and empowers the entire community and promises exciting, feasible 
alternative models to Chevron’s status quo politics. Finally, the assumptions that 
these stories are based on reflect not only the values of climate justice activists but 
of the community as a whole. All of this demonstrates that successful narratives 																																																								
6 At first this argument seemed like a tautology: climate justice narratives are successful because 
they reflect the values of climate justice. But actually we are finding that as communities construct 
their own climate justice narratives it is inevitable that the community’s values will be reflected in 
their stories. Climate justice communicators have to frame their narratives to ensure that those 
values are centered in the story. 
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must be deeply rooted in the community for whom they are intended and 
storytellers must have a profound connection to, or at the very least excellent 
understanding of, the community in which they are telling their stories. 
Recognizing and speaking to a certain set of values is therefore essential. 
Climate Justice and Community Values 
 
The Our Power stories connect with the values of their intended audiences and it 
is clear why – they are stories constructed by members of the community for 
members of that same community. Inevitably the concerns and values of the 
community are reflected in the stories they tell. Some of the obvious values that 
are shared across a large portion of the city are health, meaningful and sustainable 
livelihoods, and local democracy – these are all core elements of climate justice 
and a just transition, which means that when climate justice activists focus on 
these aspects of climate change in communities like Richmond they can more 
easily make climate justice fit into the frames and values of their audiences.  How 
activists have engaged with these shared values is worth examining in greater 
detail. 
 
Health  - The health threat to which Chevron’s refinery subjects the local 
community is, for the most part, something that the intended audience directly 
experiences. The health of the community and the risk that Chevron’s supporters 
place it in has been a key feature of climate justice activists’ framing. Health and 
the right to a healthy environment in which your children do not grow up with 
severe respiratory disorders is a value that these storytellers have engaged with 
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honestly and effectively. The Chevron refinery, and therefore Chevron itself, 
represents a direct threat to the health of the community. This claim was validated 
during the 2012 fire at the refinery, sending 15,000 people to hospital. This event 
has become something of a shared folk memory. Community organizers have 
worked to emphasize the direct link between Chevron’s refinery and high rates of 
asthma and respiratory difficulties in the city. In this way they have delegitimized 
many of Chevron’s candidates who want to help the company expand its refinery. 
 
Sustainable and meaningful employment – The struggle over who will provide the 
most and best jobs is another important feature of Richmond political discourse. 
Our Power campaigners have begun to win this fight. Chevron holds fewer and 
fewer employment opportunities for local residents while Our Power and the RPA 
are pushing for huge investments in community-owned sustainable energy and 
efficiency projects though projects like the Green Way. They also call for greater 
community involvement in the construction of new green jobs that allow residents 
to claim ownership over their work and livelihoods. They have shown how this 
approach has already created many jobs in the city and, with greater investment, 
can create many more. Additionally, it helps counter the jobs vs. the environment 
polemic, so climate jobs has been an important reframing of the local debate on 
Chevron’s role in the community that has combined values of health, jobs and 
equity. 
 
Democracy and self-determination – A prominent feature of the 2014 election was 
Chevron’s political spending. As the extent to which it had sought to buy the 
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election became clear, corruption and Chevron’s corrupting influence over local 
democracy became a very important hurdle that Chevron’s candidates failed to 
jump. Consequently, their credibility, connection to the community and 
trustworthiness were all called into question (Soto, 2016). Meanwhile, grassroots 
activists from the community were able to connect with their community’s values, 
while Chevron’s paid canvassers knew very little about the issues that most 
concerned Richmond’s residents (ibid.). As Soto caustically remarks “ the people 
prepared to run as Chevron candidates were terrible so it was a lot easier to defeat 
them than say a candidate who was articulate and intelligent and has something to 
offer” (ibid.).  Chevron’s candidates and the ideology they espoused no longer 
tapped into the values of the majority of Richmond’s population so voters were 
unlikely to believe that these candidates could honestly and accurately represent 
their concerns on the council. Moreover, RPA’s candidates promised community 
empowerment and self-determination while Chevron’s candidates promised more 
of the same failing status quo. As such, the grassroots organizers backed by Our 
Power and RPA won council seats by going door to door, going to all the 
community events, telling better stories and relying on the twenty-five years of 
community organizing that won the trust of Richmond’s residents (Parker, 2014). 
The backlash against Chevron’s  displacement and control of local democracy is 
indicative of a more widespread frustration with politicians taking money from 
corporate interests who then fail to represent the electorate. The stories that Our 
Power campaigners have told are about bringing democracy back under the 
control of local people. These stories reinforce their right to self-determination 
and to be at the heart of constructing solutions Richmond’s intersecting 
	 168	
oppressions. As an alternative to 100 years of stagnant politics, corruption and 
underrepresentation, greater democratic control over decisions guiding their lives 
is welcomed.  
 
Climate Change – Richmond’s residents are directly threatened by climate 
change. They are vulnerably to sea level rise and drought and campaigners have 
used these to bring the consequences of climate change home to Richmond (Soto, 
2016). However, as the threat is perceived to exist in the (admittedly very near) 
future rather than here and now, the climate crisis alone wasn’t enough to shift the 
balance of power in Richmond. Thus the Chevron refinery expansion plans 
provided a narrative device that helped align climate change concerns with calls 
for democracy, health and meaningful work into a coherent story. Meanwhile 
Chevron has been condemned for trying to “retrofit 33 existing refineries, 
construct five new ones, and build thousands of miles of new pipeline,” rather 
than shift to renewable energy (Choy and Orozco, 2009, 43). This opened up the 
opportunity for RPA candidates to champion community-owned renewable 
energy projects and investment in climate jobs that resonated far better with the 
values the Richmond community. Thus Chevron’s responsibility for greenhouse 
has emissions linked the Richmond local struggle for health and democracy to 
more far reaching discourses on climate justice.  
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Conclusion – The Local in Global and the Global in Local 
 
It is no exaggeration to say that the Richmond Progressive Alliance’s victory in 
the 2014 election was an expression of, and a result of, radically shifting the 
discursive conditions that the Our Power campaign and its anchor organizations 
helped to instigate. The Richmond case study shows how the Our Power 
campaign was able to bring climate justice discourses into the environmental 
justice organizations already operating on the ground in Richmond. This brought a 
more coherent vision of alternatives to Chevron’s neoliberal discourse and politics 
that was based on the principles of climate justice.  It also brought much needed 
resources and national recognition to the tireless efforts of environmental justice 
organizers over the past twenty-five years. The Our Power campaign brought to 
its coalition partners an explicitly climate justice-oriented framing and this has 
given local activists an opportunity to begin resting power away from Chevron 
and its hegemonic control of the city’s discursive and political structures. 
 
Furthermore, this case study demonstrates an presents example of where a global 
crisis manifests itself a local struggle and indeed the importance of local struggles 
in shaping the global response; the global appears in the local and local in the 
global (Darian-Smith, 2016). This is important for climate communicators to 
understand because it is essential that they are able to make climate change 
relevant to the specificity of different local communities. By targeting the refinery 
and Chevron’s attack on local democracy climate justice activists with Our Power 
and the RPA drew attention to climate change and exposed the global dimensions 
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of local environmental injustice, but then used climate justice solutions to lock the 
response to the global crises into local values, by drawing upon local discursive 
opportunity structures and values. In this way Richmond has become one of “the 
battlegrounds of this global struggle” (Choy and Orozco, 2009, 43).   
 
The stories that climate justice activists are telling have played an essential role in 
this effort. The stories they tell are about organizing communities to resist fossil 
fuel extraction and to fight for their land, water and sovereignty; they are about 
going after the real bad guys, and about finding your own stake in this fight. 
Ultimately they are about community, empowerment and hope. They allowed the 
community to believe that another world is not only possible but, in Arundhati 
Roy’s words, “is on her way.” Crucially, these stories relied upon local 
storytellers who were relatable and credible and deeply embedded in the 
community. They also engaged with values and concerns that were shared across 
the community and helped to reframe a stale jobs vs. environment narrative with 
one that emphasized the pursuit of meaningful work and healthy living spaces 
being inextricably linked. By connecting a story about Chevron and possible 
alternatives to its hegemony to the values of Richmond’s residents, climate justice 
activists operating in Richmond have won a victory that has global ramifications. 
Climate justice activists can learn a great deal from Our Power’s strategic 
narrative intervention that helped shift discourses and common sense in a city that, 
for so long, had been subject to Chevron’s hegemony. Richmond’s story is one 
that provides a glimmer of hope in the face of an Earth in crisis.  
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IV. Communicating Across Difference – Conclusions, Findings and 
Implications of Climate Justice Interventions in Climate Change Discourse 
 
My thesis has asked the question “How can the Climate Justice Movement 
successfully challenge hegemonic climate discourse while engaging with, and 
appealing to, a larger and more diverse array of audiences?” This research paper is 
ultimately about persuasion, communication and ethics but it recognizes that a 
fundamental question in the study of all of these is where does power lie? It has 
taken seriously the concept of cultural hegemony, interpreted as shaping and 
mediating common sense in any given society, and followed the example of 
theorists like Laclau and Mouffe, Gramsci, and DeLuca in pointing towards 
discourse as a crucial terrain of power and ideological struggle.  Intervening in 
discourse is one essential strategy to counter cultural hegemony, to shift common 
sense and to challenge prevailing structures of power. I have argued that with the 
era of climate change denial drawing to a close, a new struggle is beginning to 
emerge, one over the meaning of climate change and the appropriate responses to 
it. I have showed that the hegemonic, neoliberal approach is perceived to be 
inadequate and, as the Climate Justice Movement argues, fundamentally 
unethical. Climate justice activists around the world have responded by resisting 
fossil fuel infrastructure and communities on the frontlines of climate change and 
fossil fuel extraction and pioneering new energy and economic models. My case 
studies have covered two struggles where intervening in dominant neoliberal 
discourse has been a central component to challenging the fossil fuel industry and 
to reimagining an energy economy based on principles of equity, democracy and 
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horizontalism. I have claimed that Fossil Free UC and the Our Power campaign 
are two excellent models of the kind of discursive intervention developed in my 
literature review, which communicate through narrative and framing to engage 
with an audience’s values. 
 
In this closing chapter I will discuss the extent to which my case studies 
demonstrate the efficacy of discursive interventions based on Reinsborough and 
Canning’s story-based strategy and, moreover, whether they successfully 
challenge hegemonic climate discourse while engaging with, and appealing to, a 
larger and more diverse array of audiences. I will also examine some of the 
drawbacks and limitations of strategic discursive interventions in neoliberal 
climate discourse. Finally, I will open up a conversation pointed to by the findings 
of this research paper, discussing where I believe climate justice research must be 
targeted in the future: namely, forging solidarity across difference to build the 
largest, most powerful, social movement the world has ever seen. Here I ask 
whether discursive interventions, such as the ones described in this paper, can 
help build political cultures of opposition and creativity by communicating across 
very different sets of lived experiences and values and ultimately fashion forms of 
solidarity amongst them all. I conclude with a brief summary of what scholars and 
activists can learn from the strategies that this research has uncovered. 
 
How Effectively Do the Discursive Interventions Described in My Case Studies 
Challenge Hegemonic Climate Discourse While Engaging With, and Appealing 
to, a Larger and More Diverse Array of Audiences? 
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Deva Woodly succinctly and effectively explains the importance of discursive 
interventions. She says “the way movements communicate matters because 
changing public discourse changes power relations, and altered power relations 
change politics” (Woodly, 2015, 1). She goes on to claim that “a movement that 
effectively alters the terms of discourse can overcome considerable opposition and 
structural disadvantages to achieve sustained, meaningful change” (ibid.). This 
nicely sums up the argument I have sought to elaborate upon and defend 
throughout this thesis. Fossil Free UC and Our Power are campaigns that 
intervene in dominant neoliberal climate discourse to change what is politically 
acceptable as a response to climate change. Fossil Free does this by telling a story 
about the fossil fuel industry, singling it out and targeting it as “the enemy” in 
climate politics. Moreover, as Fossil Free has embraced a position more closely 
aligned with climate justice, this enemy has been constructed as a symptom of a 
broader systemic crisis. Despite the overwhelming influence and power that fossil 
fuel industry wields (and indeed has wielded to stamp out this story for decades), 
Fossil Free is successfully attaching a new meaning to climate change and is 
therefore helping reinforce new discourses about what the solutions to it should 
be. Our Power, meanwhile, intervenes directly in the struggle over climate 
solutions. Operating in a city blighted by Chevron’s pollution, Our Power, along 
with many other progressive organizations in Richmond, have rallied citizens 
around stories about reclaiming democracy, restoring community and demanding 
self-determination to lead the city out of dependency on Chevron and towards 
equitable, sustainable and democratic models of energy production and 
livelihoods. These stories led to a direct confrontation with the neoliberal politics 
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Chevron props up and against which the Richmond Progressive Alliance with its 
counterhegemonic politics won in the 2014 local elections. 
 
Both campaigns have used a form of story-based strategy to persuasively shift 
discursive conditions that reach a broad and diverse range of audiences. Our 
Power in Richmond has been making profound change at the local level, while 
Fossil Free UC, as part of the global fossil fuel divestment campaign has begun to 
shift meaning attached to climate change as publicly visible and credible 
institutions divest across the world. People understand and attach meaning to the 
world around them through stories, which in turn form discourses. Stories are 
therefore an important way of changing discourses and thereby countering 
hegemony. Through applying a narrative power analysis to each campaign it 
becomes clear that both Fossil Free and Our Power have used some form of story-
based strategy in their campaigns.   
 
Fossil Free is starting to undermine assumptions about climate change within 
dominant culture with a reframing narrative that shifts blame and guilt away from 
the individual and onto the fossil fuel industry and the politics/politicians that/who 
protect it. This reframing shows that climate change is not an apolitical 
phenomenon for which everyone is equally to blame but rather a result of a 
particular set of power dynamics. This mandates a very different set of solutions 
and lends legitimacy to the Climate Justice Movement. As more institutions divest 
Fossil Free’s frames and narrative are being accepted into public discourse and are 
changing the story around responses to climate change. This was evinced in many 
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of the articles that covered Fossil Free UC’s partial divestment victory as well as 
“Keep It In The Ground” rhetoric that is becoming very widespread and genuinely 
threatening the fossil fuel industry.  Each oil spill, news piece on a fossil fuel 
company’s corruption, each company bankruptcy or refinery explosion reinforces 
Fossil Free activists’ messages. Not without significant backlash, these messages 
gradually become accepted into public discourse and displaces dominant 
narratives about equally shared responsibility, changing consumption habits, and 
melting ice caps. 
 
The Richmond Our Power campaign operates differently in that its stories are 
embedded in the lived experiences of its storytellers and are reinforced as 
alternative models of energy economies are realized in the city. Thus there is a 
materiality to the Our Power campaign that is less obvious in fossil fuel 
divestment. Story-based strategy is just one (albeit essential) component of the 
campaign. Directly intervening in policy and experimenting with models based on 
climate justice feature alongside, and help to strengthen, the campaign’s 
discursive intervention. The stories Our Power campaigners tell are rooted in the 
community’s lived experience of the consequences of neoliberal politics that 
reinforced Chevron’s power grab, led to the pollution around their homes and 
sicknesses of their families. The stories reflect the values of the community for 
whom they were intended, and indeed, who constructed them. The storytellers 
were members of the community who spoke in the shared idioms and values of 
their community.  Our Power’s stories were about leading the way out of our 
contemporary politics and energy economy towards solutions that are sustainable, 
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democratic and equitable. They not only reflected the values of the community but 
also the principles of climate justice. This shows that climate justice campaigners 
do not have to radically alter their message but simply have to make it fit into the 
frames and values of their intended audiences (which, of course, is easier said than 
done). Furthermore, these stories were ones that RPA candidates spread, 
reproduced and built upon in several election campaigns. The narrative that Our 
Power’s stories challenged was one that propped up a stale binary of jobs vs. the 
environment. Proposing and actually building alternatives that proved that the 
community’s health and meaningful work could both be achieved undermined 
Chevron’s narrative. The efficacy of Our Power’s discursive intervention is 
demonstrated in the enormous success with which the RPA was able to topple 
Chevron’s decades-long hegemonic grip over city politics.  All of this has helped 
to construct a political culture of opposition and creativity that has drawn a highly 
diverse community into the principles of climate justice.  
 
Woodly writes that “social movements have their most lasting and permanent 
effect not though particular policy victories but instead by changing politics, 
redefining what is at stake and what can and ought to be about a politicized 
problem” (Woodly, 2015, 5). This is precisely what the Fossil Free and Our 
Power campaigns are currently doing. Fossil Free is rearticulating the meaning of 
climate change while the Our Power campaign is reshaping public perceptions of 
possible solutions to the crisis. Both of these are redefining what is at stake and 
what should be done about it. More than changing policy, they are changing 
politics. As such, they are two excellent examples of how climate justice activists 
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can intervene in hegemonic discourse with strategically constructed counter 
narratives to win legitimacy amongst larger and more diverse audiences. This 
strategy, however, is not without some limitations and drawbacks. 
 
What Are Some Drawbacks and Limitations of Discursive Intervention Strategies?  
 
In both of these case studies some drawbacks and limitations to story based 
strategy and movement strategies intervening in discourse became apparent. Some 
of the most important ones are discussed in the following section. First, discursive 
interventions alone are never enough, building political cultures of opposition and 
resistance must have an equally important material dimension as well. Secondly, I 
must respond to the critique that neither case study is intervening in climate 
change discourse but rather in neoliberal discourse without the climate change 
component. Thirdly, I will briefly explore whether intervening in neoliberal 
climate discourse might actually do more harm than good to the climate 
movement as whole. And finally, I will discuss a problem that activist 
communicators in both the Our Power campaign and Fossil Free have run into 
which is material access to media and resources in a hostile media environment. 
 
In his Prison Notebooks Gramsci writes of Wars of Position and Wars of 
Maneuver as two different components of counterhegemonic strategy. The War of 
Maneuver is an overt struggle for governmental or state power, often involving 
those of force, elections or both. The War of Position, meanwhile, is a struggle for 
legitimacy, for the hearts and minds, the battle over what passes for common 
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sense in any given society. My thesis is primarily concerned with struggles over 
shaping discursive conditions and, as such, describes a War of Position. However, 
the War of Position and the War of Maneuver were never meant to be separate 
entities but rather part of a continuum of struggle (Gramsci, 1977). It is true that 
the War of Maneuver has been under-emphasized in this thesis. This is because 
elsewhere in climate justice literature it is overemphasized, particularly with 
regards to winning specific policy concessions at the annual UN climate talks 
(Bond and Dorsey, 2011; Tokar, 2014; Doherty, 2006). I have written this thesis, 
in part, to refocus attention upon the winning of public acceptance and legitimacy 
for climate justice principles before taking them to neoliberal forums like the 
Conference of the Parties, which is fundamentally hostile to climate justice.  It 
would also be unfair to suggest that this paper has completely ignored policy 
interventions. One purpose of Fossil Free, for example, is to establish political 
cover for politicians to distance themselves from the influence of fossil fuel 
industry lobbyists and legislate for more meaningful climate policy (McKibben, 
2012). Additionally, the Our Power campaign built up a discourse that RPA’s 
candidates were able to take advantage of and thereby win control of the city 
council. These councilors are now instituting policy that reinforces and facilitates 
the creation of alternative economic and energy models based on climate justice 
(Moyers, 2014). Thus the Wars of Positions, the struggles over discursive 
conditions, described in this thesis have direct policy implications and 
consequences for Wars of Maneuver. 
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Secondly, I must respond to the possible critique that my case studies are only 
intervening in neoliberal discourse but not hegemonic climate discourse. 
Throughout both case studies I have sought to show otherwise, but I want to 
address this critique more explicitly in the following paragraphs. Fossil Free seeks 
to shift contemporary climate discourse by targeting the fossil fuel industry. 
Therefore much of its intervention may seem as though it is confronting the 
neoliberal politics that prop up the industry rather than the neoliberal approach to 
climate change. In fact it is doing both. Fossil Free very obviously and directly 
challenges the politics that fossil fuel companies benefit from and support, but in 
its confrontation with the fossil fuel industry, Fossil Free lays out the framework 
for a broader critique of an ideology that positions individual consumption habits 
as both the cause and solution to climate change. This position is deeply engrained 
in the neoliberal approach to climate change (Al Gore’s solutions at the end of An 
Inconvenient Truth provide no better example) but it is one that fossil fuel 
divestment confronts by specifically targeting fossil fuel industries and the system 
it benefits from, rather than individual consumption habits. 
 
Similarly, in targeting Chevron it may appear that the Our Power campaign and 
Richmond’s environmental justice activists are not intervening in neoliberal 
climate discourse but rather a single company’s narratives that have maintained its 
legitimacy in a single city. Moreover, the “jobs vs. environment” frame that 
climate justice campaigns have helped undermine is one that ecomodernists and 
eco-neoliberals also fundamentally reject – after all green growth is their ultimate 
goal. This points to a messiness within neoliberal discourses that pits traditional 
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neoliberals against ecomodernists, as the former maintain and reproduce the fossil 
fuel industry’s power and the latter would prefer a form of green capitalism. This 
tension reveals the false promises of eco-neoliberalism tied to corporate elites, 
which despite their purported commitment to free markets will not allow the fossil 
fuel industry to fail.  All that said, it is also important to look at Our Power’s 
solutions to see where the direct confrontation with neoliberal climate politics lies. 
The “climate jobs” that Our Power campaigners are fighting for are very different 
to those that would exist under an ecomodernist framework. They empower the 
community, give them control over energy production and would require a lot of 
regulation to ensure they remained equitable and sustainable. It is more than 
conceivable that the prospect, and indeed realization, of solar energy cooperatives 
has inspired the Richmond community far more than, for example Tesla’s 
gigafactory for electric cars in Reno, Nevada where General Motors’ workers 
went on strike in March 2016 (Gordon-Bloomfield, 2016). In ways like this Our 
Power’s radically democratic approach to energy production and climate politics 
has helped to counter eco-neoliberal climate discourse in Richmond. 
 
Thirdly, I must address the claim that a critical intervention in neoliberal climate 
discourse at this stage might be counterproductive. After all, neoliberal elites have 
finally agreed that it is time to do something about climate change and trying to 
push solutions in a direction that contradicts neoliberal hegemony might force 
elites back into climate denial. Implied in this claim is the belief that climate 
change is too big a threat to politicize, that once climate change is dealt with we 
can start talking about social justice. In some ways it is a compelling argument but 
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what it really means is that to ensure climate change is actually dealt with we must 
allow eco-neoliberals to solve the crisis on their terms and be grateful that they 
did. This aligns with the position many climate change communicators take when 
they call on climate change activists to frame the crisis to appeal to conservative 
values (Corner, 2012; Christensen, 2015; Marshall, 2014). 
 
As I showed in my literature review climate change is already a politicized 
category and to deny this is to ignore oppressive relations of power that mean that 
climate change and proposed neoliberal solutions negatively and 
disproportionately impact low income people and people of color worldwide. If 
the solutions to climate change entrench and reproduce the systems and 
oppressions that led to it in the first place they are not only unethical but also 
likely to fail. The Carbon Tracker report shows that eighty-percent of fossil fuels 
must remain below ground and unburned to maintain a reasonable chance of 
climate stability (Carbon Tracker, 2012). Meanwhile, Kevin Anderson shows that 
remaining below two degrees will require emissions cuts of ten-percent year on 
year from now until 2050 and argues that the rate of technological innovation 
simply can’t keep pace with mandated emissions cuts and the economic growth 
model (Anderson, 2012). Annie Leonard, Larry Lohmann, Patrick Bond and 
Michael Dorsey have all demonstrated the failures and injustices of carbon 
markets and offsets as well (Leonard, 2009; Lohmann, 2010; Bond and Dorsey, 
2011). The COP 21 agreement, a milestone in international climate policy, is 
nonbinding and at current commitments ensures warming of at least three degrees. 
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Neoliberal economics and politics can’t solve the crisis so to pretend that they can 
is the truly counterproductive avenue.  
 
Finally, I want to address an important limitation of discursive interventions: 
access to media and resources in a hostile media environment. Counterhegemonic 
agents will almost always face heavily unbalanced access to media compared to 
their adversaries (Quiroz, 2013). As such, it is hard for stories to be 
communicated to larger and more diverse audiences. Both case studies displayed 
this limitation. For example, after the partial UC divestment announcement, Fossil 
Free UC activists found it difficult to control their message once media outlets in 
the public sphere picked it up. Disciplined messaging, well-trained spokespeople 
and narrative and strategic framing only got them so far. The University of 
California and the fossil fuel industry, however, have far greater access to 
mediators of discourse. The UC’s Chief Investment Officer had his message 
repeated at the top of almost every article and his message even shaped many of 
the articles’ headlines. The Guardian and Democracy Now! have been 
consistently supportive of Fossil Free and have used its frames and narratives but 
these are media outlets that do little to reach beyond the choir to engage with a 
larger and more diverse set of audiences. 
 
With the help of the Richmond Progressive Alliance and twenty-five years of 
environmental justice activism prior to it, the Our Power campaign had slightly 
more access to local resources and media. Nevertheless, Chevron consistently 
outspends RPA candidates and in 2014 it bought up almost every billboard in the 
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city of Richmond and spent heavily on television ads (Soto, 2016). The RPA 
raised about $120,000 for all their candidates, while Chevron raised and spent at 
least $3 million to get its message heard (ibid.). As I’ve shown this ultimately 
wasn’t enough for Chevron to maintain its credibility but it does demonstrate the 
disproportionate access to media and resources that hegemonic forces have. 
Clearly activists are still at a disadvantage when it comes to discursive 
interventions.  
 
In Echoing Justice, Quiroz argues that “To win front end framing victories, local 
communities need media rules that keep media platforms accessible, affordable, 
and accountable, and communications strategies that engage the methodologies of 
organizing and create the cultural environment for political change” (Quiroz, 
2013, 4).  However, these are unlikely to come about anytime soon. What has 
emerged, however, is access to social media and blogging that can act as a leveler 
of the playing field. It is by no means equal because those with institutional access 
to power and resources can still buy more space on the Internet but not nearly to 
the extent that they have in traditional media. Activists with Fossil Free and Our 
Power have very successfully used social media to their advantage. 
 
 
 
 
	 184	
Can Interventions in Discourse Help Build Counterhegemonic Political Cultures 
of Opposition and Creativity by Communicating Across Difference and Forging 
Transcendent Solidarities?  
In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Laclau and Mouffe write: “Our central 
problem is to identify the discursive conditions for the emergence of a collective 
action, directed towards struggling against inequalities and challenging relations 
of subordination” (Laclau and Mouffe, 2014, 137). My thesis and its case studies 
have responded to this problem in the context of climate justice communications 
that intervene in and change discursive conditions. However, this thesis stopped 
short of illustrating how exactly shifting discursive conditions may lead to the 
emergence of collective action.  Further research on whether and how climate 
justice activists can shift discursive conditions to build the kind of solidarities that 
transcend political, cultural, ideological or simply strategic differences, and that 
are necessary for collective action, is urgently needed. I open this conversation 
because I think it is where my research directly leads. I don’t have answers to this 
problem but based on the research in this thesis, I will briefly suggest a possible 
avenue of thought that may prove productive. Bringing together Foran’s poltiical 
cultures of opposition and ceativity and Giles’ Gunn’s “Cosmopolitan Challenge” 
yields fruitful results.  
 
As I discussed in my literature review, John Foran has developed an analytical 
category he calls Political Cultures of Opposition and Creativity (PCOCs) and 
argues that these are an essential component of radical social change. 
Constructing the largest and most diverse PCOCs the world has ever seen is 
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therefore a crucial part of social movement building in the 21st Century (Foran, 
Ellis, and Gray, forthcoming) Laclau and Mouffe provide insight as they discuss 
how counterhegemonic “political spaces” (what Foran calls PCOCs) can attract a 
large and diverse range of movements, campaigns, theories of change, and people. 
They argue for “The rejection of privileged points of rupture and the confluence 
of struggles into a unified political space, and the acceptance on the contrary, of 
the plurality and indeterminacy of the social” (Laclau and Mouffe, 2014, 136). If 
the Climate Justice Movement is to grow and nurture PCOCs they may have to 
reject the temptation to position climate change as the single most important 
“point of rupture” and instead accept a plurality of struggles, strategies, ideologies 
and values to build solidarity across counterhegemonic movements. The Our 
Power campaign did this particularly well when emphasizing the community’s 
health, self-determination, and access meaningful work over climate change per 
se. 
 
Paul Routledge has produced exciting and innovative work on what he calls 
Translocal Climate Justice Solidarities. As he writes: 
A key issue concerning the forging of meaningful solidarities is how 
the network’s [of different counterhegemonic movements] 
‘imaginary’ is visualized and developed at the grassroots: how to 
construct senses of shared (or ‘tolerant’) identities concerning 
climate justice amongst very different place-based communities. 
This will require the co-recognition and internalization of others’ 
struggles in a global community. (Routledge, 2011, 392)  
 
As part of a global counterhegemonic network of movements the CJM must 
articulate common ground across counterhegemonic struggles, across different 
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lived experiences and values, and across very different geographic localities. 
Meanwhile, it must also avoid privileging its points of rupture, i.e. capitalism and 
climate change, over those of other counterhegemonic struggles. This could help 
build PCOCs with the power necessary to confront, and model alternatives to, 
neoliberal hegemony. 
 
Of course, this is all so much easier said than done. Gunn understands this well 
when he writes, “People not only seem to prefer their own values to the values of 
others but appear to be able to maintain their own values too often at the expense 
of disparaging and frequently demonizing the values of others” (Gunn, 2003, 
316). Climate justice for climate justice activists is the most important point of 
rupture imaginable, and truly embracing and understanding the struggle of another 
counterhegemonic group or even the values of a community that has a very 
different set of concerns to those of the movement is a very difficult task.  
However, Gunn has helped theorize a way forward that involves communicating 
across difference. He argues that new cross cultural understandings can be 
formed, and bridges built, through learning to put ourselves in what is possible to 
understand about another’s place or position: 
The first step, which can be called interpretation, entails… figuring 
out, as best one can with the limitation one has, what that other mind 
is essentially up to, or about, or desires. The second step, which can 
be called translation, involves a conversion of the principles, 
purposes, and practices of that other mind back into the idioms of 
one’s own… The third step, called appropriation, is the most 
difficult because it requires an assessment of how such translations 
challenge one’s previous understanding and internal adjustment must 
be made as a consequence. (Gunn, 2014, 434) 
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Placing yourself in someone else’s shoes may seem like an obvious first step but it 
is rarely practiced. Learning and understanding, as far as is possible, what 
motivates others, and speaking in those terms, is vital to the formation of large 
and diverse counterhegemonic political cultures. All this, I think, depends on 
discursive conditioning and framing that can bring different groups into PCOCs 
while maintaining their own identity and struggles. This practice should extend 
not only to other counterhegemonic groups but also to the specific audiences that 
movement communicators are trying to reach.  
 
 The CJM needs to create the discursive conditions for solidarity amongst 
counterhegemonic movements that can confront neoliberal forces with collective 
action. In recognizing that climate change impacts people of color, women, and 
lower income people first and hardest, it is already doing this. The Our Power 
campaign provides a good example. Our Power communicators speak in idioms 
that their intended audiences understand and relate to. Moreover, they appeal to 
the values of their audiences while connecting those values to climate justice. In 
this way they have successfully built a diverse PCOC in Richmond. Fossil fuel 
divestment, meanwhile, has developed a language and a narrative that appeals to 
everyone from anarchists to the governor of the Bank of England.  Furthermore, 
Corrie Ellis’ doctoral research on resistance to fracking in Idaho suggests that the 
principles of climate justice can be framed to appeal to values that transcend 
conservative and left wing ideologies (Ellis, 2016). Confronting pollution that 
threatens the health of your family is not necessarily a left wing or conservative 
value, nor is demanding greater self-determination and control over decisions that 
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guide your life, nor is securing meaningful sustainable employment, nor even is 
protecting your livelihood from drought or flooding, but they are all powerful 
motivating forces that can join people together despite their differences. Finally, 
while climate justice does confront capitalism and in this way will alienate 
conservatives, it does not have to be framed as an anti-capitalist movement in 
order to speak to a shared set of values and goals. Forging solidarity that 
transcends these categories is both possible and crucial but more research is 
necessary to understand precisely how. 
 
 
Conclusion: What Can Scholars, Activists and Scholar-Activists Learn From the 
Movement Strategies Discussed in This Paper?  
 
As my two case studies demonstrate, many communication strategists in the 
Climate Justice Movement are already experts in the strategies I have discussed. 
Indeed they are the ones who have written about and explained these strategies to 
me. I began my research thinking I might have something to offer the movement 
in return for the opportunity to study and participate in it. While this research may 
help some activists see a coherent picture of the work they have achieved so far, 
my research has largely been playing catch up to their achievements. I think the 
findings I have to offer so far are more useful to scholars of counterhegemonic 
social movements in academia. 
 
 I have argued that climate change communication scholars and scholar-activists 
must be more sensitive to relations of power and should be wary of conservative 
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framings on climate change. I have shown that discourse and hegemony are 
important terrains of struggle for the CJM and that these have been undertheorized 
in climate justice scholarship. I have found that story-based strategy is a very 
successful method of discursive intervention that can help reframe climate change, 
attach new meaning to it, and fit climate justice into the values of a large and 
diverse range of audiences. The Fossil Free UC and Our Power campaigns are 
both excellent examples of how climate justice campaigns can intervene in and 
change discourse on climate change through story-based strategy. Finally, I have 
learned that successful climate justice communications depends upon an acute 
understanding of their intended audience, that storytellers and communicators 
must “speak in” the values of their audiences, and that the messenger matters as 
much as the message and should be a credible figure amongst the audience for 
whom climate justice messaging is intended.  
 
It is my great hope that further research will be devoted to the counterhegemonic 
discursive strategies discussed in this thesis and that these will be deployed to help 
build solidarity and to grow the largest, most powerful, most diverse, most 
emancipatory, most democratic, most hopeful, most joyfilled movement the world 
has ever seen. Confronting the crises of our times demands nothing less. 
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